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Profile: Julian Fink (Universität Bayreuth, CSMN (Oslo), Slovak Academy of Sciences)
  1. Julian Fink (2014). A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'. Erkenntnis:1-33.
    The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree (...)
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  2. Julian Fink (2013). What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning? Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.
    This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the (...)
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  3. Carolyn Benson & Julian Fink (2012). Introduction: New Perspectives on Nazi Law. Jurisprudence 3 (2):341-346.
    It is beyond doubt that the legal system established by the Nazi government in Germany between 1933-1945 represented a gross departure from the rule of law: the Nazis eradicated legal security and certainty; allowed for judicial and state arbitrariness; blocked epistemic access to what the law requires; issued unpredictable legal requirements; and so on. This introduction outlines the distorted nature of the Nazi legal system and looks at the main factors that contributed to this grave divergence.
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  4. Carolyn Benson & Julian Fink (2012). Legal Oughts, Normative Transmission, and the Nazi Use of Analogy. Jurisprudence 3 (2):445-463.
    In 1935, the Nazi government introduced what came to be known as the abrogation of the pro- hibition of analogy. This measure, a feature of the new penal law, required judges to stray from the letter of the written law and to consider instead whether an action was worthy of pun- ishment according to the ‘sound perception of the people’ and the ‘underlying principle’ of existing criminal statutes. In discussions of Nazi law, an almost unanimous conclusion is that a system (...)
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  5. Julian Fink (2012). The Function of Normative Process-Requirements. Dialectica 66 (1):115-136.
    This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree (...)
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  6. Julian Fink (2011). Are All Actions Movements of the Agent's Body? Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 24:52-64.
    Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading 'movements', in 'all actions are bodily movements', transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to contradict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.
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  7. Julian Fink (2011). Are There Process-Requirements of Rationality? Organon F 18 (4):475-88.
    Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evalu- ates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction- based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based definition of state- and pro- cess-requirements. However, a (...)
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  8. Julian Fink (2010). Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
    Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, (...)
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  9. Julian Fink (2007). Is the Right Prior to the Good? South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):143-149.
    One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situa- tions, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action's rightness. This indicates that (...)
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