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  1. Julian Kiverstein (ed.) (forthcoming). Philosophy of the Social Mind. Routledge.
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  2. Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina (forthcoming). Do Sensory Substitution Extend the Conscious Mind? In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness". Amsterdam: John Benjamins. John Benjamins.
    Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be «yes » to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009) a founder and (...)
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  3. Julian Kiverstein, Mirko Farina & Andy Clark (forthcoming). Substituting the Senses. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Sensory substitution devices are a type of sensory prosthesis that (typically) convert visual stimuli transduced by a camera into tactile or auditory stimulation. They are designed to be used by people with impaired vision so that they can recover some of the functions normally subserved by vision. In this chapter we will consider what philosophers might learn about the nature of the senses from the neuroscience of sensory substitution. We will show how sensory substitution devices work by exploiting the cross-modal (...)
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  4. Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.) (2013). Decomposing the Will. OUP USA.
    There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.
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  5. Julian Kiverstein (2012). The Meaning of Embodiment. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (4):740-758.
    There is substantial disagreement among philosophers of embodied cognitive science about the meaning of embodiment. In what follows, I describe three different views that can be found in the current literature. I show how this debate centers around the question of whether the science of embodied cognition can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, which I will label body functionalism, takes the body to play the functional role of linking external resources for problem solving with internal biological machinery. (...)
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  6. Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.) (2012). Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
  7. Julian Kiverstein (2011). Social Understanding Without Mentalizing. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):41-65.
    The standard view in philosophy and psychology claims that mentalizing is necessary and sufficient for social understanding. Mentalizing (also known as “mindreading”) is the name given to the cognitive capacities humans employ in explaining and predicting their own and other’s actions. The standard view is rejected by philosophers working in the phenomenological tradition. They have argued that mentalizing is neither necessary nor sufficient for social understanding. They suggest instead that most of the time we understand each other through what Shaun (...)
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  8. Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina (2011). Embraining Culture: Leaky Minds and Spongy Brains. Teorema - Special Issue Dedicated to the Extended Mind.
    We offer an argument for the extended mind based on considerations from brain development. We argue that our brains develop to function in partnership with cognitive resources located in our external environments. Through our cultural upbringing we are trained to use artefacts in problem solving that become factored into the cognitive routines our brains support. Our brains literally grow to work in close partnership with resources we regularly and reliably interact with. We take this argument to be in line with (...)
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  9. Julian Kiverstein (2010). Consciousness and the Feeling Body. Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):607-616.
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  10. Julian Kiverstein (2010). Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):155-181.
    Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must (...)
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  11. Julian Kiverstein (2010). No Bootstrapping Without Semantic Inheritance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):279-280.
    Anderson's massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) takes the grounding of meaning in sensorimotor behaviour to be a side effect of neural reuse. I suggest this grounding may play a much more fundamental role in accounting for the bootstrapping of higher-level cognition from sensorimotor behaviour. Thus, the question of when neural reuse delivers semantic inheritance is a pressing one for MRH.
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  12. Julian Kiverstein (2010). Sensorimotor Knowledge and the Contents of Experience. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 257--274.
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  13. Edoardo Zamuner & Julian Kiverstein (2010). Could Embodied Simulation Be a by-Product of Emotion Perception? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):449 - 449.
    The SIMS model claims that it is by means of an embodied simulation that we determine the meaning of an observed smile. This suggests that crucial interpretative work is done in the mapping that takes us from a perceived smile to the activation of one's own facial musculature. How is this mapping achieved? Might it depend upon a prior interpretation arrived at on the basis of perceptual and contextual information?
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  14. Christine Falter, Valdas Noreika, Julian Kiverstein & Bruno Mölder (2009). Concrete Magnitudes: From Numbers to Time. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (3-4):335-336.
    Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) present convincing evidence indicating the existence of notation-specific numerical representations in parietal cortex. We suggest that the same conclusions can be drawn for a particular type of numerical representation: the representation of time. Notation-dependent representations need not be limited to number but may also be extended to other magnitude-related contents processed in parietal cortex (Walsh 2003).
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  15. Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Julian Kiverstein (2009). Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action. Topoi 28 (1):63-73.
    This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...)
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  16. Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (2009). Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many? Topoi 28 (1):1-7.
  17. Julian Kiverstein (2008). Bewusstsein, minimales Selbst und Gehirn. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
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  18. Julian Kiverstein (2008). Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
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  19. Julian Kiverstein (2008). La Conscience, le Soi Minimal Et le Cerveau. Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
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  20. Julian Kiverstein (2008). Wittgenstein, Qualia, and the Autonomy of Grammar. In David K. Levy & Edoardo Zamuner (eds.), Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments. Routledge.
     
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  21. Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (2008). Bootstrapping the Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):41-58.
    After offering a brief account of how we understand the shared circuits model (SCM), we divide our response into four sections. First, in section R1, we assess to what extent SCM is committed to an account of the ontogeny and phylogeny of shared circuits. In section R2, we examine doubts raised by several commentators as to whether SCM might be expanded so as to accommodate the mirroring of emotions, sensations, and intransitive actions more generally. Section R3 responds to various criticisms (...)
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  22. Andy Clark & Julian Kiverstein (2007). Experience and Agency: Slipping the Mesh. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):502-503.
    Can we really make sense of the idea (implied by Block's treatment) that there can be isolated islets of experience that are not even potentially available as fodder for a creature's conscious choices and decisions? The links between experience and the availability of information to guide conscious choice and inform reasoned action may be deeper than the considerations concerning (mere) reportability suggest.
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  23. Julian Kiverstein (2007). Could a Robot Have a Subjective Point of View? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):127-139.
    Scepticism about the possibility of machine consciousness comes in at least two forms. Some argue that our neurobiology is special, and only something sharing our neurobiology could be a subject of experience. Others argue that a machine couldn't be anything else but a zombie: there could never be something it is like to be a machine. I advance a dynamic sensorimotor account of consciousness which argues against both these varieties of scepticism.
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  24. Joshua Knobe, Dingmar Van Eck, Susan Blackmore, Henk Bij De Weg, John Barresi, Roblin Meeks, Julian Kiverstein & Drew Rendall (2005). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):785 – 817.
  25. Julian Kiverstein (2004). Lilian Alweiss, The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (1):3-5.