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Profile: Julien Murzi (Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München, University of Kent at Canterbury)
  1. Luca Incurvati & Julien Murzi (forthcoming). Maximally Consistent Sets of Instances of Naive Comprehension. Mind.
    Paul Horwich (1990) once suggested restricting the T-Schema to the maximal consistent set of its instances. But Vann McGee (1992) proved that there are multiple incompatible such sets, none of which, given minimal assumptions, is recursively axiomatizable. The analogous view for set theory---that Naïve Comprehension should be restricted according to consistency maxims---has recently been defended by Laurence Goldstein (2006; 2013). It can be traced back to W.V.O. Quine(1951), who held that Naïve Comprehension embodies the only really intuitive conception of set (...)
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  2. Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara (forthcoming). Paradox and Logical Revision. A Short Introduction. Topoi:1-8.
    Logical orthodoxy has it that classical first-order logic, or some extension thereof, provides the right extension of the logical consequence relation. However, together with naïve but intuitive principles about semantic notions such as truth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity and other naïve logical properties, classical logic quickly leads to inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since the publication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth , an increasingly popular diagnosis has been to restore consistency, or at least non-triviality, by (...)
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  3. Julien Murzi & Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Validity and Truth-Preservation. In D. Achourioti, H. Galinon & J. Martinez (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth Springer. Springer.
    The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...)
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  4. Julien Murzi (2014). The Inexpressibility of Validity. Analysis 74 (1):65-81.
    Tarski's Undefinability of Truth Theorem comes in two versions: that no consistent theory which interprets Robinson's Arithmetic (Q) can prove all instances of the T-Scheme and hence define truth; and that no such theory, if sound, can even express truth. In this note, I prove corresponding limitative results for validity. While Peano Arithmetic already has the resources to define a predicate expressing logical validity, as Jeff Ketland has recently pointed out (2012, Validity as a primitive. Analysis 72: 421-30), no theory (...)
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  5. Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara (2014). Denial and Disagreement. Topoi:1-11.
    We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A by denying A. We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only. Hence, it can’t be expressed in the glut theorist’s language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can’t be expressed in such a (...)
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  6. Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara (2014). More Reflections on Consequence. Logique Et Analyse 227:223-258.
    This special issue collects together nine new essays on logical consequence :the relation obtaining between the premises and the conclusion of a logically valid argument. The present paper is a partial, and opinionated,introduction to the contemporary debate on the topic. We focus on two influential accounts of consequence, the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic, and on the seeming platitude that valid arguments necessarilypreserve truth. We briefly discuss the main objections these accounts face, as well as Hartry Field’s contention that such objections (...)
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  7. Jc Beall & Julien Murzi (2013). Two Flavors of Curry Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.
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  8. Richard Dietz & Julien Murzi (2013). Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):403-427.
    John MacFarlane has recently presented a novel argument in support of truth- relativism. According to this, contextualists fail to accommodate retrospective reassessments of propositional contents, when it comes to languages which are rich enough to express actuality. The aim of this note is twofold. First, it is to argue that the argument can be effectively rejected, since it rests on an inadequate conception of actuality. Second, it is to offer a more plausible account of actuality in branching time, along the (...)
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  9. Julien Murzi & Florian Steinberger (2013). Is Logical Knowledge Dispositional? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):165-183.
    In a series of recent papers, Corine Besson argues that dispositionalist accounts of logical knowledge conflict with ordinary reasoning. She cites cases in which, rather than applying a logical principle to deduce certain implications of our antecedent beliefs, we revise some of those beliefs in the light of their unpalatable consequences. She argues that such instances of, in Gilbert Harman’s phrase, ‘reasoned change in view’ cannot be accommodated by the dispositionalist approach, and that we would do well to conceive of (...)
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  10. Julien Murzi (2012). Manifestability and Epistemic Truth. Topoi 31 (1):17-26.
    I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic.
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  11. Julien Murzi (2012). On Heck's New Liar. Thought 1 (2):258-269.
    Richard Heck has recently drawn attention on a new version of the Liar Paradox, one which relies on logical resources that are so weak as to suggest that it may not admit of any “truly satisfying, consistent solution”. I argue that this conclusion is too strong. Heck's Liar reduces to absurdity principles that are already rejected by consistent paracomplete theories of truth, such as Kripke's and Field's. Moreover, the new Liar gives us no reasons to think that (versions of) these (...)
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  12. Julien Murzi (2011). Inferentialism Without Verificationism: Reply to Prawitz. In Emiliano Ippoliti & Carlo Cellucci (eds.), Logic and Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars. 285-90.
    I discuss Prawitz’s claim that a non-reliabilist answer to the question “What is a proof?” compels us to reject the standard Bolzano-Tarski account of validity, andto account for the meaning of a sentence in broadly verificationist terms. I sketch what I take to be a possible way of resisting Prawitz’s claim---one that concedes the anti-reliabilist assumption from which Prawitz’s argument proceeds.
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  13. Julien Murzi (2010). Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269 - 281.
    In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, (...)
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  14. Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi (2009). The Paradox of Idealization. Analysis 69 (3):461-469.
    A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, purports to show that all truths are knowable only if all truths are known. This is the Paradox of Knowability. If we take it, quite plausibly, that we are not omniscient, the proof appears to undermine metaphysical doctrines committed to the knowability of truth, such as semantic anti-realism. Since its rediscovery by Hart and McGinn ( 1976), many solutions to the paradox have been offered. In this article, (...)
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  15. Julien Murzi & Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2009). Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen. Analysis 69 (3):480-488.
    It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen (2008) argues that this view - call it logical inferentialism - is undermined by some "very little known" considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that "in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard (...)
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  16. Luca Incurvati & Julien Murzi (2008). How Basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument? Analysis 68 (4):303-309.
    Anti-realists typically contend that truth is epistemically constrained. Truth, they say, cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Some anti-realists are also willing to make a further claim: if truth is epistemically constrained, classical logic is to be given up in favour of intuitionistic logic. Here we shall be concerned with one argument in support of this thesis - Crispin Wright's Basic Revisionary Argument, first presented in his Truth and Objectivity. We argue that the reasoning involved in the argument, if correct, (...)
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