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  1. Jürgen Schröder (2007). Mental Causation and the Supervenience Argument. Erkenntnis 67 (2):221 - 237.
    One of several problems concerning the possibility of mental causation is that the causal potential of a supervenient property seems to be absorbed by its supervenience base if that base and the supervenient property are not identical. If the causal powers of the supervenient property are a proper subset of the causal powers of the supervenience base then, according to the causal individuation of properties, the supervenience base seems to do all the causal work and the supervenient property appears to (...)
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  2. Jurgen Schroder (2006). Physicalism and Strict Implication. Synthese 151 (3):537-545.
    The aim of this paper is to determine the plausibility of Robert Kirk’s strict implication thesis as an explication of physicalism and its relation to Jackson and Chalmer’s notion of application conditionals, to the notion of global supervenience and to a posteriori identities. It is argued that the strict implication thesis is subject to the same objection that affects the notion of global supervenience. Furthermore, reference to an idealised physics in the formulation of strict implication threatens to make the thesis (...)
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  3. Jürgen Schröder (2006). Physicalism and Strict Implication. Synthese 151 (3):537 - 545.
    The aim of this paper is to determine the plausibility of Robert Kirk's strict implication thesis as an explication of physicalism and its relation to Jackson and Chalmer's notion of application conditionals, to the notion of global supervenience and to a posteriori identities. It is argued that the strict implication thesis is subject to the same objection that affects the notion of global supervenience. Furthermore, reference to an idealised physics in the formulation of strict implication threatens to make the thesis (...)
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  4. Jürgen Schröder (2002). The Supervenience Argument and the Generalization Problem. Erkenntnis 56 (3):319 - 328.
    This paper tries to show that Kim's strategy of preventing the problem of generalization of mental causation is not successful and that his original supervenience argument can be applied to cases of nonmental macrolevel causation, with the effect that nonmental macroproperties which only supervene on, but are not identical with, configurations of microproperties turn out to be epiphenomenal after all.
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  5. Jurgen Schroder (2002). The Supervenience Argument and the Generalization Problem. Erkenntnis 56 (3):319-28.
    This paper tries to show that Kims strategy of preventing the problem of generalization of mental causation is not successful and that his original supervenience argument can be applied to cases of nonmental macrolevel causation, with the effect that nonmental macroproperties which only supervene on, but are not identical with, configurations of microproperties turn out to be epiphenomenal after all.
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  6. Jurgen Schroder (2001). Higher-Order Thought and Naturalist Accounts of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):27-46.
  7. Jürgen Schröder (1999). Computation, Levels of Abstraction, and the Intrinsic Character of Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):970-971.
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  8. Jurgen Schroder (1999). La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U..
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  9. Jurgen Schroder (1999). Mental Causation: The Supervenience Argument and the Proportionality Constraint. In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U..
     
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  10. Jürgen Schröder (1998). Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (3):313 - 330.
    Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive (...)
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  11. Jürgen Schröder (1998). Explanatory Force, Antidescriptionism, and the Common Structure of Substance Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):84-85.
    Millikan's proposal of a common structure of substance concepts does not explain certain conspicuous findings in the psychological literature such as typicality effects, the context sensitivity of these effects, and slips of the tongue. Moreover, it is unclear how antidescriptionism could be relevant to psychological theorizing. Finally, it does not seem to be true that concepts of individuals, stuff, and real kinds have a common structure in older children and in adults.
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  12. Jurgen Schroder (1998). Emergence: Non-Deducibility or Downwards Causation? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):433-52.
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  13. Jurgen Schroder (1998). Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (3):313-330.
    Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive (...)
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  14. Jürgen Schröder (1997). Führt der Physikalismus Zu Absurden Konsequenzen? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (2):385-388.
    Does Physicalism lead to absurd results? Franz von Kutschera argued in his book „Grundfragender Erkenntnistheorie” that the weakest version of physicalism, i. e. the thesis that physical facts determine all the facts there are, leads to the absurd result that events in a remote future determine the present brain states of a person. It is shown that the argument is flawed in several respects and that the absurd result is not a consequence of physicalism but of an auxiliary premiss of (...)
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  15. Jürgen Schröder (1997). Qualia Und Physikalismus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (1):159-183.
    Qualia and Physicalism. It is assumed that the following three relations exhaust the possibilities for a physicalist account of qualia: 1. determination, 2. identity, 3. realization. The first relation is immediately rejected because it does not exclude property dualism. The second faces the problem that it is probably impossible to discriminate empirically between the identity thesis and the epiphenomenalist position. The third cannot handle qualia adequately, for qualia are not functional properties and the realization relation is only plausible as a (...)
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  16. Jürgen Schröder (1995). Token-Identity, Consciousness, and the Connection Principle. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):615-616.
    Searle's (1990) argument for the seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
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  17. Jürgen Schröder (1994). On the Reference of Proper Names. Conceptus 28 (71):219-237.
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  18. Jürgen Schröder (1991). Searles Kritik Am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung Des Chinesischzimmers. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (2):321-336.
    Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are (...)
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  19. Jürgen Schröder (1981). Gottfried Benn. The Artist and Politics (1910–1934). Philosophy and History 14 (2):131-133.
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