In this paper, I explore Kant’s discussion of juridical and ethical laws in the introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals as a whole. Following Marcus Willaschek and early Allen Wood, I pose a dilemma for Kant that I call “the paradox of juridical imperatives”, a dilemma that Willaschek and Wood hold Kant can only avoid by giving up his claim that juridical laws are categorical imperatives. I show how a set of interpretative issues concerning juridical incentives, (...) the content of juridical laws, and the idea of an “indirect” ethical obligations, hang together, and must solved simultaneously in order to address the paradox. I argue, contra Willaschek and Wood, that we can dissolve the paradox, solving the network of issues satisfactorily and affirming the status of juridical laws as categorical imperatives, once we recognize that one can go wrong with respect to a principle while fulfilling the letter of its requirements. The picture that emerges is one on which we can straightforwardly affirm Recht as a moral concept for Kant, while simultaneously representing its distinctive character in his system of morality. (shrink)

The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law. By Walter Edward Young. Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, vol. 9. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017. Pp. xiv + 643. $149.99, €124.79 ; $109, €101.14.

Kant has made an attempt in his Doctrine of Law to show that the principles of natural Law are a priori principles of pure practical reason. He considers this a necessary step towards establishing the obligating force of positive legislation within a legal system. It is not obvious, however, that Law, which recognizes external coercion as a possible incentive for the compliance with its duties, can be reconciled with pure practical reason, which through the categorical imperative commands that (...) one fulfill duty from the idea of duty and so independently of inclination. Accordingly, it is not clear that there is a systematic and necessary connection between Law and morality for Kant and that he has succeeded in his overall objective of justifying positive Law. ;My dissertation is concerned with the question of how, according to Kant, pure practical reason can allow for juridical legislation, a legislation which admits of an incentive other than the idea of duty for the fulfillment of certain duties. I present criticisms of interpretations according to which Law with its external character cannot be reconciled with morality for Kant. I also discuss some interpretations according to which Law with its duties and legislation is justifiable from the point of view of pure practical reason, either as directly derivable from the categorical imperative or as a means for the realization and protection of the individual's moral freedom. I argue that such accounts do not succeed in explaining the possibility of external coercion for pure practical reason. I do maintain, however, that Law is reconcilable with pure practical reason for Kant, and I offer an explanation of how this is so: an examination of the different classes of duties shows that only juridical duties, or perfect duties to others, are such that reason must recongnize for them a kind of constraint other than free self-constraint and therefore must acknowledge the possibility of juridical legislation for these duties. (shrink)

The study of argumentation is prospering. After its brilliant start in Antiquity, highlighted in the classical works of Aristotle, after an alternation of ups and downs during the following millennia, in the post-Renaissance period its gradual decline set in. Revitalization took place only after Toulmin and Perelman published in the same year their landmark works The Uses of Argument and La nouvelle rhétorique. The model of argumentation presented by Toulmin and Perelman’s inventory of argumentation techniques inspired a great many scholars (...) in various ways to take up the study of argumentation in a serious manner. Nowadays there are well-established logical approaches to argumentation, but also social and socio-psychological, linguistic, juridical and other approaches. In most of these approaches traces can be found of the influence of the classical and neo-classical argumentation theories just mentioned. (shrink)

In the Doctrine of Right Kant holds that the classical Ulpian command honeste vive is a juridical duty that has the particular feature of being internal. In this paper I explore the reasons why Kant denies that the duty to be an honorable human being comprises an ethical obligation and conceives it as a juridical duty to oneself. I will argue that, despite the conceptual problems that the systematical incorporation of this type of duty into the doctrine of (...) morals might entail, these reasons are coherent. The fulfillment of the duty honeste vive involves a coercion to the self but at the same time does not necessarily imply the adoption of a moral end. (shrink)

The study of argumentation is prospering. After its brilliant start in Antiquity, highlighted in the classical works of Aristotle, after an alternation of ups and downs during the following millennia, in the post-Renaissance period its gradual decline set in. Revitalization took place only after Toulmin and Perelman published in the same year their landmark works The Uses of Argument and La nouvelle rhétorique. The model of argumentation presented by Toulmin and Perelman’s inventory of argumentation techniques inspired a great many scholars (...) in various ways to take up the study of argumentation in a serious manner. Nowadays there are well-established logical approaches to argumentation, but also social and socio-psychological, linguistic, juridical and other approaches. In most of these approaches traces can be found of the influence of the classical and neo-classical argumentation theories just mentioned. (shrink)

Modern moral and political philosophy is in debt with natural law theory, both in its ancient and mediaeval elaborations. While the very notion of a natural law has proved highly controversial among 20th Century scholars, the last decades have witnessed a renewed interest in it. Indeed, the threats and challenges as result of multiculturalism, plural societies and global changes have generated a renewed attention to natural law theory. Clearly, it offers solid basis as possible framework to a better understanding of (...) human goods without contradictions and partial bias. The purpose of the present volume is to provide an overview of the history of this concept (Cicero, St. Paul, Aquinas, Melanchthon, Montaigne, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Burke, Kant, MacIntyre, etc.) as well as a deep understanding of ongoing research, both in Europe and in America. Furthermore, the specificity of these studies will be of particular value to philosophers, law-philosophers, historians, anthropologists, sociologists and theologians, and those concerned on such issues as the relation between law and moral norm, law and practical reason, and the presence of the idea of natural law in several prominent thinkers. It includes a selected bibliography on natural law. The book also provides an excellent introduction to several of the major topics in natural law theory making it useful both as a reference text and as a sourcebook for academics alike. Natural law is a rich, complex, and highly disputed term. Since its first appearances in the history of Western civilization, it has been used both to point to God as the source of the moral order and to assert that there is an objective order of justice in nature that men and their laws ought to respect. In modern times, natural law theory gave birth to what we usually call "human rights." Unlike the meaning of the term, the importance of an ongoing debate on natural law and on the theories related to it is undisputable. This is why I welcome today this new collection of essays edited by Alejandro Nèstor Garcìa Martìnez, Mario Å ilar and Josè M. Torralba. Natural Law: Historical, Systematic and Juridical Approaches includes a wide variety of studies, covering key authors and issues in natural law theory. Younger students will appreciate the clarity of the chapters, and more trained readers the detailed and accurate bibliographical references that each of them offers. The editors's choice to go from a historical approach to contemporary theories, and then to theoretical and more practical issues is also commendable. Students in philosophy and in legal theory will greatly benefit from this book. Fulvio Di Blasi, author of God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

While popular debate grapples with the legality of gay marriage, networks of medical, political, and juridical discourses produce and situate sexuality in a field of knowledge that is constantly under examination and administration. The rationalization of sexuality, and its dispersion into multiple fields of knowledge, has become part of a system of power relations that produces identities and manages them. Within this context, this paper places Horkheimer and Adorno's excursus on Sade's Juliette in conversation with Foucault's first volume of (...) the History of Sexuality. It explores how instrumental reason and power/knowledge relationships produce discourses of sexuality, which have come to dominate Western society. It also explores possible sites of resistance, through the notion of performativity, that exist within these modes of rationalization and power. I argue that this interlocution of Horkheimer and Adorno with Foucault helps us see sexuality as a site of both domination and resistance. It also shows how sexuality is produced in a field of contestation where possibilities of practices of freedom are always circumscribed by modes of rationalization and networks of power. (shrink)

While popular debate grapples with the legality of gay marriage, networks of medical, political, and juridical discourses produce and situate sexuality in a field of knowledge that is constantly under examination and administration. The rationalization of sexuality, and its dispersion into multiple fields of knowledge, has become part of a system of power relations that produces identities and manages them. Within this context, this paper places Horkheimer and Adorno's excursus on Sade's Juliette in conversation with Foucault's first volume of (...) the History of Sexuality. It explores how instrumental reason and power/knowledge relationships produce discourses of sexuality, which have come to dominate Western society. It also explores possible sites of resistance, through the notion of performativity, that exist within these modes of rationalization and power. I argue that this interlocution of Horkheimer and Adorno with Foucault helps us see sexuality as a site of both domination and resistance. It also shows how sexuality is produced in a field of contestation where possibilities of practices of freedom are always circumscribed by modes of rationalization and networks of power. (shrink)

This collection contains studies on justice, juridical reasoning and argumenta tion which contributed to my ideas on the new rhetoric. My reflections on justice, from 1944 to the present day, have given rise to various studies. The ftrst of these was published in English as The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. The others, of which several are out of print or have never previously been published, are reunited in the present volume. As justice is, for me, (...) the prime example of a "confused notion", of a notion which, like many philosophical concepts, cannot be reduced to clarity without being distorted, one cannot treat it without recourse to the methods of reasoning analyzed by the new rhetoric. In actuality, these methods have long been put into practice by jurists. Legal reasoning is fertile ground for the study of argumentation: it is to the new rhetoric what mathematics is to formal logic and to the theory of demonstrative proof. It is important, then, that philosophers should not limit their methodologi cal studies to mathematics and the natural sciences. They must not neglect law in the search for practical reason. I hope that these essays lead to be a better understanding of how law can enrich philosophical thought. CH. P. (shrink)

Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a person's (...) material guilt or innocence and his juridical guilt or innocence. Someone is materially guilty if his actions in fact matched the conduct proscribed by the penal law. Someone is juridically guilty if he is found guilty by a tribunal, i.e., convicted by a judge or jury. When a tribunal convicts a innocent person or acquits a guilty person, the accuracy of its verdicts can be criticized. -/- There are three definitions of the reasonable person extant amongst courts and commentators: the reasonable person is either (1) a hypothetical ordinary, average person; (2) the embodiment of a community ideal; or (3) an embodiment of an objective ethical standard, i.e., ethical principles independent of community opinion. Nonetheless, after observing the circularity, vagueness, and lack of consistency in the definitions, wise courts and commentators have sometimes resorted to identifying the reasonable person with the judgment of the jury. -/- This piece argues that failure to settle on a fixed definition of the "reasonable person" in the criminal law of self-defense effectively conflates material guilt and innocence and juridical guilt and innocence at the doctrinal level. When courts do not clearly and consistently choose between standards one, two, and three, or when they expressly treat the reasonable person as a form of words standing in for the judgment of the jury, they make it conceptually impossible for observers outside the court system to apply a fixed, definite standard to assess the actual guilt of a person apart from the judgments of tribunals. -/- This paper's main purpose is to identify a conceptual knot rather than propose reforms. Still, it recommends two small changes meant to lift the confusion surrounding the reasonable person. First, it urges that courts expressly settle on one of the three definitions canvassed above. Second, it recommends that courts be mindful of the nature of the reasonable person standard and as such, be wary of treating conclusions about reasonableness as ordinary legal precedents, and wield the power of directed verdict aggressively to protect unpopular defendants from abuse by juries. (shrink)

A puzzle arises when we consider that, for Kant, the categories are 'original acquisitions' of our understanding to which we must nevertheless prove our entitlement via 'deduction', on pain of dogmatism. I resolve this puzzle by articulating skepticism’s role in the transcendental deduction, drawing on Kant’s construal of the skeptical 'question quid juris' in the juridical terms of entitlement to property. I then situate skepticism’s transformative potential within what Kant regards as reason’s 'maturation' from dogmatism toward self-knowledge. Finally, (...) I contrast Hegel’s account of spirit’s progress toward 'absolute knowledge', which shifts both the mode of skepticism and the prospect of maturation. (shrink)

Rationality and reasonableness can be illustrated as Janus-faced concepts, not only in a descriptive diagnosis but also in a normative construction of adjudication, and in the analysis of its practical and rhetorical effects. Considering such an illustration, the present reflection returns to the discussion on the relevance of rationality and reasonableness in legal interpretation, aiming at distinguishing and/or connecting principles and criteria, beyond formally logical and/or procedurally argumentative decision-making, and, thus, within a normatively practical adjudication. Such an approach will be (...) presented in two main steps. In a first step, the rationality/reasonableness dichotomy will be discussed within a constitutive connection between principles and criteria in adjudication, and understanding legal principles as normatively substantial foundations to legal criteria—the former as axiological references filtered into the juridical system and the latter as their concretizations, and whose practical adequacy is rhetorically assigned by the interpretive communities involved in/by adjudication, and normatively referred both to their practical accordance to the axiological normativity of the principles they shall presuppose and to their suitability as practical operators to the problematic relevance of the sub judice cases. In a second step, and consequently, encompassing the projection of legal interpretation, in semiotic and in practical-normative perspectives, in order to discuss their constituting practical relevance in adjudication, the rationality/reasonableness dichotomy will be experimented within formal-logical procedures and within practical-dialectical connections between juridical problem and juridical system—therefore stating a discussion on the foundations, the intentionality and the consequences of adjudication, amongst deduction and analogy. (shrink)

This article aims to show how the traditions of ethical reasoning and policy-making shape stem cell research in Britain. To do so I give a detailed account of the earlier developments of regulations on embryo research and the specific scientific advances made in Britain. The subsequent regulation of stem cell research was largely predetermined by those structures and the different and partly opposing orientations of a utilitarian approach to policies on biomedicine. The setting up of the first stem cell bank (...) and the directing of public funding into not only bioethical but also sociological guidance of the development of the new science field are aspects of the particular British way of supporting stem cell research. However, there is also an ongoing philosophical and juridical debate on the possible erosion of fundamental values caused by incremental regulatory weakening. Although I am highly sympathetic to the critical position that there is a need for a metaphysical anchor to secure individual human rights, one has to admit that the British mode of handling the inevitable ethical problems we face with biomedical progress is rather successful in terms of securing some of the basic needs and values of a modern democratic society. (shrink)

This article gives a critical account of Agamben's contention that the camp is the paradigm of 'bio-politics' in the west. It analyses the deficiencies of this paradigm by means of comparison with other approaches to juridical topics and political theory (e.g., the treatments of the topics of force and state power in liberalism and Foucault). First, I ask about the features Agamben ascribes to the camp space and in what respects they support his contention that the camp has general (...) significance. Second, I question the reasons he gives for his view that the camp situation discloses the general tendencies of legal codes and practices in the West. In particular, I ask whether, as Agamben contends, his approach allows tendencies in the West that would otherwise be obscure to be identifiable, or whether his approach is too speculative to be useful as political theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. 208. Hardback, $105.00. -/- Even those with a passing knowledge of Kant's system will recognize his sustained use of legal metaphor and his appeal to lawfulness as a beacon of philosophical progress. He famously begins one of the most important (and impermeable) sections of the Critique (...) of Pure Reason with the juridical distinction between quid juris (what is the law) and quid facti (what is the fact) (A 84/B 116), insisting—against the empiricists—that the critique of our cognitive faculty must speak to the former and requires a Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In her book, Sofie Møller delves into the historical context and philosophical significance of such legal metaphors to reveal that their roots spread to the deepest foundations of Kant's project. In doing so, she contends that we should understand "philosophical systematicity as legal systematicity" (15). According to Møller, to accept this reading of Kant is to acknowledge that the legal system provides not just one helpful type of metaphor to be appreciated alongside many others, but the only proper symbol of the abstract nature of reason itself (173).For those interested in Kant's engagement with the natural-rights theory that prevailed during his lifetime, or in his familiarity with the concrete legal practices of eighteenth-century European courts, Møller's book proves to be thoroughly researched and informative. As the first English-language book-length study providing a comprehensive account of the legal aspects influencing Kant's system, it should serve as a valuable catchall resource. There are limits to its accessibility, however, as familiarity with basic legal distinctions—e.g. between civil and criminal codes—is assumed, and Latin terms and phrases often go untranslated. At times, this makes for a difficult intersection between the arduousness of Kant's own prose and the equally technical legal terminology that is meant to explain it. However, this barrier is mitigated by Møller's own interpretive work, which cautions that we should not let indeterminate legal terminology fix too much in our reading of Kant's texts, especially when considering the Transcendental Deduction and its reliance on the quid juris/quid facti distinction. As she concludes at the end of chapter 3, the procedure of legal deduction that Kant invokes "could be an investigation, an exposition, a thorough consideration, a review, explanation, description, account, dispute or procedure" (64). Thus, despite Kant's historically demonstrable familiarity with legal-deduction writings, on their own, they "do not present a sufficiently uniform argument structure to settle the question of the structures of the two versions of the transcendental deduction" (64). This observation serves both as a general warning as well as a criticism of Dieter Henrich's approach to Kant's system, which popularized attention to legal metaphor in Kant scholarship in the twentieth century. For Møller, little philosophical insight is won through Henrich's approach, since it "places too much weight on the importance of an origin" (60), taking its cue from a particular type of legal deduction whose assumption is unsupported, and which cannot be accurately projected onto Kant's text. As Møller argues, "The validity of the categories is not only grounded in their origin in pure apperception but in their being the necessary structures in the synthesis which creates objects of experience, which is an act of pure apperception" (60). Møller's suggestion, instead, is to read the Deduction as adopting the twofold structure of "judicial imputation," which does a more faithful job of capturing the structuring activity that Kant accords to the understanding. With the latter reading, emphasis shifts from whether the categories' application to objects of experience is valid because of their a priori origin, to the spontaneous activity of the judging subject as the originator of experience (75). Part of what is unique about this approach is that it does not read the... (shrink)

This is a controversial work of applied legal theory, addressing urgent contemporary questions about law and the state, about the character of the UK as a state, and about the juridical character of the European Union.

My aim in this paper is fairly modest. I obviously do not claim that there has never been or could never be an instance of irrational or fallacious appeals to quotations from canonical sources in the marxist tradition. Instead, I claim that the practice of using quotations from canonical sources is not, as such, irrational. If we understand the epistemological infrastructure of the practice -- the rational underpinnings of it -- we can grasp how these citations appeal to the presumptive (...) authoritativeness of formulations that condense or concisely convey the core of insights that emerged from learning processes that the intellectual tradition of marxism has already traversed. The rational underpinnings of the practice include, first, the neo-Hegelian idea that we can justify a view we now hold by rationally reconstructing the insight-motivated learning process from which it emerged, and second, the convention that these rational reconstructions do not have to be elaborated in each insistence, but can be invoked in a short-form way, such as by citing the name of a decision or a concise statement of it (like a short quotation), as is common in the epistemologically similar practice of precedential reasoning in common law juridical justification. No claim is true just because of who made it; but a claim might be presumptively authoritative in cases where it was made at the end of a learning process, which has not been overtaken by a change in the circumstances or further learning. (shrink)

Dieter Henrich ‘s “Notion of a Deduction” (1989), opened up approaches to both Deductions in terms of legal as opposed to syllogistic reasoning. Since the CpR is shot through with juridical metaphors and analogies, many points of connection suggest themselves. In this paper, I extend and modify Henrich’s approach, in order to extract a particular logic of evidence. I argue that the three syntheses of the A-Deduction correspond to parts of a deductive procedure, and that their names have been (...) chosen to indicate this connection to the reader. Nonetheless, the principal aim of the paper is not to develop and defend these historiographical claims, but to explicate the structure of the logic of evidence in question and link it to Kant’s intended refutation of Hume. Since the procedures Kant describes are part of the law of evidence of many nations and are equally well at work in contemporary information-theory, a precise reconstruction can map directly onto contemporary problems in philosophy, physics, and informatics, without any loss of historical accuracy. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with argumentation in legal proceedings, namely in criminal cases. My interest is to explore how in the legal realm different argumentation fields interact, the juridical field being just one of them. The paper lays out an approach of studying argumentation in the legal realm in the framework of an ethnographic methodology by identifying the “topical rules” the participants in criminal trials adhere to. Suggesting the notion of field-dependence as a good starting point for the analysis (...) of legal argumentation, I will give several examples of different fields of argumentation interacting in criminal proceedings. The examination of what counts as a good reason and how arguments are employed, negotiated, and evaluated within a criminal proceeding might shed light on the practice of constructing facts and arriving at decisions in court. It can furthermore point at the constitution of legal rationality and how it is produced in criminal trials. I argue that rationality in criminal proceedings is interactively accomplished by negotiating different standards of validity. (shrink)

Around the 1960's, C. Perelman / L. Olbrechts–Tyteca and S. Toulmin endorsed the separation between argumentation and logic. In fact, both assumed a gap between everyday reasoning, closer to legal reasoning, and scientific reasoning based on mathematics. The main claim was that both paradigms are incommensurable, since the legal paradigm makes use of the notion of formality, that has a procedural nature with roots on a conversational and dialectical practice, and logic is based on the notion of form, that involves (...) static (and syntactic) features. I will contest the incommensurability of both paradigms, as J. van Benthem (2009) did already, and plea that what we need is more rather than less logic. There are no juridical solutions to logical problems, if the problem is related to reasoning, then the solution relates to inferences drawn on the basis of juridical knowledge. (shrink)

This address at the Hart Centenary Conference in Cambridge in July 2007 reflects on foundational elements in Hart's method in legal philosophy. It argues that his understanding of what it is to adopt an internal point of view was flawed by (a) inattention to the difference between descriptive history (or biography or detection) and descriptive general theory of human affairs, (b) inattention to practical reason as argument from premises, some factual but others normative (evaluative) in their content, and (c) (...) relative inattention to the deliberations of law-makers as distinct from subjects of the law. These flaws contributed to a concept or theory of law that so truncated its account of the juridical, and of the sources of legal reasoning, that it could provide little or no guidance in situations of legal difficulty. The paper suggests that these flaws result, to some significant extent, from the skeptical doubts about morality evident particularly in his later work. All this has implications for the kind of approach to law and legal theory often self-described as positivist. (shrink)

A contrario reasoning (or ‘a contrario argument’ or ‘argument a contrario’) is traditionally understood as an appeal to the deliberate silence of the legislator: because a legal rule does not mention case X specifically, the rule is not applicable to it. Modern perspectives on legal reasoning often apply this label to a broader concept of reasoning, namely the reasoning by which a legal rule is not applied because of the differences between the case at hand and the one(s) mentioned in (...) the legal rule. This article first explains how the broader concept could have come into being, and then argues that from an argumentation theoretical point of view the modern concept makes no sense as a category of argumentation. Furthermore it is shown under which conditions the traditional concept can be sound. (shrink)

The article addresses the debate that has arisen in the wake of John Rawls’ political theory, in particular his concept of the ‘use of public reason’. Such a concept is crucial because it involves all his fundamental presuppositions about reason, publicity, legitimacy and the liberal subject that sustain his theory of justice. In this article we will mainly doubt Rawls’ Kantian origins in favour of Kant’s own thinking about reason and publicity. Initially then, we will critically present (...) an account of Rawls’ conception of (public) reason, and then turn to Kant in order to argue for a non-constructivist reading. This will be based on the importance of reason’s non-empirical need [Bedürfnis ], instead of Rawls’ empirical conception of it. Such a thing would constitute the basis for Kant’s non-instrumental conception of publicity as an a priori condition of our freedom, which would also have room for a positive role for dissent rather than mere consent (built into Rawls’ principle of liberal legitimacy). According to Kant, there is a juridical right based on reason’s need. In the end, it is concluded that the two thinkers have differing views on both the nature of human reason, and the nature of publicity at the basis of modern societies, a fact that might also be the beginning for the strengthening of Kant’s modern republicanism rather than liberalism. (shrink)

: The article examines the metapher proposed by Kant in order to clarify how our mind attains knowledge of reality, and consequently according to what method we should work out a new metaphysics. The judge succeeds in knowing a juridical reality in so far as he asks the witnesses questions which he himself formulates. Hence Kant draws the conclusion that reason learns from nature only what she herself has put into nature. Now the problem lies in clarifying how (...) the active-creative moment and the receptive moment in human knowledge refer to one another . Kant acknowledges initially the complementarity of both moments. But since he had failed to grasp clearly the real distinction between the anticipatory-constructive capacity of our understanding and the following critical-reflective capacity of the same he ended up by making the first moment prevail unilaterally. The consequence is the idealist interpretation of knowing and being to which the first Critique leads. Also the later attempts could not overcome the impasse. This would have required both revisimg radically the intuition-principle in its sensist version and to acknowledge that the dynamism of intellect refers to reality, although it needs the data of experience to know it. (shrink)

The paper argues that there is good reason to doubt that virtue-based approaches to the question of justice can adequately come to grips with sophistic uses of the political lie – especially when sophistic thinking is stretched to the point of thoroughgoing moral skepticism, or well beyond that to outright moral nihilism and its cynical uses. To counter such uses, I turn to Kant’s most influential discussion of lying, which is found in his 1797article entitled “Of a Supposed Right (...) to Lie from Philanthropy.” Although I maintain that Kant’s particular moral argument against Constant is flawed, I argue that the specifically political position that Kant’s general juridical argument supports is sound. I thereby show how Kant’s account of the conditions for the possible conformity of politics with principles of right does effectively establish that an impeachable act of lying categorically requires impeachment and prosecution for wrongdoing. KEY WORDS – Kant. Moral philosophy. Fhilosophy of right. Political lie. (shrink)

As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by desires. Instead, they (...) may say, there is just one principle, a principle of, if you will, instrumental transmutation: if one desires the end, then one has reason to take the means. See the discussion of General Production, in section 8, for a doubt about this. (shrink)

The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current (...) form by the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally. (shrink)

We offer a model of moral reform and regeneration that involves a wrong-doer making two movements: on the one hand, he identifies with himself as the one who did the act, while he also intentionally moves away from that self (or set of desires and intentions) and moves toward a transformed identity. We see this model at work in the formal practice of contrition and reform in Christian and Buddhist rites. This paper is part of a broader project we are (...) undertaking on the philosophy of forgiveness. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reincarnation/Rebirth Karma Causality Problem of Evil Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility Karma and Release Transfer of Merit Recent Developments Works cited.

Conscious macrostates are usually assumed to be emergent from the underlying physical microstates comprising the brain and nervous system of biological organisms. However, a major problem with this assumption is that consciousness is essentially nonmeasurable unlike all other proven emergent properties of physical systems. In an earlier paper, using a no-go theorem, it was shown that conscious states cannot be comprised of processes that are physical in nature (Reason, 2019). Combining this result with another unrelated work on causal emergence (...) in physical systems (Hoel, Albantakis and Tononi, 2013), we show in this paper that conscious macrostates are not emergent from physical systems and they also do not supervene on physical microstates. An important implication of our work is that there must be some form of violation of energy conservation in biological systems that are conscious. (shrink)