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Profile: Justin Capes (East Tennessee State University)
  1.  52
    Justin A. Capes (2012). Blameworthiness Without Wrongdoing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):417-437.
    In this article I argue that it is possible to be blameworthy for doing something that was not objectively morally wrong. If I am right, this would have implications for several debates at the intersection of metaphysics and moral philosophy. I also float a view about which actions can serve as legitimate bases for blame that allows for the possibility of blameworthiness without objective wrongdoing and also suggests an explanation for the appeal of the commonly held view that blameworthiness requires (...)
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  2.  19
    Justin A. Capes (forthcoming). Freedom with Causation. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Our actions have causes, some of which are beyond our control. Of that there can be no serious doubt. Some worry that this fact undermines the commonsense view that we perform free actions for which we are morally responsible. My aim in this article is to show that such worries are unfounded and, consequently, that pure non-causal theories of free action, according to which free actions must be entirely uncaused, are false. My argument for this conclusion doesn’t presuppose the cogency (...)
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  3.  9
    Justin A. Capes & Philip Swenson (forthcoming). Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response Revisited. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Frankfurt cases are supposed to provide us with counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities. Among the most well known responses to these cases is what John Fischer has dubbed the flicker of freedom strategy. Here we revisit a version of this strategy, which we refer to as the fine-grained response. Although a number of philosophers, including some who are otherwise unsympathetic to Frankfurt’s argument, have dismissed the fine grained response, we believe there is a good deal to be said (...)
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  4. Justin A. Capes, I Couldn't Help It! Essays on Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities.
    According to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), a person is blameworthy for what he did only if he could have avoided doing it. This principle figures importantly in disputes about the relationship between determinism, divine foreknowledge, free will and moral responsibility, and has been the subject of considerable controversy for over forty years now. Proponents of the principle have devoted a good deal of energy and ingenuity to defending it against various objections. Surprisingly, however, they have devoted comparatively little (...)
     
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  5.  27
    Justin A. Capes (2016). Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1477-1495.
    Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other (...)
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  6.  88
    Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):61-77.
    There has been a great deal of critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), almost all of which has focused on whether the Frankfurt-style examples, which are designed to be counterexamples to PAP, can be given a coherent formulation. Recently, however, David Widerker has argued that even if Frankfurt-style examples can be given a coherent formulation, there is reason to believe that an agent in those examples could never be morally blameworthy for what she (...)
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  7. Justin A. Capes (2010). Can 'Downward Causation' Save Free Will? Philosophia 38 (1):131-142.
    Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with (...)
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  8.  56
    Justin A. CApes (2013). Mitigating Soft Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):640-663.
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  9.  27
    Justin A. Capes (2014). James Stacey Taylor, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):181-182.
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  10.  15
    Justin A. Capes (2014). The Flicker of Freedom: A Reply to Stump. Journal of Ethics 18 (4):427-435.
    In a fascinating article in The Journal of Ethics, Eleonore Stump contends that while the flicker of freedom defense is the best available strategy for defending the principle of alternative possibilities against the threat posed to that principle by the Frankfurt cases, the defense is ultimately unsuccessful. In this article I identify a number of difficulties with Stump’s criticism of the flicker strategy. Along the way, I also clarify various nuances of the strategy that often get overlooked, and I highlight (...)
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  11. Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):61-77.
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