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  1. Justin Broackes (2011). Where Do the Unique Hues Come From? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):601-628.
    Where are we to look for the unique hues? Out in the world? In the eye? In more central processing? 1. There are difficulties looking for the structure of the unique hues in simple combinations of cone-response functions like ( L − M ) and ( S − ( L + M )): such functions may fit pretty well the early physiological processing, but they don’t correspond to the structure of unique hues. It may seem more promising to look to, (...)
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  2. Justin Broackes (2010). What Do the Colour-Blind See? In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 291.
     
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  3. Justin Broackes (2009). Aυtoσ Kaθ' Aυton in the Clouds: Was Socrates Himself a Defender of Separable Soul and Separate Forms? Classical Quarterly 59 (01):46-.
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  4. Justin Broackes (2007). Black and White and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.
    To the familiar idea of an undetectable spectrum inversion some have added the idea of inverted earth. This new combination of ideas is even harder to make coherent, particularly as it applies to a supposed inversion of black and white counteracted by an environmental switch of these. Black and white exhibit asymmetries in their connections with illumination, shadow and visibility, which rule out their being reversed. And since the most saturated yellow is light and the most saturated blue dark, yellow (...)
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  5. Justin Broackes (2007). Colour, World and Archimedean Metaphysics: Stroud and the Quest for Reality. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):27-71.
    Barry Stroud’s book _The Quest for Reality_1 is, I think, the most substantial study of colour realism that has yet been written. It subjects to fundamental criticism a tradition that found its classic expression in Descartes and Locke and which in many ways remains standard today; it argues to be flawed not only the traditional rejection of colours as mere ideas or features of ideas in the mind, but also the view that colours are dispositions or powers in objects to (...)
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  6. Justin Broackes (2006). Substance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):131–166.
    The categorial concepts of substance (thing) and substance (stuff) are described, and the conceptual relationships between things and their constitutive stuff delineated. The relationship between substance concepts, expressed by other count-nouns, and natural kind concepts is examined. Artefacts and their parts are argued to be substances, whereas parts of organisms are not. The confusions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers who invoked the concept of substance are adumbrated.
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  7. Kate Abramson, Larry Arnhart, Carla Bagnoli, Martin Bell, Theodore Benditt, Christopher Berry, Deborah Boyle, John Bricke, Justin Broackes & Janet Broughton (2004). Hume Studies Referees, 2003–2004. Hume Studies 30 (2):443-445.
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  8. Justin Broackes (2004). Realism, Scepticism and the Lament for an Archimedean Point: Stroud and the Quest for Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):415–422.
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  9. Kate Abramson, Donald Ainslie, Donald L. M. Baxter, Tom L. Beauchamp, Martin Bell, Richard Bett, John Bricke, Philip Bricker, Justin Broackes & Stephen Buckle (2003). Hume Studies Referees, 2002–2003. Hume Studies 29 (2).
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  10. Justin Broackes (2003). Do Opponent Process Theories Help Physicalism About Color? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):786-788.
    Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) give some excellent replies to the objections to realism about color. However, the particular form of realism they propose, based on opponent processing, prompts several challenges. Why characterize a color by its tendency to produce an intermediate brain signal, rather than in terms of the final effect – either a perception or a neural substrate for it? At the level of the retina, and even of the cortex, there are processes that partly parallel the structure of (...)
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  11. Justin Broackes (2002). Hume, Belief, and Personal Identity. In Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry. Clarendon Press.
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  12. Justin Broackes (2001). Experience, Attention, and Mental Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):978-979.
    O'Regan & Noë make plausible that perception involves mastery of sensory-motor dependencies. Their rejection of qualia, however, is less persuasive; as is their view that we see only what we are attending to. At times they seem to oppose “internal representation” in general; I argue that they should in fact only be rejecting crude conceptions of brain picturing.
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  13. Justin Broackes (1999). Aristotle, Objectivity and Perception. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17:57-113.
     
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  14. Justin Broackes (1999). Hume. In Ted Honderich (ed.), The Philosophers: Introducing Great Western Thinkers. Oup Oxford.
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  15. Justin Broackes (1997). Could We Take Lime, Purple, Orange, and Teal as Unique Hues? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):183-184.
    Saunders and van Brakel question whether the special status of red, green, yellow, and blue in our perceptual organization is anything more than a shadow cast by the English language. I suggest that it is more than this. We can hardly imagine treating lime, purple, orange, and teal as unique hues, and the reason does not lie in special training. To settle the issue, I suggest some lines for psychological experiment and anthropological investigation.
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  16. Justin Broackes (1997). The Nature of Colour. Routledge.
     
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  17. Justin Broackes (1995). Common Sense, Science and Scepticism. Hume Studies 21 (1):138-139.
  18. Justin Broackes (1995). Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Review). Hume Studies 21 (1):138-139.
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  19. Justin Broackes (1993). Did Hume Hold a Regularity Theory of Causation? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1 (1):99 – 114.
    In The Secret Connexion1 Galen Strawson argues against the traditional interpretation of Hume, according to which Hume’s theory of meaning leads him to a regularity theory of causation. In actual fact, says Strawson, ‘Hume believes firmly in some sort of natural necessity’ (p. 277). What Hume denied was that we are aware of causal connections outrunning regular succession, and that we have a ‘positively or descriptively contentful conception’ of such powers (p. 283); he did not deny that there are such (...)
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  20. Justin Broackes (1992). Nonreductionism, Content and Evolutionary Explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):31-32.
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  21. Justin Broackes (1992). The Autonomy of Colour. In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. 191-225.
    This essay* takes two notions of autonomy and two notions of explanation and argues that colours occur in explanations that fall under all of them. The claim that colours can be used to explain anything at all may seem to some people an outrage. But their pessimism is unjustified and the orthodox dispositional view which may seem to support it, I shall argue, itself has difficulties. In broad terms, Section 2 shows that there exist good straight scientific laws of colour, (...)
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  22. Justin Broackes (1987). Thoughts and Definitions. Analysis 47 (2):95 - 100.
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  23. Justin Broackes (1986). Belief de Re and de Dicto. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):374-383.
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