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Profile: Justin D'Arms (Ohio State University)
  1. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.) (2014). Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. OUP Oxford.
    This volume examines the implications of developments in the science of ethics for philosophical theorizing about moral psychology and human agency. These ten new essays in empirically informed philosophy illuminate such topics as responsibility, the self, and the role in morality of mental states such as desire, emotion, and moral judgement.
     
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  2. Justin D'Arms (2013). Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.
    “Sentiment” is a term of art, intended to refer to object-directed, irruptive states, that occur in relatively transient bouts involving positive or negative affect, and that typically involve a distinctive motivational profile. Not all the states normally called “emotions” are sentiments in the sense just characterized. And all the terms for sentiments are sometimes used in English to refer to longer lasting attitudes. But this discussion is concerned with boutish affective states, not standing attitudes. That poses some challenges that will (...)
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  3. Justin D'Arms (2011). Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):134-141.
    This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role it accords to empathy. (...)
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  4. Justin D'Arms, Envy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. Justin D'Arms & Allison Kerr (2008). Envy in the Philosophical Tradition. In Richard Kim (ed.), Envy, Theory and Research. Oxford University Press 39-59.
     
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  6. Daniel Jacobson & Justin D'Arms (2006). Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press
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  7. Justin D'Arms (2005). Review: Relationality, Relativism, and Realism About Moral Value. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (3):433 - 448.
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  8. Justin D'Arms (2005). Two Arguments for Sentimentalism. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1–21.
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  9. Justin D'arms (2004). Bennett Helm, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Pp. X + 261. Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.
  10. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2003). VIII. The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism). Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:127-145.
    Sentimentalist theories in ethics treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities. While the precise nature of this dependence varies, the general idea is that evaluative concepts are to be understood by way of more basic emotional reactions. Part of the task of distinguishing between the concepts that sentimentalism proposes to explicate, then, is to identify a suitably wide range of associated emotions. In this paper, we attempt to deal with an important obstacle to such views, which arises (...)
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  11. Justin D'arms (2000). When Evolutionary Game Theory Explains Morality, What Does It Explain? Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):296-299.
    Evolutionary attempts to explain morality tend to say very little about what morality is. If evolutionary game theory aspires not merely to solve the ‘problem of altruism', but to explain human morality or justice in particular, it requires an appropriate conception of that subject matter. This paper argues that one plausible conception of morality (a sanction-based conception) creates some important constraints on the kinds of evolutionary explanations that can shed light on morality. Game theoretic approaches must either meet these constraints, (...)
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  12. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). Sentiment and Value. Ethics 110 (4):722-748.
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  13. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  14. Justin D'Arms (1999). Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character:Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. Ethics 109 (3):645-648.
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  15. Justin D'Arms, Robert Batterman & Krzyzstof Gorny (1998). Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice. Philosophy of Science 65 (1):76-102.
    Game theoretic explanations of the evolution of human behavior have become increasingly widespread. At their best, they allow us to abstract from misleading particulars in order to better recognize and appreciate broad patterns in the phenomena of human social life. We discuss this explanatory strategy, contrasting it with the particularist methodology of contemporary evolutionary psychology. We introduce some guidelines for the assessment of evolutionary game theoretic explanations of human behavior: such explanations should be representative, robust, and flexible. Distinguishing these features (...)
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  16. Justin D'Arms (1996). Sex, Fairness, and the Theory of Games. Journal of Philosophy 93 (12):615-627.
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  17. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (1994). Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions. Ethics 104 (4):739-763.
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