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Profile: Justin Khoo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
  1. Justin Khoo (2013). A Note on Gibbard's Proof. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):153-164.
    A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer (Chic Linguist Soc 22(2):1–15, 1986, 2012)]. In this note, I raise some trouble for Kratzer’s proposed method of escape and then show that her semantics avoids this consequence of Gibbard’s proof by denying (...)
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  2. Justin Khoo (2013). Conditionals, Indeterminacy, and Triviality. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):260-287.
  3. Justin Khoo (2011). Operators or Restrictors? A Reply to Gillies. Semantics and Pragmatics 4:1-25.
    According to operator theories, "if" denotes a two-place operator. According to restrictor theories, "if" doesn't contribute an operator of its own but instead merely restricts the domain of some co-occurring quantifier. The standard arguments (Lewis 1975, Kratzer 1986) for restrictor theories have it that operator theories (but not restrictor theories) struggle to predict the truth conditions of quantified conditionals like -/- (1) a. If John didn't work at home, he usually worked in his office. b. If John didn't work at (...)
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