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Profile: Justin Weinberg (University of Miami)
Profile: Justin Weinberg (University of South Carolina)
  1. Molly Gardner & Justin Weinberg (2013). How Lives Measure Up. Acta Analytica 28 (1):31-48.
    The quality of a life is typically understood as a function of the actual goods and bads in it, that is, its actual value. Likewise, the value of a population is typically taken to be a function of the actual value of the lives in it. We introduce an alternative understanding of life quality: adjusted value. A life’s adjusted value is a function of its actual value and its ideal value (the best value it could have had). The concept of (...)
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  2. Justin Weinberg (2013). Non-Identity Matters, Sometimes. Utilitas 26 (1):1-11.
    Suppose the only difference between the effects of two actions is to whom they apply: either to parties who would exist if the actions were not performed. Is this a morally significant difference? This is one of the central questions raised by the Non-Identity Problem. Derek Parfit answers no, defending what he calls the . I argue that Parfit is mistaken and that sometimes this difference is morally significant. I do this by formulating a familiar kind of example in a (...)
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  3. Justin Weinberg (2013). The Practicality of Political Philosophy. Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):330-351.
    Must principles of justice be practical? Some political philosophers, the say yes. Others, the say no. Despite this disagreement, the implementers and idealists agree on what means, subscribing to the (IP) conception of practicality. They also seem to agree that principles of so-called need not be (and often are not) IP-practical. The implementers take this as a reason to reject ideal theory as an approach to principles of justice, while the idealists do not. In this paper, I argue that we (...)
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  4. Justin Weinberg & Kevin C. Elliott (2012). Science, Expertise, and Democracy. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):83-90.
  5. Justin Weinberg (2011). Is Government Supererogation Possible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):263-281.
    Governments are subject to the requirements of justice, yet often seem to go above and beyond what justice requires in order to act in ways many people think are good. These kinds of acts – examples of which include putting on celebrations, providing grants to poets, and preserving historic architecture – appear to be acts of government supererogation. In this paper, I argue that a common view about the relationship between government, coercion, and justice implies that most such acts are (...)
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  6. Justin Weinberg (2011). Young , Iris Marion . Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 193. $35.00 (Cloth). Ethics 122 (1):224-228.
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  7. Justin Weinberg (2009). Norms and the Agency of Justice. Analyse & Kritik 31 (2):319-338.
    In this paper I argue that when thinking about justice, political philosophers should pay more attention to social norms, not just the usual subjects of basic principles, rights, laws, and policies. I identify two widely-endorsed ideas about political philosophy that interfere with recognizing the importance of social norms—ideas I dub ‘compulsoriness’ and ‘institutionalism’—and argue for their rejection. I do this largely by focusing on questions about who can and should be an agent of justice. I argue that careful reflection on (...)
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  8. Justin Weinberg (1998). Self‐ and World‐Ownership: Rejoinder to Epstein, Palmer, and Feallsanach. Critical Review 12 (3):325-336.
    Abstract G. A. Cohen's argument against the claim that respect for self?ownership entails libertarianism features the imaginary example of ?Able and Infirm.? Richard Epstein, Tom Palmer, and Am Feallsanach criticize the example, but fail to rescue libertarianism from Cohen's attack. This is due to a misunderstanding of the role the example plays in Cohen's argument, and to a false belief that the initial ownership status of the world is important for resolving disputes in political philosophy.
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  9. Justin Weinberg (1997). Freedom, Self‐Ownership, and Libertarian Philosophical Diaspora. Critical Review 11 (3):323-344.
    Abstract In Self?Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that libertarianism does not follow from respect for freedom, and that libertarianism cannot be grounded on self?ownership. Cohen's arguments are, for the most part, compelling. That leaves the libertarian philosopher the options of either moving leftwards?for example, along the lines of Philippe Van. Parijs's Real Freedom for All?or embracing some form of consequentialism. Either way, the result is the abandonment of characteristically libertarian political philosophy.
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