Online research in philosophy

How realistic should normative political philosophy be? Our choices fall along a spectrum. At one end is utopianism. We could set out a theory that depicts the truly just society inhabited by ideal persons under highly favorable circumstances. Yet if we are not ideal persons and do not inhabit highly favorable circumstances, it is unlikely that such a theory would be feasible, or, if it were feasible, that it would give us particularly good advice. At the other end of the (...) spectrum is a kind of strict realism. We could set out a theory that sticks close to recommending a society we are sure is possible, namely, our own. Yet few of us believe the distance between where we are and where we should be is so small. A theory that did little more than endorse the status quo would be normatively overmodest. The consensus on this question for many years was thought to reside somewhere between these extremes, with John Rawls’s idea of a “realistic utopia.”1 A realistically utopian theory holds out the prospect of improvement for us and our social world, while constraining that prospect to what we think is possible given what we know about us and our world. There are obviously some questions about what this means, but suffice it to say that Rawls took himself to be offering a realistically utopian theory. (shrink)

The quality of a life is typically understood as a function of the actual goods and bads in it, that is, its actual value. Likewise, the value of a population is typically taken to be a function of the actual value of the lives in it. We introduce an alternative understanding of life quality: adjusted value. A life’s adjusted value is a function of its actual value and its ideal value (the best value it could have had). The concept of (...) adjusted value is useful for at least three reasons. First, it fits our judgments about how well lives are going. Second, it allows us to avoid what we call False Equivalence, an error related to the non-identity problem. Third, when we use adjusted value as an input for calculating the value of a population, we can avoid two puzzles that Derek Parfit calls the “Repugnant Conclusion” and the “Mere Addition Paradox.”. (shrink)

Governments are subject to the requirements of justice, yet often seem to go above and beyond what justice requires in order to act in ways many people think are good. These kinds of acts – examples of which include putting on celebrations, providing grants to poets, and preserving historic architecture – appear to be acts of government supererogation. In this paper, I argue that a common view about the relationship between government, coercion, and justice implies that most such acts are (...) not supererogatory, but wrong. Many will find that conclusion unattractive, but rejecting the common view that implies it raises problems, too. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that when thinking about justice, political philosophers should pay more attention to social norms, not just the usual subjects of basic principles, rights, laws, and policies. I identify two widely-endorsed ideas about political philosophy that interfere with recognizing the importance of social norms—ideas I dub ‘compulsoriness’ and ‘institutionalism’—and argue for their rejection. I do this largely by focusing on questions about who can and should be an agent of justice. I argue that careful reflection on (...) these questions supports a kind of pluralism that reveals the importance of social norms, three types of which I discuss. (shrink)

Abstract G. A. Cohen's argument against the claim that respect for self?ownership entails libertarianism features the imaginary example of ?Able and Infirm.? Richard Epstein, Tom Palmer, and Am Feallsanach criticize the example, but fail to rescue libertarianism from Cohen's attack. This is due to a misunderstanding of the role the example plays in Cohen's argument, and to a false belief that the initial ownership status of the world is important for resolving disputes in political philosophy.

Abstract In Self?Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that libertarianism does not follow from respect for freedom, and that libertarianism cannot be grounded on self?ownership. Cohen's arguments are, for the most part, compelling. That leaves the libertarian philosopher the options of either moving leftwards?for example, along the lines of Philippe Van. Parijs's Real Freedom for All?or embracing some form of consequentialism. Either way, the result is the abandonment of characteristically libertarian political philosophy.