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Keith Hossack [15]Keith G. Hossack [1]K. Hossack [1]
  1. Keith Hossack (2014). Sets and Plural Comprehension. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):517-539.
    The state of affairs of some things falling under a predicate is supposedly a single entity that collects these things as its constituents. But whether we think of a state of affairs as a fact, a proposition or a possibility, problems will arise if we adopt a plural logic. For plural logic says that any plurality include themselves, so whenever there are some things, the state of affairs of their plural self-inclusion should be a single thing that collects them all. (...)
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  2. Keith Hossack (2013). A Correspondence Theory of Exemplification. Axiomathes 23 (2):365-380.
    What is exemplification? A proposition that attributes a property to an object is true if the object exemplifies the property. But according to the correspondence theory, a proposition is true if the corresponding fact exists. So if the correspondence theory is correct, an exemplification of a temporal property by an object is simply the concrete circumstance of the object’s having the property. But since not all properties are temporal, not all exemplifications are circumstances, and we need to recognise timeless as (...)
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  3. Keith Hossack (2011). Précis of The Metaphysics of Knowledge. Dialectica 65 (1):71-73.
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  4. Keith Hossack (2011). Replies to Comments. Dialectica 65 (1):125-151.
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  5. Keith Hossack (2007). Actuality and Modal Rationalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):433-456.
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  6. Keith Hossack (2007). Actuality: Scott Soames and Keith Hossack: Actuality and Modal Rationalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107:433 - 456.
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  7. Keith Hossack (2007). The Metaphysics of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    The Metaphysics of Knowledge presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But Keith Hossack argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. (...)
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  8. Kit Fine, Jane Heal, Jennifer Hornsby, Keith Hossack, April Jones, Mark Kalderon, Guy Longworth, Mike Martin, Joseph Melia & Alex Oliver (2006). Fraser MacBride. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Keith Hossack (2006). Reid and Brentano on Consciousness. In Markus Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. 1--36.
  10. Keith Hossack (2006). Vagueness and Personal Identity. In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. 221.
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  11. Keith Hossack (2003). Consciousness in Act and Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.
    This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions elucidates the relations between (...)
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  12. Keith Hossack (2002). Self-Knowledge and Consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.
    The Identity Thesis, proposed by Reid for the case of sensations, and extended by Brentano to conscious states generally, says that a state is conscious iff it is identical with introspective knowledge of its own instantiation. The Thesis offers simple explanations of a number of puzzling features of introspective self-knowledge, and unites the problems of introspection, consciousness and knowledge in the single problem of the metaphysical nature of conscious states. It does nothing to solve the latter problem, but it does (...)
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  13. K. Hossack (2000). Plurals and Complexes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3):411-443.
    Atomism denies that complexes exist. Common-sense metaphysics may posit masses, composite individuals and sets, but atomism says there are only simples. In a singularist logic, it is difficult to make a plausible case for atomism. But we should accept plural logic, and then atomism can paraphrase away apparent reference to complexes. The paraphrases require unfamiliar plural universals, but these are of independent interest; for example, we can identify numbers and sets with plural universals. The atomist paraphrases would fail if plurals (...)
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  14. Keith Hossack (1994). Intolerant Clones. Mind 103 (409):55-58.
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  15. Geoffrey Hellman & Keith Hossack (1992). Constructivist Mathematics, Quantum Physics and Quantifiers. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:61 - 97.
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  16. Keith Hossack (1991). Access to Mathematical Objects. Critica 23 (68):157 - 181.
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  17. Keith G. Hossack (1990). A Problem About the Meaning of Intuitionist Negation. Mind 99 (394):207-219.
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