Grier attempts a good deal here and succeeds admirably. He gives us, first, a concise but more than adequate history of Marxist ethical theory from the young Marx to the neo-Kantians. This is followed by an overview of philosophy in the Soviet Union, emphasizing the "ambiguous inheritance" of dialectical and historical materialism, and then by a thorough history of Soviet ethical theory in its formative period. From these well-chosen and substantial preliminaries, Grier turns to an elaboration of the basic features (...) and problems of contemporary ethical theory that includes a considered evaluation from both the stance of the student of ethics and that of the intellectual historian. The foregoing is accomplished in four chapters entitled "Ethical Theory and its Object, Morality," "Discussions of Value Theory in Soviet Marxism," "Society and the Individual," and "Historical Progress and Intrinsic Values." All this is followed by a discussion of the impact of Western ethical thought that deals in turns with the contemporary influence of Kant, Hegel, neopositivism, and existentialism. (shrink)

This is one of four volumes from the same press collecting Hare’s major papers. Of the six papers in this volume, two have appeared in Mind, one in the Philosophical Review, two have appeared in special collections, and only one has not been previously published. There is brief additional material appended to some of the articles and, perhaps most important, a four page bibliography of Hare’s writings. From this bibliography one can discover which of Hare’s articles appear in each of (...) the volumes of this group and also find their original location. One might thus save the cost of a volume or two for there is little doubt, considering the size and price of these books, upon what principle the publisher of this series has decided. The articles are largely a development and defense of Hare’s views of practical reason as set forth in The Language of Morals, with particular attention to the logical forms of imperatives and ought statements, and to the forms of inference valid for each. Beyond this basic theme, the collection is not particularly unified. Two fundamental impressions, however, emerge. The first is an awareness of the enormous influence of J. L. Austin on Hare’s thinking. This is evident not only in his discussion and rejection of Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, but more importantly in his constant respect for ordinary usage and his resistance to ideal formalism. The second impression is that there is much to be done to develop a logic for imperative and prescriptive inferences. These papers present some basic principles for such a development but, since they are primarily defenses against criticisms of Hare’s book, there is an ad hoc character about them. What is now required is a more complete and systematic treatment of these topics. Ordinary language analysts might here make some inroads on the domain of formal logic to recall some of that logic to philosophy. The articles collected, therefore, are valuable, particularly as they encourage further development of the overlap of logic and ethics.—K. M. (shrink)

This second volume of the critical edition of William of Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard maintains the same standard of excellence as did the first. All the major manuscripts are collated in the text, the notes and critical apparatus are complete, and the type is large and clear. This volume contains the second and third distinctions of Book I of Ockham’s commentary, material of particular interest to philosophers. Here Ockham launches his attack on Scotistic realism in answer (...) to such questions as "whether the universal is real outside the mind, but not really distinct from the individual." Now that the work of one of the founding fathers of nominalism is available in a reliable edition, philosophers have fertile territory for re-exploring past solutions to these still present logical and epistemological problems. The introduction to this volume is only a supplement to that of the first volume, but it does add some important material. Another manuscript has been located which was almost certainly the basis for the early printed edition of Ockham’s work. The importance of this text, together with its reasonable price and easy availability, make it practically a necessary addition to any university library.—K. M. (shrink)

These two volumes compile an impressive scholarly tribute to the memory and influence of Thomas Aquinas. The volumes are commemorative both in the sense of being a tribute to Aquinas and in the sense of being largely studies of his philosophical and theological writings. The studies are divided into seven sections: The Life of St. Thomas, The Writings of St. Thomas, Exegetical Studies, St. Thomas and His Predecessors, St. Thomas and His Contemporaries, St. Thomas in History: 14th to 19th Centuries, (...) and St. Thomas in the 20th Century. The historical character of these basic divisions reflects the generally historical character of the studies. Most of the studies also reflect the theological character of Aquinas’s own work in that they place the thought of Aquinas in the context of some theological tradition or dispute. (shrink)

This is the first critical edition of Peter’s work from the manuscripts. And critical it is. First of all, it is critical for being the first such edition of an important and influential work of medieval logic. Second, the editor’s introduction is critical of almost every other scholar who has worked on Peter of Spain. The text has been prepared from six of the three hundred extant manuscripts. The edition reflects the editor’s strong judgments about changes and additions introduced to (...) the work even in some of the earliest manuscripts. De Rijk has added valuable indices of other works cited, of examples, and an exhaustive index of terms. This edition is indispensable for anyone interested in the development of medieval logic. (shrink)

The first chapters of Michalos’ book give an account of the controversy between Karl Popper and Rudolph Carnap following the former’s critique of Carnap in "Degree of Confirmation". Michalos very compactly summarizes the controversy and argues: 1) that Popper was mistaken when he tried to show that Carnap always identified the quantitative degree of confirmation with the acceptability of scientific theories; 2) that Popper is mistaken in accusing Carnap of confusing classificatory, comparative, and quantitative concepts; 3) that a conflict between (...) Popper and Carnap, apparently over the problem of unrestricted universals, was in fact over the everyday practical use of such universal sentences; 4) that Popper’s critique of Carnap’s theorem for the singular predictive inference is incorrect because Popper construes the theorem with respect to two different kinds of evidential statements. The final chapters of the book deal with some additional issues that have developed out of the central controversy. One chapter consists largely in a reply to Imre Lakatos in further defense of Carnap. A second presents a critique of the Hintikka-Hilpinen acceptance rule. The last chapter is a comparison of cost—benefit versus utility acceptance rules in which Michalos claims to show the superiority of the former. In general, the book is an attempt to defend an inductive logic against the criticisms offered by Popperian deductive methodologists. A great deal of this material already appeared in various forms. The book is useful insofar as it collects material in one place and provides references to the important contributions to the controversy. Unfortunately, the book is cramped, explicitly discussing only some of the narrow issues found in the journal literature, and some sections are so compact as to be incomprehensible without extensive knowledge of the source material. Michalos might have given himself wider scope so that he could develop the implications of these limited problems for the broader issues of the philosophy of science.—K. M. (shrink)

This book consists of two essays of equal length. The first is a revised edition of Smart’s An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics while the second, by Williams, is a general critique of utilitarianism with pointed reference to Smart. Combining the normative utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick with the non-cognitivist metaethics of R. M. Hare, Smart outlines a version of act utilitarianism. In the course of doing this, he tackles the traditional problems of utilitarianism. He rejects rule utilitarianism because (...) it is "rule worship." He defends a middle ground between hedonistic and idealistic utilitarianism by admitting that happiness is in part an evaluative and not entirely a descriptive concept. Finally, he defends utilitarianism against deontic and common sense ethical theories by remarking about those cases in which utilitarianism seems to produce jarring results, "so much the worse for common sense ethics." Once one commits oneself to the principle of benevolence, it is the yardstick against which the value of acts is to be measured. Furthermore, this principle leads to the traditional utilitarian distinction between the value of an action and the value of praising or blaming the action. (shrink)