Online research in philosophy

: Workers generally face higher levels of pollution and risk in their workplace than members of the public. Economists justify the double standard (for workplace versus public exposures to various pollutants) on the grounds of the compensating wage differential (CWD). The CWD, or hazard-pay premium, is the increment in wages, all things being equal, that workers in hazardous environments receive, as compared to other workers. Economists defend the CWD by asserting that workers willingly trade safety for extra money. This essay (...) (1) examines the theory behind the CWD, (2) presents and evaluates economists' Market-Efficiency Argument for the CWD, (3) offers several reasons for questioning the CWD, and (4) applies the Market-Efficiency Argument to a real-world case, that of U.S. nuclear workers. The essay concludes that this argument fails to justify the CWD, at least in the case of U.S. nuclear workers. (shrink)

: Scientists are divided on the status of hypothesis H that low doses of ionizing radiation (under 20 rads) cause hormetic (or non-harmful) effects. Military and industrial scientists tend to accept H, while medical and environmental scientists tend to reject it. Proponents of the strong programme claim this debate shows that uncertain science can be clarified only by greater attention to the social values in(integral)uencing it. While they are in part correct, this paper argues that methodological analyses (not merely attention (...) to social values) also can help clarify uncertain science. The paper analyzes five measurement uncertainties, as well as seven methodological value judgments, relevant to H. Using criteria of internal and external consistency, as well as predictive power, it argues that metascience also helps resolve this debate. And if so, then value-laden, policy-relevant science may need, not only more attention to social values in order to resolve and to clarify disputes, but also more conceptual and methodological analyses of science. (This paper suggests what such methodological analyses might be like and uses the case of low-dose risks from radiation to illustrate its points, while a companion paper ("Chemical Hormesis, Conceptual Clarification, and the Warrant for Policy-Driven Science") in this same issue of POS suggests what such conceptual analyses might be like and uses the case of low-dose risks from chemicals to illustrate its points.) If this paper's thesis holds in the very politicized "hard case" of radiation hormesis, then it suggests that the metascientists may be right about what is also often necessary to clarify scientific disputes. (shrink)

In a world of massive extinctions where not all taxa can be saved, how ought biologists to decide their preservation priorities? When biologists make recommendations regarding conservation, should their analyses be based on scientific criteria, on public or lay criteria, on economic or some other criteria? As a first step in answering this question, we examine the issue of whether biologists ought to try to save the endangered Florida panther, a well known glamour taxon. To evaluate the merits of panther (...) preservation, we examine three important arguments of biologists who are skeptical about the desirability of panther preservation. These arguments are (1) that conservation dollars ought to be spent in more efficient ways than panther preservation; (2) that biologists and conservationists ought to work to preserve species before subspecies; and (3) that biologists and conservationists ought to work to save habitats before species or subspecies. We conclude that, although all three arguments are persuasive, none of them provides convincing grounds for foregoing panther preservation in favor of other, more scientifically significant conservation efforts. Our conclusion is based, in part, on the argument that biologists ought to employ ethical, as well as scientific, rationality in setting conservation priorities and that ethical rationality may provide persuasive grounds for preserving taxa that often are not viewed by biologists as of great importance. (shrink)

In this volume, the authors discuss what practical contributions ecology can and can't make in applied science and environmental problem solving. In the first section, they discuss conceptual problems that have often prevented the formulation and evaluation of powerful, precise, general theories, explain why island biogeography is still beset with controversy and examine the ways that science is value laden. In the second section, they describe how ecology can give us specific answers to practical environmental questions posed in individual case (...) studies, and argue for a new way to look at scientific error. A case study using the Florida panther is examined in the light of these findings. (shrink)

When is a law too idealized to be usefully applied to a specific situation? To answer this question, this essay considers a law in hydrogeology called Darcy''s Law, both as it is used in what is called the symmetric-cone model, and as it is used in equations to determine a well''s groundwater velocity and hydraulic conductivity. After discussing Darcy''s law and its applications, the essay concludes that this idealized law, as well as associated models and equations in hydrogeology, are not (...) realistic in the sense required by the D-N account. They exhibit what McMullin calls mathematical idealization, construct idealization, empirical-causal idealization, and subjunctive-causal idealization. Yet this lack of realism in hydrogeology is problematic for reasons unrelated to the status of the D-N account. These idealizations are also problematic in applied situations. Their problems require developing two supplemental criteria, necessary for their productive application. (shrink)

Nearly all current attempts at environmental impact analysis and technology assessment fall victim to an ethical and methodological assumption that Keniston termed “the fallacy of unfinished business.” Related to one version of the naturalistic fallacy, this assumption is that technological and environmental problems have only technical, but not social, ethical, or political solutions. After using several impactanalyses to illustrate the policy consequences of the fallacy of unfinished business, I suggest how it might be overcome. Next I present three standard arguments, (...) repeatedly used in technology and environmental impact assessments, by those who subscribe to this “fallacy.” I briefty examine the logical, consequentialist, and historical reasons for rejecting all three arguments in favor of this assumption. Ifmy suggestions are correct, then environmental impact analysis is not only a matter of discovering how to finish our technological business, but also a question of learning how to recognize the ethical and epistemological dimensions of our assessment tasks. (shrink)

An offshoot of decision analysis, risk-cost-benefit analysis (RCBA) dominates US policymaking regarding science and technology. In this paper a central normative presupposition of RCBA, called "the linearity assumption" is argued against. This is that there is a linear relationship between the actual probability of fatality and the value of avoiding a social risk or the cost of a social risk. The main object of this essay is to show that the presuppositions underlying the linearity assumption are highly questionable. It is (...) maintained that assessors ought to give more consideration to broadening their interpretations of "unit cost" and "societal risk" and to abandoning their claims about linearity. (shrink)

The main question addressed in this essay is whether quarks have been observed in any sense and, if so, what might be meant by this use of the term, observation. In the first (or introductory) section of the paper, I explain that well-known researchers are divided on the answers to these important questions. In the second section, I investigate microphysical observation in general. Here I argue that Wilson's analogy between observation by means of high-energy accelerators and observation by means of (...) microscopes is misleading, for at least three reasons. Moreover, so long as high-energy observation is accomplished by means of spark or bubble chambers, then sentences about these observations do not meet Maxwell's criterion, that observation statements are quickly decidable. I argue, however, that this criterion is not a good norm for what is observable in high-energy physics, both because it would result in our describing a great many allegedly observed particle events as unobserved or theoretical, and because it fails to distinguish the reasons why some observation statements might not be quickly decidable. Most important, Maxwell's criterion fails because, contrary to Hanson's analysis, it presupposes that seeing does not involve both seeing as and seeing that.With this background concerning what is meant by general microphysical observation, in the third section of the essay, I discuss what might be meant by a more particular type of observation, that of the quark via scattering events. I employ Feinberg's distinction concerning observation of manifest, versus existent, particles and claim that the alleged indirect observation of quarks as existent particles is really based on a retroductive inference. I explain which premise in the retroductive argument appears most open to the charge of being theoretical (in a damaging sense) and less substantiated by observation. (shrink)

In this paper the author analyzes the recent history of the concept of matter by examining two criteria, in-principle-observability and noncompositeness, for use of the term 'elementary particle'. Arguing that how these criteria are employed sheds light on a change in what matter means, the author draws three conclusions. (1) Since the seventeenth century, in-principle-observability has undergone a progressive devaluation, if not abandonment, in favor of the criterion of theoretical simplicity. As a consequence, (2) the concept of matter (...) has undergone a "third phase" of dematerialization. (This is an extension of the view of Russ Hanson, who described two such phases.) Finally, (3) the current concept of matter reveals a dilemma: if alleged elementary particles are verified through observation, they are composite and hence not elementary; if they are elementary, they are in-principle-unobservable. (shrink)