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Kai Vogeley [17]K. Vogeley [8]
  1. Sarah Schwarzkopf, Leonhard Schilbach, Kai Vogeley & Bert Timmermans (2014). “Making It Explicit” Makes a Difference: Evidence for a Dissociation of Spontaneous and Intentional Level 1 Perspective Taking in High-Functioning Autism. Cognition 131 (3):345-354.
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  2. Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley (2013). A Second-Person Neuroscience in Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):441-462.
    In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...)
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  3. Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley (2013). Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):393-414.
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  4. Kai Vogeley & Shaun Gallagher (2011). Self in the Brain. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
     
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  5. H. Kockler, L. Scheef, R. Tepest, N. David, B. H. Bewernick, A. Newen, H. H. Schild, M. May & K. Vogeley (2010). Visuospatial Perspective Taking in a Dynamic Environment: Perceiving Moving Objects From a First-Person-Perspective Induces a Disposition to Act☆. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):690-701.
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  6. Albert Newen, Kai Vogeley & Christoph Michel (2010). Self, Other and Memory: A Preface. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):687-689.
    Spatial perspective taking is an everyday cognitive process that is involved in predicting the outcome of goal directed behavior. We used dynamic virtual stimuli and fMRI to investigate at the neural level whether motion perception interacts with spatial perspective taking in a life-like design. Subjects were asked to perform right-left-decisions about the position of either a motionless, hovering or a flying ball , either from their own or from the perspective of a virtual character . Our results showed a significant (...)
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  7. Kai Vogeley & Andreas Roepstorff (2009). Contextualising Culture and Social Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (12):511-516.
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  8. N. David, A. Newen & K. Vogeley (2008). The “Sense of Agency” and its Underlying Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):523-534.
    The sense of agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself as the agent of one’s own actions. Several different cognitive theories on the sense of agency have been proposed implying divergent empirical approaches and results, especially with respect to neural correlates. A multifactorial and multilevel model of the sense of agency may provide the most constructive framework for integrating divergent theories and findings, meeting the complex nature of this intriguing phenomenon.
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  9. A. Newen, K. Vogeley & A. Zinck (2008). Social Cognition, Emotion and Self-Consciousness: A Preface. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):409-410.
  10. N. SaNtos, N. David, G. Bente & K. Vogeley (2008). Parametric Induction of Animacy Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):425-437.
    Graphical displays of simple moving geometrical figures have been repeatedly used to study the attribution of animacy in human observers. Yet little is known about the relevant movement characteristics responsible for this experience. The present study introduces a novel parametric research paradigm, which allows for the experimental control of specific motion parameters and a predictable influence on the attribution of animacy. Two experiments were conducted using 3D computer animations of one or two objects systematically introducing variations in the following aspects (...)
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  11. L. SchiLbach, S. Eickhoff, A. RotArskajagiela, G. Fink & K. Vogeley (2008). Minds at Rest? Social Cognition as the Default Mode of Cognizing and its Putative Relationship to the "Default System" of the Brain. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):457--467.
    The “default system” of the brain has been described as a set of regions which are ‘activated’ during rest and ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks. To investigate the reliability of task-related deactivations, we performed a meta-analysis across 12 fMRI studies. Our results replicate previous findings by implicating medial frontal and parietal brain regions as part of the “default system”.However, the cognitive correlates of these deactivations remain unclear. In light of the importance of social cognitive abilities for human beings and their (...)
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  12. Kevin Guise, Karen Kelly, Jennifer Romanowski, Kai Vogeley, Steven M. Platek, Elizabeth Murray & Julian Paul Keenan (2007). The Anatomical and Evolutionary Relationship Between Self-Awareness and Theory of Mind. Human Nature 18 (2):132-142.
    Although theories that examine direct links between behavior and brain remain incomplete, it is known that brain expansion significantly correlates with caloric and oxygen demands. Therefore, one of the principles governing evolutionary cognitive neuroscience is that cognitive abilities that require significant brain function (and/or structural support) must be accompanied by significant fitness benefit to offset the increased metabolic demands. One such capacity is self-awareness (SA), which (1) is found only in the greater apes and (2) remains unclear in terms of (...)
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  13. Kai Vogeley & Christian Kupke (2007). Disturbances of Time Consciousness From a Phenomenological and Neuroscientific Perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.
  14. Kai Vogeley, M. May, A. Ritzl, P. Falkai, K. Zilles & Gereon R. Fink (2004). Neural Correlates of First-Person Perspective as One Constituent of Human Self-Consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (5):817-827.
  15. A. Newen & K. Vogeley (2003). Reply to Dorothee LeGrand. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):547-548.
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  16. Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley (2003). Self-Representation: Searching for a Neural Signature of Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):529-543.
    Human self-consciousness operates at different levels of complexity and at least comprises five different levels of representational processes. These five levels are nonconceptual representation, conceptual representation, sentential representation, meta-representation, and iterative meta-representation. These different levels of representation can be operationalized by taking a first-person-perspective that is involved in representational processes on different levels of complexity. We refer to experiments that operationalize a first-person-perspective on the level of conceptual and meta-representational self-consciousness. Interestingly, these experiments show converging evidence for a recruitment of (...)
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  17. Kai Vogeley (2003). Modelling Our Selves. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (6):237-239.
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  18. Kai Vogeley (2003). Schizophrenia as Disturbance of the Self-Construct. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press. 361--379.
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  19. Kai Vogeley & Gereon R. Fink (2003). Neural Correlates of the First-Person Perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):38-42.
  20. Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley (eds.) (2000). Selbst Und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein Und Seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen. Mentis.
  21. K. Vogeley, P. Bussfeld, A. Newen, S. Herrmann, F. Happe, P. Falkai, J. Shah & K. Zilles (2000). Mental States of Oneself and Others Are Distinctly Implemented in the Human Brain. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S51 - S51.
     
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  22. Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust (1999). Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness. The Monist 82 (4).
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  23. K. Vogeley, M. Kurthen, P. Falkai & W. Maier (1999). The Prefrontal Cortex Generates the Basic Constituents of the Self. Consciousness and Cognition 8:343-363.
     
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  24. Kai Vogeley (1999). Hallucinations Emerge From an Imbalance of Self-Monitoring and Reality Modelling. The Monist 82 (4):626-644.
  25. Kai Vogeley, M. Moskopp Kurthen, P. Falkai & W. Maier (1999). Essential Functions of the Human Self Model Are Implemented in the Prefrontal Cortex. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):343-363.
    The human self model comprises essential features such as the experiences of ownership, of body-centered spatial perspectivity, and of a long-term unity of beliefs and attitudes. In the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, it is suggested that clinical subsyndromes like cognitive disorganization and derealization syndromes reflect disorders of this self model. These features are neurobiologically instantiated as an episodically active complex neural activation pattern and can be mapped to the brain, given adequate operationalizations of self model features. In its unique capability of (...)
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