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Daniel Kahneman [37]D. Kahneman [5]D. Slovic Kahneman [1]
  1. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
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  2.  78
    Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick (2005). A Model of Heuristic Judgment. In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge Univ Pr 267--293.
    The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples. The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned (...)
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  3. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman (1993). Probabilistic Reasoning. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press 43--68.
     
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  4.  18
    Carey K. Morewedge & Daniel Kahneman (2010). Associative Processes in Intuitive Judgment. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):435-440.
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  5.  3
    Daniel Kahneman (1966). Time-Intensity Reciprocity Under Various Conditions of Adaptation and Backward Masking. Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (4):543.
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  6.  28
    Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1979). On the Interpretation of Intuitive Probability: A Reply to Jonathan Cohen. Cognition 7 (December):409-11.
  7.  12
    Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1982). Variants of Uncertainty. Cognition 11 (2):143-157.
  8. Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch (forthcoming). Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction. Environmental Values.
  9. Daniel Kahneman, Joel Norman & Michael Kubovy (1967). Critical Duration for the Resolution of Form: Centrally or Peripherally Determined? Journal of Experimental Psychology 73 (3):323.
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  10.  22
    Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick (2007). Frames and Brains: Elicitation and Control of Response Tendencies. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):45-46.
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  11.  5
    Anat Ninio & Daniel Kahneman (1974). Reaction Time in Focused and in Divided Attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology 103 (3):394.
  12.  5
    Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1982). On the Study of Statistical Intuitions. Cognition 11 (2):123-141.
  13.  9
    Daniel Kahneman (1981). Who Shall Be the Arbiter of Our Intuitions? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.
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  14.  26
    Daniel Kahneman (1997). New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption. Legal Theory 3 (2):105-124.
    In contrast to logical criteria of rationality, which can be assessed entirely by reference to the system of preferences, substantive criteria of rational choice refer to an independent evaluation of the outcomes of decisions. One of these substantive criteria is the experienced hedonic utility of outcomes. Research indicates that people are myopic in their decisions, may lack skill in predicting their future tastes, and can be led to erroneous choices by fallible memory and incorrect evaluation of past experiences. Theoretical and (...)
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  15.  29
    Daniel Kahneman (2000). A Psychological Point of View: Violations of Rational Rules as a Diagnostic of Mental Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):681-683.
    The target article focuses exclusively on System 2 and on reasoning rationality: the ability to reach valid conclusions from available information, as in the Wason task. The decision-theoretic concept of coherence rationality requires beliefs to be consistent, even when they are assessed one at a time. Judgment heuristics belong to System 1, and help explain the incoherence of intuitive beliefs.
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  16.  13
    Daniel Kahneman & Jason Riis (2005). Living, and Thinking About It: Two Perspectives on Life. In Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis & Barry Keverne (eds.), The Science of Well-Being. OUP Oxford 285--304.
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  17. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society:263--291.
    The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - JSTOR.
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  18.  61
    Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law.
    Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain is distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System I, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System II, may or may not provide an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. An understanding of indignation helps to (...)
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  19.  8
    Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1983). Can Irrationality Be Intelligently Discussed? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
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  20.  9
    Daniel Kahneman & W. Scott Peavler (1969). Incentive Effects and Pupillary Changes in Association Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (2p1):312.
  21.  4
    Daniel Kahneman & Joel Norman (1964). The Time-Intensity Relation in Visual Perception as a Function of Observer's Task. Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (3):215.
  22.  11
    Daniel Kahneman, Bernard Tursky, David Shapiro & Andrew Crider (1969). Pupillary, Heart Rate, and Skin Resistance Changes During a Mental Task. Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (1p1):164.
  23. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman (1974). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  24. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1973). On the Psychology of Prediction. Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.
    Considers that intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic-representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness was supported in a series of studies with both naive and sophisticated university students. The ranking of outcomes by likelihood coincided with the ranking by (...)
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  25. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman (1973). Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability. Cognitive Psychology 5 (2):207-232.
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  26. Daniel Kahneman (2009). Can We Trust Our Intuitions? In Alex Voorhoeve (ed.), Conversations on Ethics. Oxford University Press
     
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  27.  2
    Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1982). A Reply to Evans. Cognition 12 (3):325-326.
  28.  1
    D. Kahneman (1983). Philosophical Arguments, Psychological Experiments, and the Problem of Consistency. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):253.
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  29. Ed Diener, Daniel Kahneman & John Helliwell (2010). International Differences in Well-Being. Oxford University Press Usa.
    This book draws together the latest work from scholars around the world using subjective well-being data to understand and compare well-being across countries and cultures. Starting from many different vantage points, the authors reached a consensus that many measures of subjective well-being, ranging from life evaluations through emotional states, based on memories and current evaluations, merit broader collection and analysis. Using data from the Gallup World Poll, the World Values Survey, and other internationally comparable surveys, the authors document wide divergences (...)
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  30. Daniel Kahneman & Paul Slovic (1982). Amos Tversky, Eds. 1982. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press
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  31. D. Kahneman (1980). Human Engineering of Decisions. In Melvin Kranzberg (ed.), Ethics in an Age of Pervasive Technology. Westview Press
     
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  32. Daniel Kahneman (1979). Mechanisms That Produce Critical Durations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):265-266.
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  33. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler (2000). Normative Feelings Produced by Market Processes. In Raymond Boudon & Mohamed Cherkaoui (eds.), Central Currents in Social Theory. Sage Publications 6--4.
  34. D. Kahneman (1982). P. Slovic, and A. Tversky. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press
  35. Daniel Kahneman (1982). Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Eds. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press
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  36. D. Slovic Kahneman (1982). P. & Tversky, A. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press
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  37. D. Kahneman & J. Snell (1990). Predictive Utility. In L. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research. Guilford Press 66--100.
     
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  38. D. Kahneman & P. Slovic (1982). Tversky, Eds. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press
  39. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman (2000). The Notion of Cognitive Bias. In Raymond Boudon & Mohamed Cherkaoui (eds.), Central Currents in Social Theory. Sage Publications 8--349.