The debate over patriotic education in Japan is marked by power shifts between the two different political groups that have different views of the role of patriotic education. By analyzing the power shift from a historical perspective, this essay makes a point that one of the problems of the debate over patriotic education in Japan is that the debate has never been discussed in terms of the conception of patriotism.
Les travaux ici rassemblés constituent les actes d’une journée d’études tenue en mai 2010 au Centre d’études supérieures de la Renaissance de Tours. Conformément aux coutumes épistémologiques du Centre, des spécialistes venus d’horizons disciplinaires très variés – histoire, philosophie, géographie, études italiennes – s’y sont retrouvés autour d’une interrogation commune sur les formes de la domination territoriale que met en jeu l’idée ..
Le projet d'E. Lévinas — manifester l'intelligibilité de la transcendance — le conduit à rencontrer, comme une figure exemplaire, l'expression cartésienne de l'extérionté, le thème de l'idée de l'infini. Jusqu'où va cette similitude ? Selon Lévinas, la responsabilité — pour autrui — inscrit déjà la transcendance, comme relation avec un au-delà, dans l'immanence à soi de la conscience, en tant que son en deçà, sa condition. « Par suite, l'idée de l'infini est le mode d'être, l'infinition même de l'infini ». (...) Ici apparaît la divergence : le substantialisme cartésien ne permet pas d'affirmer avec Lévinas que : « Il n'y a pas d'idée de Dieu ou Dieu est sa propre idée ». E. Lévinas' philosophical attempt to make clear the intelligibility of transcendence leads him to Descartes' version of the concept of metaphysical exteriority, i.e. to his theme of the idea of the infinite. How far does this resemblance reach ? According to Lévinas, the responsibility — for — others already places transcendence, as a relation with a beyond, within the immanence in oneself which characterizes consciousness, as its condition. Consequently, « the idea of infinite is the mode, of existence, the infinition itself of the infinite ». Here, the difference points out : cartesian substantialism does not allow to assert, as Lévinas does, that « either there is no idea of God, or God is the idea of himself ». (shrink)
L'Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines de Condillac comporte une critique de l'analyse lockienne des idées. Notre objet est d'abord de considérer le concept d'entendement que Condillac projette de substituer au concept lockien et de déterminer comment ce concept se trouve associé au projet de développer le savoir démonstratif suivant la norme d'une analyse intégrale reposant sur le principe de liaison des idées. Le dévoilement du principe s'accomplit dans et par une analyse génétique des connaissances. Mais tout se passe comme (...) si cette analyse se transformait par simple progression analytique en une logique structurant, comme de l'intérieur, le domaine entier des savoirs d'expérience.La thèse la plus fondamentale de la méthodologie condillacienne consiste à valider l'application indéfinie du principe de liaison des idées à tout le champ du connaissable tant rationnel qu ' empirique. The Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines by Condillac comprises a critique of Locke's analytic way of ideas. Our aim is first to analyse the concept of « entendement » that Condillac intends to substitute for Locke's notion of understanding, then to determine how this concept is involved in his project of developing demonstrative knowledge according to the norm of an integral analysis based on the principle of connexion of ideas. This principle is revealed through a genetic analysis of the cognitive operations. But such a genetic analysis transforms itself by mere analytic progression into a logic structuring as from the inside the entire domain of empirical knowledge. The most fundamental element in Condillac's methodology consists in its advocating indefinite application of the principle of connexion of ideas to the full range of the knowable, whether rational or empirical. (shrink)
Cet article se propose d’établir que la réalité que reçoivent les idées de la raison pure, les idées de liberté, de Dieu et de l’immortalité de l’âme, dans l’usage pratique de la raison, est moins objective que la réalité dont sont susceptibles les concepts purs de l’entendement dans leur fonction de détermination d’objet. À cette fin, il explicite, en premier lieu, en quoi la réalité objective des idées de Dieu et del’immortalité de l’âme peut être qualifiée de «subjective», en second (...) lieu, en quel sens on peut considérer la réalité objective de l’idée de liberté en tant que res facti comme incomplète relativement à l’objectivité théorique, enfin, en troisième lieu, il met en avant que l’acquisition de réalité objective pratique n’implique pas l’extension de la connaissance théorique des objets de ces trois idées.My aim in this article is to demonstrate that the reality of ideas of pure reason (liberty, God, and the immortality of the soul) in the practical use of reason is less objective than the reality of pure concepts of understanding in their function of determining the object. To this end I explain how the objective reality of ideas of God and the immortality of the soul can be qualified as “subjective,” and in what sense the objective reality of the idea of liberty as a res facti can be considered as incomplete in terms of theoretical objectivity. Finally, I propose that the acquisition of practical objective reality does not entail expanding our theoretical knowledge of the objects of these three ideas. (shrink)
L’iconologie traditionnelle a fixé la représentation d’un être « inspiré », immobilisé par une soudaine et visible illumination, main levée ou en suspens, regard fixe et aimanté. À l’inverse de cette image arrêtée, on souhaite mettre en valeur la dynamique d’une quête, d’un « voyage des idées ». L’idée même d’inspiration témoigne de glissements notionnels, de reprises et de refontes ; plus encore, elle permet de reconsidérer la métaphore du voyage — voyage des idées et par les idées. En soulignant (...) le lent déplacement notionnel qui ramène l’inspiration du ciel à la terre et de l’extraordinaire à l’ordinaire, on plaidera pour la puissance d’idées « vagabondes ». Les poursuivre oblige à transgresser délimitations et frontières, à construire l’itinéraire hasardeux d’une pensée risquée. (shrink)
Che cosa si intende, oggi, per fonte? La domanda non mira alla ricostruzione e definizione di una presunta entità sovrastorica. Essa è da intendere piuttosto come spia, nel variare delle forme storiche, di una persistenza delle questioni legate alla circolazione e al controllo dei saperi, anche in un epoca segnata da profondi mutamenti nei media della comunicazione intellettuale. L'articolo ha inteso indagarne alcuni aspetti, quali l''accesso all'informazione sul web, le nuove forme online dell'enciclopedia del sapere e i nuovi oggetti culturali (...) (ebook), nel quadro di una storia delle idee e della lettura che mostrasse, attraverso alcuni casi emblematici, le dinamiche di azione e reazione tra rivendicazioni di una libera circolazione delle idee e istanze di controllo. Il filo della riflessione si muove quindi alla ricerca di analogie che aiutino a decifrare alcuni fenomeni contemporanei e le questioni epistemologiche che ne derivano, dalle auctoritates dei secoli medievali al problema dell'autorevolezza delle fonti online. What can we mean, talking about sources today? The question doesn't aim at the definition of a presumed overhistorical object. We must rather think of it as a sign, in the changing of historical forms, of the persistence of questions connected to circulation and control of knowledge, in an age of deep changes concerning media. The paper would investigate some aspects of the question, like access to the web information, online versions of classical encyclopedia and new supports for reading (like ebook), in a history of ideas context able to show, using some historical examples, the dynamics of acting and reacting between claimings of free circulation of opinions and the attempt to put them down. Definitively, these pages try to find analogies to understand some issues of our age and some epistemological problems, driving the reader from the auctoritas concept in the Middle Ages to the authority of online sources. (shrink)
The Peri ide^on (On Ideas) is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work. She asks how, and how well, Aristotle understands Plato's theory of forms, and why and with what justification he favors an alternative metaphysical scheme. She examines the significance of the Peri ide^on for some central questions about Plato's theory of forms--whether, for (...) example, there are forms corresponding to every property or only to some, and if only to some, then to which ones; whether forms are universals, particulars or both; and whether they are meanings, properties or both. Fine also provides a general discussion of Plato's theory of forms, and of our evidence about the Peri ide^on and its date, scope, and aims. While she pays careful attention to the details of the text, she also relates it to contemporary philosophical concerns. The book will be valuable for anyone interested in metaphysics ancient or modern. (shrink)
This paper explores the application of the concept of "dignity" to groups such as nations, peoples, cultures, and communities. It suggests that while there are certain difficulties with attributing dignity to groups, and while the attribution of dignity to some groups can be invidious, and while the attribution of dignity to a group might in the end amount to nothng more than an emphasis on the dignity of its members, still the ide aof group dignity cannot be ruled out. It (...) cannot be ruled out on either logical grounds or on grounds of moral and political principle; indeed it may often be the best way of conveying important moral information about the value of groups to their members. (shrink)
Commonly overlooked in the commentaries on Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld is the fact that Husserl conceived his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science with an empirical as well as a non-empirical (eidetic) stage. At the lower stage, it deals with our factical lifeworld and aims at general propositions about the very world we live in. At the higher stage, i.e., the primary stage for Husserl, it aims at general propositions about the lifeworld as such but not about (...) our factical lifeworld, which now serves only as one possible lifeworld among others. This higher-level science of the lifeworld is a descriptive eidetics made up of pure descriptive concepts and pure descriptive laws (descriptive eidetic laws), in which no factical entity is posited explicitly or implicitly. The present paper analyzes these relationships. In an excursus, it also traces out the elements, principles and methodology of a descriptive eidetics in general to see how they are applied to Husserl’s descriptive eidetics of the lifeworld as it is subsequently developed in his lectures on Phenomenological Psychology from 1925, a text in which Husserl explicitly outlines his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science. (shrink)
Approximately 48 hours ago, knowing that I would, Lord willing, be stand- ing here on this podium two days hence, I tapped http://www.fsf.org into Safari in order to begin learning at least something about the Free Software Movement (FSM). My online education has been augmented by many propo- nents of FSM in attendance at this conference, including Richard Stallman. What I have learned is that this movement is populated by a lot of seem- ingly well-intentioned people who are, at least (...) for the time being, utterly irrational, or worse. In wanting to point out why logic has heretofore been lost on the folks in question, I find within my command an embarrassment of riches. The five minutes at my disposal here is slim indeed, but nonetheless sufficient to reveal the untenability of FSM to those not gripped by an ide- ology: I shall mention here just a needle of fatal truth from the vast supply before me. (shrink)
This paper aims to offer a new and alternative perspective on the basic idea of Levinas’s philosophy. My claim is that the latter can be more appropriately understood not as a contribution to a new way of thinking about ethics or the realm of the ethical as such, but rather toward the theory of normativity. The goal of Levinas’s reflections on alterity is to exhibit the normativity that is in play in all modes of understanding. Levinas tries to understand how (...) intentional beings are normatively bound by one another. This paper tries to give answers to the questions of (1) why Levinas addresses questions of alterity, (2) what is distinctive about these questions according to his way of thinking, and (3) why one should consider Levinas’ thought from the perspective of the articulation of a theory of normativity. (shrink)
The Idea behind Tarski's Definition of Truth. In Tarski's presentations of his truth-definition, the steps of the construction are not sufficiently explained. It is not clear, on what general strategy the construction is based, what the fundamental ideas are, how some crucial steps work, and especially how the transition from the definition of satisfaction to the definition of truth should be understood. The paper shows that the account given in the model-theoretic literature, which is supported by Tarski's lemmata A and (...) B, is unsatisfactory, because Tarski's notion of truth can't be interpreted as ‘truth independent of the assignment of values to the variables’. Moreover, a satisfactory account of all the crucial steps is given. (shrink)
A cursory overview of the most recent studies on Kant's philosophy of history might lead one to suspect that Kant was so confident of the moral potential of human reason that the future could only lead to human progress. But in fact Kant was very much conscious of the disheartening picture that human development presented. In the conclusion to his Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History he writes: “The thinking person is assailed by a melancholy that can even lead (...) to moral corruption, something of which the unthinking person knows nothing: namely a dissatisfaction with that providence that rules the course of the world.” But Kant not wish to remain in a state of “melancholy”. He sees a possible connection between melancholy and the philosophy of history. In his relevant writings Kant addresses himself directly to the threat of this despair. The horrors of history can yield a philosophical meaning. Not history itself, but rather the philosophy of history has the capacity to console us. It can “heal” that which is lacking in wholeness through human progress. And because the history of philosophy contributes to the recovery of hope and conviction, it itself becomes an important movens of history. (shrink)
The article deals with the differences of the notion of 'object' or 'thing' in natural languages, concluding that some languages are by their structure more object-biased while others are more event-biased and proceeds to analyse how two common Japanese words, mono and koto , both meaning 'thing', have been treated in 20th-century Japanese thought, notably in the philosophical works of Watsuji Tetsurô, Ide Takashi, Hiromatsu Wataru and Kimura Bin. All of these thinkers represent different schools and trends (Watsuji could be (...) called a cultural particularist, Ide was an Aristotle scholar, Hiromatsu a Marxist and Kimura is a psychiatrist), but come to similar conclusions in this respect, allowing us to regard event-biased and object-biased linguistic constructions as manifestations of two different, but equally necessary cognitive faculties. (shrink)
One of the most intriguing claims of Stoic logic is Chrysippus's denial of the modal principle that the impossible does not follow from the possible. Chrysippus's argument against this principle involves the idea that some propositions are ?destroyed? or ?perish?. According to the standard interpretation of Chrysippus's argument, propositions cease to exist when they are destroyed. Ide has presented an alternative interpretation according to which destroyed propositions persist after destruction and are false. I argue that Ide's alternative interpretation as well (...) as some versions of the standard interpretation conflict with Stoic doctrines about the nature of propositions. I propose another version of the standard interpretation based on Frede's account of the Stoic theory of the proposition. I hold that this version of the standard interpretation both escapes Ide's objections and is consistent with Stoic logic and philosophy of language. (shrink)
I sin uppsats "Satsens subjekt och textens"2 ger Staffan Hellberg en översikt över vad han kallat empatimarkörer (alternativt ‘perspektivmarkörer’, sid 2) i berättande prosa. Grundidén, så som jag förstått den, är att en empatimarkör visar på en viss typ av förändring av berättarperspektivet. Hellberg skriver: Det är vanligt, för att inte säga normalt, i modern berättarteknik, att händelseförloppet upplevs genom en deltagande persons sinnen eller på annat sätt behandlas ur dennes synvinkel.3 Utgångspunkten är att en berättelse återges på ett för (...) berättelsen normalt sätt. Vissa berättelser är t.ex. i jag-form, medan andra återges på ett mer neutralt sätt, med en framställning i tredje person av berättelsens gestalter. Emellanåt bryts denna normala framställning genom att en situation återges, helt eller delvis, ur en deltagares perspektiv, t.ex. så som sedd av denna deltagare, eller så som tolkad av denne deltagare. Det som Hellberg eftersträvat är en översikt över de språkliga element som markerar en sådan tillfällig förskjutning av berättarperspektivet. För egen del vill jag använda termen perspektivförskjutning för de fenomen jag kommer att behandla nedan. Hellbergs översikt är i mycket hög grad baserad på intuitioner om förekomster av markörer för perspektivförskjutning, och bygger på en litteraturvetenskaplig tradition där intuitioner om perspektiv och perspektivförskjutning av olika slag behandlats under åtskilliga decennier. Detta förhållande erbjuder både svårigheter och utmaningar för en som står utanför denna tradition. Hellberg försöker inte formulera några allmänna kriterier för att vara en empatimarkör, varför det ankommer på läsarens egen intuitiva uppfattning av exemplen att förstå vad som exemplifieras. För den som är skolad i den tradition Hellberg bygger på kanske detta inte erbjuder några svårigheter alls, eller endast ringa svårigheter, men för mig, som är skolad i analytisk filosofi, och som visserligen läst en del romaner men aldrig studerat skönlitteratur teoretiskt, är svårigheterna emellanåt betydande. Utmaningen består å andra sidan just i att försöka formulera en allmän idé om perspektivförskjutning, så att vi också kan erhålla ett kriterium för att vara en språklig markör av sådana förskjutningar.. (shrink)
Review of two books in Polish: -/- Between Monism and Pluralism. A Study of the Genesis and Foundations of John Dewey’s Philosophy. -/- Concepts of Ch. S. Peirce’s Pragmatism and their Revival in 20th-Century Philosophy of Language.
