Drawing on risk mitigation theory, this article examines whether the improvement of firms’ social performance reduces debt financing costs (CDFs) in China, the world’s largest emerging market. Employing both the ordinary least square (OLS) and the two-stage instrumental variable regression methods, we find that improved corporate social responsibility (CSR) reduces the CDF when firms’ CSR investment is lower than an optimal level; however, this relationship is reversed after the CSR investment exceeds the optimal level. Firms with extremely low or extremely (...) high CSR are subject to a higher CDF. The results also suggest that the optimal CSR level for small firms is higher than that for large firms. This study is the first to document a U-shaped relationship between CSR and CDF and also the first to investigate this relationship within an emerging market context. (shrink)
There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism, the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception of content, and it therefore begs the question against (...) materialism. To argue for (2), Plantinga claims that the adaptiveness of a belief is indifferent to its truth. I argue that this claim is unsupported unless it again assumes an anti-materialistic conception of content and truth. I further argue that Plantinga’s argument for (3) is not successful either, because an improved version of teleosemantics can meet his criticisms. Moreover, this version of teleosemantics implies that the truth of a belief is (probabilistically) positively related to its adaptiveness, at least for simple beliefs about physical objects in human environments. This directly challenges Plantinga’s claim that adaptiveness is indifferent to truth. (shrink)
This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs (...) to anti-realism, but can meet those challenges and can perhaps convince some realists, at least those who are also naturalists. (shrink)
This paper explores how to explain the applicability of classical mathematics to the physical world in a radically naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics. The applicability claim is first formulated as an ordinary scientific assertion about natural regularity in a class of natural phenomena and then turned into a logical problem by some scientific simplification and abstraction. I argue that there are some genuine logical puzzles regarding applicability and no current philosophy of mathematics has resolved these puzzles. Then I introduce (...) a plan for resolving the logical puzzles of applicability. (shrink)
The Kripkean metaphysical modality (i.e. possibility and necessity) is one of the most important concepts in contemporary analytic philosophy and is the basis of many metaphysical speculations. These metaphysical speculations frequently commit to entities that do not belong to this physical universe, such as merely possible entities, abstract entities, mental entities or qualities not realizable by the physical, which seems to contradict naturalism or physicalism. This paper proposes a naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality, as a naturalist’s response to these (...) metaphysical speculations. It will show that naturalism can accommodate the Kripkean metaphysical modality. In particular, it will show that naturalism can help to resolve the puzzles surrounding Kripke’s a posteriori necessary propositions and a priori contingent propositions. (shrink)
Radical interpretation is used by Davison in his linguistic theory not only as an interesting thought experiment but also a general pattern that is believed to be able to give an essential and general account of linguistic interpretation. If the principle of charity is absolutely necessary to radical interpretation, it becomes, in this sense, a general methodological principle. However, radical interpretation is a local pattern that is proper only for exploring certain interpretation in a specific case, and consequently the principle (...) of charity is an applicable principle in the limited scope. It is neither the case that every linguistic interpretation is in nature radical nor that the principle of charity is the primary and fundamental principle for all linguistic interpretation as Davidson believes. (shrink)
The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical (...) entities; second, the thoughts that we create in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions. (shrink)
I argue that the most popular versions of naturalism imply nominalism in philosophy of mathematics. In particular, there is a conflict in Quine's philosophy between naturalism and realism in mathematics. The argument starts from a consequence of naturalism on the nature of human cognitive subjects, physicalism about cognitive subjects, and concludes that this implies a version of nominalism, which I will carefully characterize. The indispensability of classical mathematics for the sciences and semantic/confirmation holism does not affect the argument. The disquotational (...) theory of reference and truth is discussed but rejected. This argument differs from the Benacerrafian arguments against realism, because it does not rely on any specific assumption about the nature of knowledge or reference. It differs from the popular objections to the indispensability argument for realism as well, because it can admit both indispensability and holism. This argument motivates a new, radically naturalistic and nominalistic approach to philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)
Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the (...) “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy. (shrink)
We show that the following results in the classical theory of unbounded linear operators on Hilbert spaces can be proved within the framework of Bishop's constructive mathematics: the Kato-Rellich theorem, the spectral theorem, Stone's theorem, and the self-adjointness of the most common quantum mechanical operators, including the Hamiltonians of electro-magnetic fields with some general forms of potentials.
Yuyan Yiyi Zhicheng : Zizhu de Yiyi yu Shizai 语言·意义·指称: 自主的意义与实在 (Autonomous Language: A Possible Theory of Meaning). By YE Chuang Content Type Journal Article Pages 170-172 DOI 10.1007/s11466-011-0132-8 Authors Yi Jiang, School of Philosophy and Sociology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875 China Journal Frontiers of Philosophy in China Online ISSN 1673-355X Print ISSN 1673-3436 Journal Volume Volume 6 Journal Issue Volume 6, Number 1.
This article interprets Newton’s De gravitatione as presenting a reductive account of substance, on which divine and created substances are identified with their characteristic attributes, which are present in space. God is identical to the divine power to create, and mind to its characteristic power. Even bodies lack parts outside parts, for they are not constructed from regions of actual space, as some commentators suppose, but rather consist in powers alone, maintained in certain configurations by the divine will. This interpretation (...) thus specifies Newton’s meaning when he writes that bodies subsist ‘through God alone’; yet bodies do qualify as substances, and divine providence does not extend so far as occasionalism. (shrink)
Scholars and scientists do research to create new knowledge so that other scholars and scientists can use it to create still more new knowledge and to apply it to improving people's lives. They are paid to do research, but not to report their research: That they do for free, because it is not royalty revenue from their research papers but their "research impact" that pays their salaries, funds their further research, earns them prestige and prizes, etc.
Genetic variability and diversity are the result of a mutation-selection balance that acts permanently within and between species. The presence of deleterious mutations is a necessary consequence of this process and thus “the price paid by a species for its capacity for further evolution” (Haldane 1937, Am Nat 71:337–349). Recent estimations of mutation rate in the human lineage has revived the debate as to whether the high number of deleterious mutations poses a severe problem for the future of mankind. Theoretical (...) considerations allow a scenario in which the survival of the human race is maintained by truncation selection of deleterious mutations that removes as many mutations as appear anew in every generation. In this case our genetic burden is carried by those individuals that suffer a genetic death resulting from random distribution of deleterious alleles. Nevertheless, one has to ask whether the mutation rate may set absolute limits on the complexity of a species. (shrink)
Genetic variability and diversity are the result of a mutation-selection balance that acts permanently within and between species. The presence of deleterious mutations is a necessary consequence of this process and thus the price paid by a species for its capacity for further evolution (Haldane 1937, Am Nat 71:337â349). Recent estimations of mutation rate in the human lineage has revived the debate as to whether the high number of deleterious mutations poses a severe problem for the future of mankind. Theoretical (...) considerations allow a scenario in which the survival of the human race is maintained by truncation selection of deleterious mutations that removes as many mutations as appear anew in every generation. In this case our genetic burden is carried by those individuals that suffer a genetic death resulting from random distribution of deleterious alleles. Nevertheless, one has to ask whether the mutation rate may set absolute limits on the complexity of a species. (shrink)
In what does the sense of a sentential connective consist? Like many others, I hold that its sense lies in rules that govern deductions. In the present paper, however, I argue that a classical logician should take the relevant deductions to be arguments involving affirmative or negative answers to yes-or-no questions that contain the connective. An intuitionistic logician will differ in concentrating exclusively upon affirmative answers. I conclude by arguing that a well known intuitionistic criticism of classical logic fails if (...) the answer 'No' is accorded parity with the answer 'Yes'. (shrink)
Preposed negation yes/no (yn)-questions like Doesn''t Johndrink? necessarily carry the implicature that the speaker thinks Johndrinks, whereas non-preposed negation yn-questions like DoesJohn not drink? do not necessarily trigger this implicature. Furthermore,preposed negation yn-questions have a reading ``double-checking'''' pand a reading ``double-checking'''' p, as in Isn''t Jane comingtoo? and in Isn''t Jane coming either? respectively. We present otheryn-questions that raise parallel implicatures and argue that, in allthe cases, the presence of an epistemic conversational operator VERUMderives the existence and content of the (...) implicature as well as thep/ p-ambiguity. (shrink)
Is Knowledge a Duty? Yes, It Is, and We Also Have to “Respect People As Things”, At Least in Our Technological World: Response to Bernd Carsten Stahl’s Review of Morality in a Technological World: Knowledge as Duty Content Type Journal Article Pages 161-164 DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9179-x Authors Lorenzo Magnani, University of Pavia Department of Philosophy Piazza Botta 6 27100 Pavia Italy Journal Minds and Machines Online ISSN 1572-8641 Print ISSN 0924-6495 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, Number 1.
There is a long history of using logic to model the interpretation of indirect speech acts. Classical logical inference, however, is unable to deal with the combinations of disparate, conflicting, uncertain evidence that shape such speech acts in discourse. We propose to address this by combining logical inference with probabilistic methods. We focus on responses to polar questions with the following property: they are neither yes nor no, but they convey information that can be used to infer such an answer (...) with some degree of confidence, though often not with enough confidence to count as resolving. We present a novel corpus study and associated typology that aims to situate these responses in the broader class of indirect question–answer pairs (IQAPs). We then model the different types of IQAPs using Markov logic networks, which combine first-order logic with probabilities, emphasizing the ways in which this approach allows us to model inferential uncertainty about both the context of utterance and intended meanings. (shrink)
Yes, relative to the status quo.Â But the role of health policy experts is not to say what policies we personally favor, but rather to make policy consequences clear to the public.Â Once we tell the public that such a policy would not much harm the health of the non-low-income, then it is up to them to decide if they want to use the savings to subsidize low-income coverage.
Certain information-seeking yes/no (yn)-questions –e.g. Did Jorge really bring a present? and Doesn’t John drink?– convey an epistemic bias of the speaker. Two main approaches to biased yn-questions are compared: the VERUM approach and the Decision Theory approach. It is argued that, while Decision Theory can formally characterize the notion of “intent” of a question, VERUM is needed to derive the data.
1 — 100 / 547
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it: