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  1. Karol Polcyn, Chalmers' Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.
     
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  2. Karol Polcyn (2013). Conceivability, Possibility and Rationality. Filozofia Nauki 2.
    Chalmers argues that ideal conceivability (conceivability on ideal rational reflection) entails possibility and on this basis assumes that zombies are possible and, therefore, that materialism is false. I argue that the paradigm cases of conceivability intuitions that Chalmers takes to be reliable guides to possibility are not only conceptually coherent, even on ideal rational reflection, but in addition have some rational explanation. The conceivability of zombies, however, has no rational explanation. So it is not ad hoc to deny that the (...)
     
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  3. Karol Polcyn (2012). Objects, Their Parts, and Essences. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    According to some philosophical views, parts of objects (either three-dimen¬sional or four-dimensional) and whole objects are distinct entities. This raises the question of how to identify objects and their parts across possible worlds. By the principle of the necessity of diversity, the distinctness of objects and their parts must be preserved across possible worlds and this, paradoxically, seems to imply that in other possible worlds objects cannot be temporally or spatially different from what they actually are. For example, it seems (...)
     
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  4. Karol Polcyn (2011). Can Perceptual Experiences Justify Beliefs? Filozofia Nauki 2.
    The question whether perceptual experiences justify perceptual beliefs is ambiguous. One problem is the well familiar skeptical one. How can perceptual experiences justify beliefs if those experiences may systematically deceive us? Our experiences might be just as they are and yet the world might be radically different. But there is also another problem about the justification of perceptual beliefs which arises independently of the above skeptical worry. This other problem has to do with our understanding of the very notion of (...)
     
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  5. Karol Polcyn (2011). Split Brains. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    Brain bisection raises the intriguing question about how many minds the split-brain patients have. Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit, who have brought this question into consideration, come to similar conclusions in response to it. They both argue that the question has no answer, that there simply isn’t any countable number of minds that the split-brain patients have. In addition, Parfit argues that the split-brain cases can be adequately described only if we adopt a certain particular view about the metaphysical nature (...)
     
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  6. Karol Polcyn (2011). The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism and its Semantic Premise. Diametros 29 (29):80-92.
    David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, (...)
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  7. Karol Polcyn (2010). The Conceivability Argument and the Intuition of Dualism. Diametros 24:90-106.
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  8. Karol Polcyn (2007). Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Diametros 11:10-39.
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  9. Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism. Diametros 7 (March):37-55.
    Chalmers argues that zombies are possible and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on physical facts, which shows the falsity of materialism. The crucial step in this argument – that zombies are possible – follows from their conceivability and hence depends on assuming that conceivability implies possibility. But while Chalmers’s defense of this assumption – call it the conceivability principle – is the key part of his argument, it has not been well understood. As I see it, Chalmers’s defense of (...)
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  10. Karol Polcyn (2006). Phenomenal Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap. Diametros 6:49-69.
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  11. Karol Polcyn (2005). Argument z wyobrażalności a strategia pojęć fenomenalnych. Filozofia Nauki 3.
    According to the conceivability argument, physicalism is false since it is conceivable and hence possible that the physical truth do not entail the phenomenal truth. The influential way of responding to the conceivability argument is to claim that our conceivability intuitions can be accounted for in purely psychological terms, by appealing to some cognitive and functional differences between phenomenal and physical concepts, and that therefore what is conceivable does not entail what is possible. On this account, the entailment from the (...)
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  12. Karol Polcyn (2005). Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap. Diametros 6:49-69.
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  13. Karol Polcyn (1997). Realizm metafizyczny i referencja w świetle poglądów H. Putnama. Principia.
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