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Karyn L. Freedman [12]Karyn Freedman [2]
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Profile: Karyn Freedman (University of Guelph)
  1. Karyn L. Freedman (forthcoming). Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account. Social Epistemology:1-19.
    In this paper, I give an answer to the central epistemic question regarding the normative requirements for beliefs based on testimony. My suggestion here is that our best strategy for coming up with the conditions for justification is to look at cases where the adoption of the belief matters to the person considering it. This leads me to develop, in Part One of the paper, an interest-relative theory of justification, according to which our justification for a proposition p depends on (...)
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  2. Karyn L. Freedman (2014). One Hour in Paris: A True Story of Rape and Recovery. University of Chicago Press.
  3. Karyn L. Freedman (2013). Interests, Disagreement and Epistemic Risk. Dialogue 52 (3):587-604.
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  4. Karyn L. Freedman (2010). Disquotationalism, Truth and Justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):371-386.
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  5. Karyn L. Freedman (2010). The Limits of Internalism: A Case Study. Dialogue 49 (01):73-89.
    Looking at specific populations of knowers reveals that the presumption of sameness within knowledge communities can lead to a number of epistemological oversights. A good example of this is found in the case of survivors of sexual violence. In this paper I argue that this case study offers a new perspective on the debate between the epistemic internalist and externalist by providing us with a fresh insight into the complicated psychological dimensions of belief formation and the implications that this has (...)
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  6. Karyn L. Freedman (2009). Diversity and the Fate of Objectivity. Social Epistemology 23 (1):45-56.
    Helen Longino argues that the way to ensure scientific knowledge is objective is to have a diversity of scientific investigators. This is the best example of recent feminist arguments which hold that the real value of diversity is epistemic, and not political, but it only partly succeeds. In the end, Longino's objectivity amounts to intersubjective agreement about contextually based standards, and while her account gives us a good reason for wanting diversity in our scientific communities, this reason turns out to (...)
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  7. Karyn L. Freedman (2007). Knowledge Without Citable Reasons. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 14 (1):25-28.
    I want to thank Paul Lieberman, Nancy Nyquist Potter, and Marilyn Nissim-Sabat for their very thoughtful and stimulating commentaries on my paper (Lieberman 2007; Potter 2007; Nissim-Sabat 2007). Each offers an interesting and distinct challenge to my work and I am happy for the opportunity to reply to the insights they bring to it. In this short response, I focus on what I take to be the most serious objections from each commentator, with the hopes of both clearing up some (...)
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  8. Karyn L. Freedman (2007). Traumatic Blocking and Brandom's Oversight. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 14 (1):1-12.
    Robert Brandom grants that an individual can know even if she cannot provide a reasoned defense of her non-accidentally true beliefs about the world. Brandom is wrong, I argue, to suggest that this phenomenon of super blindsightedness is rare or fringe. This oversight becomes clear when we turn from the eccentric example of the industrial chicken-sexer to the case of the survivor of sexual violence. What we have in this instance is a subject who, qua survivor, has certain reliably formed, (...)
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  9. Karyn L. Freedman (2006). Disquotationalism, Truth and Justification: The Pragmatist's Wrong Turn. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):371-386.
    I argue that Cheryl Misak, in her Deflating Truth: Pragmatism vs. Minimalism, puts forth a pragmatist theory of truth that is deflationary in spirit but goes beyond the triviality of the equivalence schema. Furthermore, Misak's criticism of disquotationalism is systemic of a larger problem with her pragmatist theory of truth, namely her desire to explicate justification in terms of truth. She is right that people's assorteric practices involve defending their beliefs to one another, but she is wrong to think that (...)
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  10. Karyn L. Freedman (2006). Normative Naturalism and Epistemic Relativism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):309 – 322.
    In previous work, I defended Larry Laudan against the criticism that the axiological component of his normative naturalism lacks a naturalistic justification. I argued that this criticism depends on an equivocation over the term 'naturalism' and that it begs the question against what we are entitled to include in our concept of nature. In this paper, I generalize that argument and explore its implications for Laudan and other proponents of epistemic naturalism. Here, I argue that a commitment to naturalism in (...)
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  11. Karyn L. Freedman (2006). The Epistemological Significance of Psychic Trauma. Hypatia 21 (2):104-125.
    This essay explores the epistemological significance of the kinds of beliefs that grow out of traumatic experiences, such as the rape survivor's belief that she is never safe. On current theories of justification, beliefs like this one are generally dismissed due to either insufficient evidence or insufficient propositional content. Here, Freedman distinguishes two discrete sides of the aftermath of psychic trauma, the shattered self and the shattered worldview. This move enables us to see these beliefs as beliefs; in other words, (...)
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  12. Karyn L. Freedman (2005). Naturalized Epistemology, or What the Strong Programme Can't Explain. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):135-148.
    In this paper I argue that the Strong Programme's aim to provide robust explanations of belief acquisition is limited by its commitment to the symmetry principle. For Bloor and Barnes, the symmetry principle is intended to drive home the fact that epistemic norms are socially constituted. My argument here is that even if our epistemic standards are fully naturalized-even relativized-they nevertheless can play a pivotal role in why individuals adopt the beliefs that they do. Indeed, sometimes the fact that a (...)
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  13. Karyn Freedman (1999). Laudan's Naturalistic Axiology. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):537.
    Doppelt (1986,1990), Siegel (1990), and Rosenberg (1996) argue that the pivotal feature of Laudan's normative naturalism, namely his axiology, lacks a naturalistic foundation. In this paper I show that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of Laudan's use of the term 'naturalism'. Specifically, I argue that there are two important senses of naturalism running through Laudan's work. Once these two strands are made explicit, the objection raised by Doppelt and others simply disappears.
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  14. Karyn Freedman (1998). What's New on the Net. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (2):193 – 195.
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