Search results for 'Katalin Bombó' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  13
    Katalin Bombó (2005). The Church-Rosser Property in Symmetric Combinatory Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (2):536 - 556.
    Symmetic combinatory logic with the symmetric analogue of a combinatorially complete base (in the form of symmetric λ-calculus) is known to lack the Church-Rosser property. We prove a much stronger theorem that no symmetric combinatory logic that contains at least two proper symmetric combinators has the Church-Rosser property. Although the statement of the result looks similar to an earlier one concerning dual combinatory logic, the proof is different because symmetric combinators may form redexes in both left and right associated terms. (...)
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  2.  4
    Vadkerty Katalin (forthcoming). 1. Magyar sors Csehszlovákiában, 1945-47. História.
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  3.  4
    Dér Katalin (1987). Vidularia: Outlines Of A Reconstruction. Classical Quarterly 37 (02):432-.
    The last play of the Varronian canon, Vidularia, is transmitted to us through two different channels. Some pages of it survive in the Codex Ambrosianus, containing the prologue and a couple of scenes from the beginning of the play. On the other hand grammarians quote fragments of a few lines out of context, as examples of idiosyncratic Latin syntax and morphology. From the combination of these two disparate sources classical scholars have reconstructed a Vidularia that is parallel to Rudens on (...)
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  4. K. Katalin (2001). Hungarian Rhapsodies. Essays on Ethnicity, Identity and Culture. By Richard Teleky. The European Legacy 6 (5):673-673.
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  5. Brie Gertler (2009). The Subject's Point of View – Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.
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  6.  37
    A. Avramides (2009). The Subject's Point of View * by Katalin Farkas. Analysis 69 (4):791-794.
    On the dust jacket of The Subject's Point of View there is a detail from Vilhelm Hammershoi's Interior with Sitting Woman. It is hard to think of a painter who better captures the inner in his work. From the monochrome colour, to the back that faces us, to the door swung open to reveal yet another doorway, we are led to interiority – to the inner. This is a perfect image for a book whose author wants to persuade us to (...)
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  7.  33
    W. Fish (2011). The Subject's Point of View, by Katalin Farkas. Mind 119 (476):1161-1165.
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  8.  7
    Tamás Demeter (1999). Nyíri, J.C., Tradition and Individuality: Philosophical Essays, “Synthese Library”; Nyíri, Kristóf, A Hagyomány Filozófiája (The Philosophy of Tradition); Neumer, Katalin, Gondolkodás, Beszéd, Írás (Thought, Language, and Writing). [REVIEW] Studies in East European Thought 51 (4):329-340.
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  9.  9
    Erin Bradfield (2013). Katalin Makkai, Ed. , Vertigo: Philosophers on Film . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (5):384-387.
  10.  11
    Sandy Goldberg (2009). Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5).
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  11. Andrés Luis Jaume Rodríguez (2011). Katalin Farkas: un punto de vista cartesiano sobre el contenido mental. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):169-177.
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  12. Tamas Demeter (2001). Katalin Neumer: Die Relativität der Grenzen. Studien zur Philosophie Wittgensteins. [REVIEW] Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 54 (3).
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  13. Robert Fahrnkopf (2005). Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas, Eds., Metaphysics, a Guide and Anthology Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 25 (4):247-250.
     
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  14. Robert Fahrnkopf (2005). Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas, Eds., Metaphysics, a Guide and Anthology. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 25:247-250.
     
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  15. Robert Giannasi (1995). Katalin Halász, Images d'auteur dans le roman médiéval (XIIe–XIIIe siècles).(Studia Romanica, Series Litteraria, 17.) Debrecen, Hungary: Kossuth Lajos Tudományegyetem, 1992. Paper. Pp. 131; errata sheet. [REVIEW] Speculum 70 (4):913-914.
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  16. Roberta L. Krueger (2004). Douglas Kelly, with Maciej Abramowicz, Katalin Halàsz, Ceridwen Lloyd-Morgan, Et Al., Chrétien de Troyes: An Analytic Bibliography, Supplement 1. Woodbridge, Eng., and Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell and Brewer, 2002. Paper. Pp. Ix, 582. $85. [REVIEW] Speculum 79 (3):777-779.
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  17. Lorenzo PeÑa (1990). Alboran Is and Is Not Dry: Katalin Havas on Logic and Dialectic. Logique Et Analyse 33 (31):331.
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  18. A. Rational Superego (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem, Katalin Balog. Philosophical Review 108 (4).
  19. János Tőzsér (2009). Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 26:243-251.
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  20.  85
    Katalin Farkas (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  21. Katalin Farkas (2010). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  22.  87
    Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Practical Know-Wh. Noûs.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...)
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  23. Katalin Balog, Hard, Harder, Hardest.
    In this paper I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is epistemological, and it concerns whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is a problem (...)
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  24. Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...)
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  25. Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr (2015). The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument. Kemanusiaan 22 (1).
    The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is widely regarded as the most promising physicalist defence against the so-called epistemic arguments—the anti-physicalist arguments that establish an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal facts on the basis of the occurrence of epistemic gaps in our descriptions of these facts. The PCS tries to undercut the force of the epistemic arguments by attributing the occurrence of the epistemic gaps to the special character of phenomenal concepts—the concepts by means of which we think about our (...)
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  26. Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  27. Katalin Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press 292--312.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  28. Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  29. Katalin Farkas (2012). Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis. Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...)
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  30.  82
    Katalin Farkas (2016). Know-Wh Does Not Reduce to Know That. American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):109-122.
    Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of (...)
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  31. Katalin Bimbo & J. Michael Dunn (2008). Generalized Galois Logics: Relational Semantics of Nonclassical Logical Calculi. Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
    Nonclassical logics have played an increasing role in recent years in disciplines ranging from mathematics and computer science to linguistics and philosophy. _Generalized Galois Logics_ develops a uniform framework of relational semantics to mediate between logical calculi and their semantics through algebra. This volume addresses normal modal logics such as K and S5, and substructural logics, including relevance logics, linear logic, and Lambek calculi. The authors also treat less-familiar and new logical systems with equal deftness.
     
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  32. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  33.  69
    Katalin Farkas & Tomasz Budek (2014). Which Causes of an Experience Are Also Objects of the Experience? In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press 351-370.
    It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the (...)
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  34. Katalin Farkas (2013). Constructing a World for the Senses. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP 99.
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...)
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  35. Katalin Farkas (2014). A Sense of Reality. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucinations. MIT Press 399-417.
    Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...)
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  36. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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  37. Katalin Farkas (2015). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  38. Katalin Balog (2009). Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content. Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...)
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  39. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  40.  4
    Jan Surman, Katalin Stráner & Peter Haslinger (2014). Introduction: Nomadic Concepts—Biological Concepts and Their Careers Beyond Biology. Contributions to the History of Concepts 9 (2):1-17.
    This article introduces a collection of studies of biological concepts crossing over to other disciplines and nonscholarly discourses. The introduction discusses the notion of nomadic concepts as introduced by Isabelle Stengers and explores its usability for conceptual history. Compared to traveling and interdisciplinary concepts, the idea of nomadism shifts the attention from concepts themselves toward the mobility of a concept and its effects. The metaphor of nomadism, as outlined in the introduction, helps also to question the relation between concepts' movement (...)
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  41. Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...)
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  42. Katalin Varga, Zoltán Németh & Anna Szekely (2011). Lack of Correlation Between Hypnotic Susceptibility and Various Components of Attention. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1872-1881.
    The purpose of our study was to measure the relationship between performance on various attentional tasks and hypnotic susceptibility. Healthy volunteers participated in a study, where they had to perform several tasks measuring various attention components in a waking state: sustained attention, selective or focused attention, divided attention and executive attention in task switching. Hypnotic susceptibility was measured in a separate setting by the Waterloo-Stanford Groups Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form C .We found no significant correlation between any of the (...)
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  43. Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic Internalism and Externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
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  44. Katalin Balog (1999). Stor®. Philosophical Review 108 (4).
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  45.  37
    Katalin Bimbó, J. Michael Dunn & Roger D. Maddux (2009). Relevance Logics and Relation Algebras. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):102-131.
    Relevance logics are known to be sound and complete for relational semantics with a ternary accessibility relation. This paper investigates the problem of adequacy with respect to special kinds of dynamic semantics (i.e., proper relation algebras and relevant families of relations). We prove several soundness results here. We also prove the completeness of a certain positive fragment of R as well as of the first-degree fragment of relevance logics. These results show that some core ideas are shared between relevance logics (...)
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  46. Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
    In this commentary I criticize David Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory of consciousness . This is one of the best articulated philosophical accounts of consciousness available. The theory is, roughly, that a mental state is conscious in virtue of there being another mental state, namely, a thought to the effect that one is in the first state. I argue that this account is open to the objection that it makes “HOT-zombies” possible, i.e., creatures that token higher order mental states, (...)
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  47.  8
    Bronwyn Davies & Susanne Gannon (eds.) (2009). Pedagogical Encounters. Peter Lang.
    Introduction Bronwyn Davies We began this book at a collective biography workshop that Susanne and I convened in a house at Bombo on the south coast of New ...
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  48.  23
    Katalin Bimbó & J. Michael Dunn (2009). Symmetric Generalized Galois Logics. Logica Universalis 3 (1):125-152.
    Symmetric generalized Galois logics (i.e., symmetric gGl s) are distributive gGl s that include weak distributivity laws between some operations such as fusion and fission. Motivations for considering distribution between such operations include the provability of cut for binary consequence relations, abstract algebraic considerations and modeling linguistic phenomena in categorial grammars. We represent symmetric gGl s by models on topological relational structures. On the other hand, topological relational structures are realized by structures of symmetric gGl s. We generalize the weak (...)
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  49. Katalin Balog (2001). Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.
    Symposium contribution on Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book he develops this thesis within the two-dimensional framework and also proposes a formal argument for it. I argue that the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.
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  50.  78
    Katalin Bimbó, Combinatory Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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