Search results for 'Katalin Bombó' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Katalin Bombó (2005). The Church-Rosser Property in Symmetric Combinatory Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (2):536 - 556.score: 240.0
    Symmetic combinatory logic with the symmetric analogue of a combinatorially complete base (in the form of symmetric λ-calculus) is known to lack the Church-Rosser property. We prove a much stronger theorem that no symmetric combinatory logic that contains at least two proper symmetric combinators has the Church-Rosser property. Although the statement of the result looks similar to an earlier one concerning dual combinatory logic, the proof is different because symmetric combinators may form redexes in both left and right associated terms. (...)
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  2. Dér Katalin (1987). Vidularia: Outlines Of A Reconstruction. Classical Quarterly 37 (02):432-.score: 30.0
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  3. K. Katalin (2001). Hungarian Rhapsodies. Essays on Ethnicity, Identity and Culture. By Richard Teleky. The European Legacy 6 (5):673-673.score: 30.0
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  4. Vadkerty Katalin (forthcoming). 1. Magyar sors Csehszlovákiában, 1945-47. História.score: 30.0
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  5. Brie Gertler (2009). The Subject's Point of View – Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-747.score: 15.0
  6. W. Fish (2011). The Subject's Point of View, by Katalin Farkas. Mind 119 (476):1161-1165.score: 15.0
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  7. A. Avramides (2009). The Subject's Point of View * by Katalin Farkas. Analysis 69 (4):791-794.score: 15.0
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  8. Sandy Goldberg (2009). Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5).score: 15.0
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  9. Erin Bradfield (2013). Katalin Makkai, Ed. , Vertigo: Philosophers on Film . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (5):384-387.score: 15.0
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  10. Tamás Demeter (1999). Nyíri, J.C., Tradition and Individuality: Philosophical Essays, “Synthese Library”; Nyíri, Kristóf, A Hagyomány Filozófiája (The Philosophy of Tradition); Neumer, Katalin, Gondolkodás, Beszéd, Írás (Thought, Language, and Writing). [REVIEW] Studies in East European Thought 51 (4):329-340.score: 15.0
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  11. Robert Fahrnkopf (2005). Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas, Eds., Metaphysics, a Guide and Anthology Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 25 (4):247-250.score: 15.0
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  12. Robert Giannasi (1995). Katalin Halász, Images d'auteur dans le roman médiéval (XIIe–XIIIe siècles).(Studia Romanica, Series Litteraria, 17.) Debrecen, Hungary: Kossuth Lajos Tudományegyetem, 1992. Paper. Pp. 131; errata sheet. [REVIEW] Speculum 70 (4):913-914.score: 15.0
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  13. Roberta L. Krueger (2004). Douglas Kelly, with Maciej Abramowicz, Katalin Halàsz, Ceridwen Lloyd-Morgan, Et Al., Chrétien de Troyes: An Analytic Bibliography, Supplement 1. (Research Bibliographies and Checklists, N.S., 3.) Woodbridge, Eng., and Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell and Brewer, 2002. Paper. Pp. Ix, 582. $85. [REVIEW] Speculum 79 (3):777-779.score: 15.0
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  14. Andrés Luis Jaume Rodríguez (2011). Katalin Farkas: un punto de vista cartesiano sobre el contenido mental. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 30 (1):169-177.score: 15.0
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  15. A. Rational Superego (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem, Katalin Balog. Philosophical Review 108 (4).score: 15.0
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  16. János Tőzsér (2009). Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 26:243-251.score: 15.0
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  17. Katalin Farkas (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  18. Katalin Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 292--312.score: 3.0
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  19. Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.score: 3.0
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  20. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.score: 3.0
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We (...)
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  21. Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.score: 3.0
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...)
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  22. Katalin Farkas (2012). Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis. Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.score: 3.0
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...)
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  23. Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 16.score: 3.0
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  24. Katalin Balog (2009). Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content. Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.score: 3.0
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...)
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  25. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.score: 3.0
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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  26. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.score: 3.0
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  27. Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.score: 3.0
    In this commentary I criticize David Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory of consciousness (HOT). This is one of the best articulated philosophical accounts of consciousness available. The theory is, roughly, that a mental state is conscious in virtue of there being another mental state, namely, a thought to the effect that one is in the first state. I argue that this account is open to the objection that it makes “HOT-zombies” possible, i.e., creatures that token higher order mental states, but (...)
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  28. Katalin Farkas (2014). A Sense of Reality. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucinations. MIT Press. 399-417.score: 3.0
    Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...)
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  29. Katalin Balog (2001). Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.score: 3.0
  30. Katalin Farkas (2003). Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.score: 3.0
    In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we (...)
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  31. Katalin Balog, Illuminati, Zombies and Metaphysical Gridlock.score: 3.0
    In this paper I survey the landscape of anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses to them. The anti-physicalist arguments I discuss start from a premise about a conceptual, epistemic, or explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions and conclude from this – on a priori grounds – that physicalism is false. My primary aim is to develop a master argument to counter these arguments. With this master argument in place, it is apparent that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks (...)
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  32. Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).score: 3.0
    The book under review is a collection of thirteen essays on the nature phenomenal concepts and the ways in which phenomenal concepts figure in debates over physicalism. Phenomenal concepts are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences (aka “qualia”) whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. There are recent arguments, originating in Descartes’ famous conceivability argument, that purport to show that phenomenal experience is irreducibly non-physical. Second, phenomenal (...)
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  33. Katalin Balog (2004). Review: Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):774-778.score: 3.0
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  34. Katalin Farkas (2008). Time, Tense, Truth. Synthese 160 (2):269 - 284.score: 3.0
    Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary (...)
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  35. Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.score: 3.0
    Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...)
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  36. Katalin Makkai (2010). Kant on Recognizing Beauty. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):385-413.score: 3.0
    Abstract: Kant declares the judgment of beauty to be neither ‘objective’ nor ‘merely subjective’. This essay takes up the question of what this might mean and whether it can be taken seriously. It is often supposed that Kant's denials of ‘objectivity’ to the judgment of beauty express a rejection of realism about beauty. I suggest that Kant's thought is not to be understood in these terms—that it does not properly belong in the arena of debates about the constituents of ‘reality’—motivating (...)
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  37. Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.score: 3.0
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...)
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  38. Katalin Bimbó, Combinatory Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 3.0
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  39. Katalin Farkas (2009). Not Every Feeling is Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):39 - 52.score: 3.0
  40. Katalin Farkas (2010). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perpetual Consciousness and Critical Realism – Paul Coates. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):197-201.score: 3.0
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  41. Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic Internalism and Externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
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  42. Katalin Farkas (2005). The Unity of Descartes's Thought. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (1):17 - 30.score: 3.0
    Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence of Descartes’s dualist theory. (...)
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  43. Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-16.score: 3.0
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  44. Katalin Bimbó, J. Michael Dunn & Roger D. Maddux (2009). Relevance Logics and Relation Algebras. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):102-131.score: 3.0
    Relevance logics are known to be sound and complete for relational semantics with a ternary accessibility relation. This paper investigates the problem of adequacy with respect to special kinds of dynamic semantics (i.e., proper relation algebras and relevant families of relations). We prove several soundness results here. We also prove the completeness of a certain positive fragment of R as well as of the first-degree fragment of relevance logics. These results show that some core ideas are shared between relevance logics (...)
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  45. Katalin Farkas (2003). Review: The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):786-789.score: 3.0
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  46. Katalin Bimbó (2010). Schönfinkel-Type Operators for Classical Logic. Studia Logica 95 (3):355-378.score: 3.0
    We briefly overview some of the historical landmarks on the path leading to the reduction of the number of logical connectives in classical logic. Relying on the duality inherent in Boolean algebras, we introduce a new operator ( Nallor ) that is the dual of Schönfinkel’s operator. We outline the proof that this operator by itself is sufficient to define all the connectives and operators of classical first-order logic ( Fol ). Having scrutinized the proof, we pinpoint the theorems of (...)
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  47. Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.score: 3.0
    Th e type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, fi nding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics, and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. Th is volume (...)
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  48. Katalin Makkai (2007). Review of Rebecca Kukla (Ed.), Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8).score: 3.0
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  49. Katalin Bimbó & J. Michael Dunn (2009). Symmetric Generalized Galois Logics. Logica Universalis 3 (1):125-152.score: 3.0
    Symmetric generalized Galois logics (i.e., symmetric gGl s) are distributive gGl s that include weak distributivity laws between some operations such as fusion and fission. Motivations for considering distribution between such operations include the provability of cut for binary consequence relations, abstract algebraic considerations and modeling linguistic phenomena in categorial grammars. We represent symmetric gGl s by models on topological relational structures. On the other hand, topological relational structures are realized by structures of symmetric gGl s. We generalize the weak (...)
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  50. Katalin Farkas (2013). Constructing a World for the Senses. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP. 99.score: 3.0
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...)
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