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Profile: Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
  1. Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). A Sense of Reality. In Fiona MacPherson (ed.), Hallucinations. MIT Press.
    Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...)
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  2. Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  3. Katalin Farkas (2013). 18 A Sense of Reality. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. Mit Press. 399.
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  4. Katalin Farkas (2013). Constructing a World for the Senses. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP. 99.
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...)
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  5. Katalin Farkas (2012). Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis. Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...)
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  6. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  7. Katalin Farkas (2010). The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perpetual Consciousness and Critical Realism – Paul Coates. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):197-201.
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  8. Katalin Farkas (2009). Not Every Feeling is Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):39 - 52.
  9. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We (...)
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  10. Katalin Farkas (2008). Review of Laird Addis, Ontology and Explanation: Collected Papers. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (8).
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  11. Katalin Farkas (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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  12. Katalin Farkas (2008). Time, Tense, Truth. Synthese 160 (2):269 - 284.
    Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary (...)
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  13. Katalin Farkas (2006). Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.
    Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...)
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  14. Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic Internalism and Externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
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  15. Katalin Farkas (2006). 15.1 Three Claims About Meaning. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 323.
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  16. Katalin Farkas & Judit Szalai (2006). Foreword. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):5-6.
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  17. Katalin Farkas (2005). The Unity of Descartes's Thought. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (1):17 - 30.
    Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence of Descartes’s dualist theory. (...)
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  18. Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.) (2004). Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
    A complete and self-contained introduction to metaphysics, this anthology provides an extensive and varied collection of fifty-four of the best classical and contemporary readings on the subject. The readings are organized into ten sections: God, idealism and realism, being, universals and particulars, necessity and contingency, causation, space and time, identity, mind and body, and freewill and determinism. It features a substantial general introduction and detailed section introductions that set the selections in context and guide readers through them. Discussion questions and (...)
     
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  19. Katalin Farkas (2003). Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.
    In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we (...)
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  20. Katalin Farkas (2003). Review: The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):786-789.
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  21. Katalin Farkas (2003). The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World. Mind 112 (448):786-789.
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  22. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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