Quality is usually considered to be an attribute of an object, its degree of excellence or, more subjectively, fitness for use. Stemming from this point of view, the goal of most ranking systems is to find efficient ways of discovering, or rather uncovering, the quality of specific products or services. However, from a social psychological perspective it seems that the notion of quality belongs predominantly to the realm of social relationships. We argue that quality exists mainly between the users of (...) an object, not within the object itself, and its functions are predominantly social, i.e. promoting interactions, creating a shared reality, or building social relationships. Quality is constructed in social interactions and used as a token therein. In the present paper we outline the social functions of quality, and discuss the implications of this perspective for designing more useful recommendation systems. (shrink)
To account for category-specific semantic deficits, Humphreys and Forde propose to fractionate semantic memory into multiple sensory and functional knowledge stores. There are reasons to doubt the empirical productivity of this proposal, unless theoretically motivated principles of distinguishing and weighting the different kinds of object knowledge can be spelled out in detail.
Abstract Previous research has shown that children and adolescents can progress in the stages of moral judgment. However, in the case of adults, Kohlberg (1973) suggested there might be crystallization after the age of 25. The purpose of this study was to establish whether the structure of moral judgment of adults could be systematically encouraged toward change. Thirty?six adults (three groups) enrolled in an adult sexology course were assessed to determine stage level at the beginning of the course, and post?tested (...) at the completion of the course. Four dilemmas were used: two for general moral judgment, and two for sexual moral judgment. During the 45?hour course, subjects were systematically introduced to arguments of a higher stage, and discussions focused on the axiological aspects of the adults? sexual life. Results show that there was a significant increase in the scores at the post?test, both in general and in sexual moral judgments; subjects over 25 also increased their scores, thus indicating that the structure of moral judgment is not crystallized after that age. The existence of a differential between general and sexual moral judgments was also corroborated. Implications with regard to the use of the ?+1 stage? technique for adult education, and more particularly for adult sexual education, are discussed. 1Based upon an experimental study conducted by Louise Marchand?Jodoin and Michel Rainville. (shrink)
In this paper, a mathematical model of the respiratory mechanics is used to reproduce experimental signal waveforms acquired from three newborn lambs. As the main challenge is to determine specific lamb parameters, a sensitivity analysis has been realized to find the most influent parameters, which are identified using an evolutionary algorithm. Results show a close match between experimental and simulated pressure and flow waveforms obtained during spontaneous ventilation and pleural pressure variations acquired during the application of positive pressure, since root (...) mean square errors equal to 0.0119, 0.0052 and 0.0094. The identified parameters were discussed in light of previous knowledge of respiratory mechanics in the newborn. (shrink)
In this paper, I argue that John Milton, in his tragedy Smason Agonistes, raises and offers a solution to a version of the problem of evil raised by Marilyn McCord Adams. Sections I and II are devoted to the presentation of Adams’s version of the problem and its place in the current discussion of the problem of evil. In section III, I present Milton’s version of the problem as it is raised in Samson Agonistes. The solution Milton offers to (...) this problem is taken up in section IV and examined in section V. Last, in section VI, I explore briefly the existential aspect of Milton’s solution. (shrink)
In his preface to Samson Agonistes, Milton cites ?the ancients? and especially Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, as his models in a tragedy ?after the Greek manner.? In this preface, Milton interprets Aristotelian catharsis in medical terms as a restoration of balance or ?just measure.? The final lines of Samson Agonistes, beginning with the words ?All is best,? are an attempt at closure, suggesting that the storms of passion should give way to a healthy, serene calmness. But the mass (...) slaughter near the end of the poem makes these closing moments deeply disturbing and problematical. Unlike the heroes of Sophocles? Oedipus at Colonus and Philoctetes, and unlike the Samson of the Book of Judges, Milton's Samson is presented throughout the poem as a free moral agent. Rather than being the plaything of a remote and cruel deity, Milton's Samson accepts his responsibility for his own downfall. His conviction that he is God's ?nurseling,? set aside from early childhood as ?a person separate to God, / Designed for great exploits,? that he has failed in his responsibilities and has been brought low by his own weaknesses is consistent with Milton's sometimes heterodox theology as set forth in De Doctrina Christiana. At the heart of Milton's tragedy is the paradox of tragic freedom, the hidden presence of a deity, who with divine foreknowledge, allows his creatures freedom on the condition that, if they fail to obey his exacting demands, they must bear the terrible consequences. (shrink)
Sidgwick's defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams's condemnation of it as 'Government House utilitarianism.' It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and (...) show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications. (shrink)
The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...) Call & Tomasello, 2005). Fluent social interaction in adult humans implies efficient processing of beliefs, yet direct tests suggest that belief reasoning is cognitively demanding, even for adults (e.g., Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005). We interpret these findings by drawing an analogy with the domain of number cognition, where similarly contrasting results have been observed. We propose that the success of infants and non-human animals on some belief reasoning tasks may be best explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. In humans this capacity persists in parallel with later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding theory of mind abilities. (shrink)
The recognition of the close relation between the concept of action and the concept of responsibility goes at least as far back as Aristotle. His account of voluntary action could be seen as being the source of two general strategies for understanding the concept of action.1 One such approach is to determine when something is not an action first by studying a variety of interfering conditions. (e) The agent’s ϕing was a mere happening (non-action) iff external forces caused him to (...) ϕ. But Aristotle described those cases as ones where the principle of action is not in the agent,2 generating what might be thought of as a corresponding picture of what it means for a performance to be an action. (shrink)
We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics (...) is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle. (shrink)
Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her ability to perform the (...) contrary action, must be dropped. In its stead, they propose the weaker requirement of guidance control, which only demands the agent’s causal control over the action for which she is to be held responsible. (shrink)
Consider the idea that moral rules must be suitable for public acknowledgement and acceptance, i.e., that moral rules must be suitable for being ‘widely known and explicitly recognized’, suitable for teaching as part of moral education, suitable for guiding behaviour and reactions to behaviour, and thus suitable for justifying one’s behaviour to others. This idea is now most often associated with John Rawls, who traces it back through Kurt Baier to Kant.[1] My book developing ruleconsequentialism, Ideal Code, Real World, accepted (...) the ‘publicity requirement’ on moral rules.[2] Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer attack my moral theory on precisely this matter.[3] Here I reply to their attack. The question under discussion is whether moral rightness is a matter of the application of principles or rules that must be suitable for public acceptance. No, answered Henry Sidgwick, holding that perhaps the principles that determine moral right and wrong should be kept secret, because publicizing these principles would not maximize utility.[4] Since I think not-purely utilitarian forms of consequentialism may be more plausible than purely utilitarian forms, let me make the point in terms of consequentialism instead of utilitarianism. The standard form of act-consequentialism is maximizing and ‘global’, i.e., direct about everything.[5] This act-consequentialism includes, among the acts to be evaluated by their consequences, instances of espousing principles, teaching morality, blaming, feeling indignation, feeling guilt, and punishing. On this form of act-consequentialism, an act that maximizes good consequences might be one that others should blame and even punish, since blaming and punishing the agent of the good-maximizing act might also for some reason maximize good consequences. Likewise, on this standard form of act-consequentialism, it may be right to do what it would be right neither to advocate openly nor even to recommend privately. All these ideas are entailed by the kind of act-consequentialism that evaluates, by their consequences, all ‘acts’—in a very broad sense of the term that takes in not only acts of doing or allowing but also acts of blaming, punishing, and recommending. De Lazari-Radek and Singer accept that there are strong consequentialist considerations in support of ‘board support for transparency in ethics’ and avoiding esoteric morality in most circumstances.. (shrink)
Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position (...) to support a bold claim: the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality. (shrink)
According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the (...) agent. In the first part of the paper, I show that some powerful arguments designed to demonstrate the incoherence of explanatory nonindividualism fail. In the second part of the paper, I offer a nonindividualist explanation of the apparent obviousness of belief-desire psychology. I argue that there are two levels of the intelligibility of our actions. On the more fundamental (explanatory) level, the question "Why did the agent do something?" admits a variety of folk-psychological categories. But there is another (formation-of-self) level, at which the same question admits only of answers that ultimately appeal only to the agent's own desires. Explanatory individualism results from the confusion of the two levels. (shrink)
The ‘publicity requirement on moral rules’ refers to the idea that moral rules must be suitable for public acknowledgement and acceptance. The idea is that moral rules must be suitable for being ‘widely known and explicitly recognized’, suitable for teaching as part of moral education, suitable for guiding behaviour and reactions to behaviour, and thus suitable for justifying one’s behaviour to others. The publicity requirement is now most often associated with John Rawls, who traces it back through Kurt Baier to (...) Kant.1 Ideal Code, Real World, my book defending rule-consequentialism, accepted the publicity requirement.2 In this issue of Ratio, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer attack the publicity requirement.3 Here is my reply. Is moral rightness is a matter of the application of principles or rules that must be suitable for public acceptance? No, answered Henry Sidgwick, holding that perhaps the principles that determine moral right and wrong should be kept secret, because publicizing these principles would not maximize utility.4 Since I think that forms of consequentialism that are not purely utilitarian may be more plausible than forms that are purely utilitarian, let me make the point in terms of consequentialism instead of utilitarianism. The standard form of act-consequentialism is maximizing and ‘global’, i.e., direct about everything.5 This act-consequentialism includes, among the acts to be evaluated by their consequences, instances of espousing principles, teaching morality, blaming, feeling indignation, feeling guilt, and punishing. According to this form of act-consequentialism, an act that maximizes good consequences might be one that others should blame and even punish, since blaming and punishing the agent of the good-maximizing act might also for some reason maximize good consequences. Likewise, on this standard form of actconsequentialism, it may be right to do what it would be right neither to advocate openly nor even to recommend privately.. (shrink)
Motivated by a question of W. Rautenberg, we prove that any matrix that is term-equivalent to the well-known nonfinitely based matrix of A. Wroski is itself also nonfinitely based.
Denise Meyerson has recently argued that the adaptational account of false consciousness must appeal to a psychological element, contrary to explicit declarations of its proponents. In order to explain why the rulers genuinely hold ideological beliefs, one must take them to desire to think well of themselves. She concludes that the desire to think well of oneself causes the ideological beliefs. The article defends the adaptational account from Meyerson's attempt to ground it in the psychology of the rulers. Meyerson is (...) wrong both in thinking that the desire in question is explanatorily necessary and in thinking that its explanatory role would consist in its causing ideological beliefs. (shrink)
Kant and Milton: fundamentals and foundations -- Kant's journey in the constellation of German Miltonism: toward the procedure of succession -- Kant's Miltonic transfer to exemplarity: the succession to Milton's "On his blindness" in the groundwork of the Metaphysics of morals -- Kantian tragic form and Kantian "storytelling" -- The Critique of practical reason and Samson agonistes -- Kant's Miltonic procedure of succession in a key moment of the Critique of judgment.
If I lose my key in Canada, for instance, and I search for it in the United Kingdom, how long will I take to find it? This paper argues that problems in education are caused by non-professional teachers who are employed when trained teachers move in search of promotion friendly activities or financially rewarding duties. This shift of focus means that policy makers in education act without adequate professional guidance. The problems in education, therefore, result from demands made on mainstream (...) education based on misconceptions about what education can offer. It is argued that the implementation of e-learning in education faces the risk of developing on the basis of unproven theories. This scenario increasingly sees the replacement of formal education activities in institutions of learning with non-formal and informal education practices. Given that the contents and influences of non-formal and informal education are not under the control of the teacher, the experiences that learners bring to education settings are increasingly difficult to manage. The paper proposes that by integrating e-learning in teacher education and rewarding 'good teaching', there is a potential for a successful e-learning revolution in education. (shrink)
In many circumstances we tend to assume that other people believe or desire what we ourselves believe or desire. This has been labeled 'egocentric bias.' This is not to say that we systematically fail to understand other people and forget that they can have a different perspective. If it were the case, then it would be highly difficult, if not impossible, to communicate, cooperate or compete with them. In those situations, we need to take the other person's perspective and to (...) inhibit our own. But can the other's perspective furtively intrude even when no reason seems to require it, or even when it is detrimental for us? We shall see a series of evidence of what has been called altercentric bias (Samson et al., 2010; Apperly, 2011): other people's beliefs can unduly influence us even when they are wrong. At first sight, altercentric bias questions 1st person priority. In particular, it may appear as incompatible with simulation-based accounts of 3rd person mindreading. We shall argue, on the contrary, that the simulationist framework enables confusions between self and others that go both ways: taking one's beliefs for the other's beliefs (egocentric bias) and vice-versa, taking the other's beliefs for one's beliefs (altercentric bias). We shall then see how the risk of such confusion may be disadvantageous from an evolutionary perspective, questioning thus the evolutionary plausibility of the simulation theory. (shrink)
The debate between the causalists and the teleologists has reached something of a standstill. In the 1950s, it was widely believed that the proper way of thinking about action (reason) explanations is in exclusively teleological terms and that the very idea of causality is misplaced in a systematic thinking about the relation between actions and reasons (e.g.: Anscombe 1963; Melden 1961; Peters 1958; Ch. Taylor 1964; R. Taylor 1966). This atmosphere was disrupted by Donald Davidson’s famous paper “Actions, Reasons and (...) Causes” (1963). He argued that without the invocation of the idea that reasons are causes, one cannot account for the idea of reasons’ efficacy, which is manifested in the distinction between acting for reasons and acting while merely having reasons. The teleologists have answered that teleological explanations do too support the distinction (e.g. Collins 1987; von Wright 1971; Wilson 1989). But other challenges ensued. For example, Frederick Stoutland (1976; 1989) objected to G.H. von Wright’s version of the teleological theory that a teleological explanation leaves it mysterious why a behavior occurs when the agent intends it to occur. More recently, William Child (1994) argued that reason explanations must be capable of explaining why an action occurs just when it occurs and only a causal explanation can do so. Such challenges are usually met either by demonstrating that teleological explanations are capable of meeting them or that they are not really general features of ordinary reasons explanations (see, for example, Hursthouse 2000). (shrink)
We present a game semantics for Linear Logic, in which formulas denote games and proofs denote winning strategies. We show that our semantics yields a categorical model of Linear Logic and prove full completeness for Multiplicative Linear Logic with the MIX rule: every winning strategy is the denotation of a unique cut-free proof net. A key role is played by the notion of history-free strategy; strong connections are made between history-free strategies and the Geometry of Interaction. Our semantics incorporates a (...) natural notion of polarity, leading to a refined treatment of the additives. We make comparisons with related work by Joyal, Blass, et al. (shrink)
There are exactly two nonfinitely axiomatizable algebraic matrices with one binary connective o such thatx(yz) is a tautology of . This answers a question asked by W. Rautenberg in [2], P. Wojtylak in [8] and W. Dziobiak in [1]. Since every 2-element matrix can be finitely axiomatized ([3]), the matrices presented here are of the smallest possible size and in some sense are the simplest possible.
The aim of the paper is to propose an understanding of idealization in terms of Nowak’s unitarian metaphysics. Two natural interpretations of the procedure are critically discussed and rejected as inadequate. The first account of idealization is unable to explain why idealized factors cease to exert influence on the investigated magnitude. The second account of idealization solves this problem but does so at the cost of blurring the distinction between idealization and abstruction. Moreover, it faces the consequence that the process (...) of idealization instead of leading to a sharper understanding of phenomena will normally result in making the picture more and more probabilistic. I propose a third account of idealization in unitarian terms that solves all three problems. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to characterize varieties of Heyting algebras with decidable theory of their finite members. Actually we prove that such varieties are exactly the varieties generated by linearly ordered algebras. It contrasts to the result of Burris [2] saying that in the case of whole varieties, only trivial variety and the variety of Boolean algebras have decidable first order theories.
A: Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other. B: The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to the same. Z: So, the two sides of this triangle are equal to each other. Achilles fails because he encounters an infinite progression of hidden premises of the form “If all the premises of the argument are true, the conclusion is true”. In [a1], the hidden premise is H1 “If A and B then Z” (...) – surely, if one did not believe that H1 is true, one would have a reason not to accept the conclusion Z. So, the argument [a2] must lead to conclusion Z from A, B and H1. But, one will have to supplement [a2] with H2: “If A and B and H1 then Z” since if one did not believe H2 one would have a reason not to draw conclusion Z. And so on ad infinitum. The puzzle can be seen as arising through the application of an apparently innocent principle of discerning missing premises (§2). If looked at in this light, the standard response given to the paradox does not so much resolve the puzzle as legislates against it being raised with respect to principles of inference (§3). I argue that a fundamental ambiguity infests the test for what is a missing premise (§4). Moreover, it explains why the puzzle appears to, though it does not (§5), arise. I end with some comments on the usefulness of the test (§6). (shrink)
The objective of this paper is to show how methods rooted in formal logic may be used to analyze socially important processes of persuasion. A formal approach to the theory of persuasion enables us to thoroughly research issues crucial in everyday life such as: how we argue, why we quarrel, where we are efficient in persuasion, when do we win a negotiation, how we influence others’ decisions, and the kinds of argumentative strategies that are apt to yield more accurate beliefs (...) for all parties involved.I concentrate on three aspects of persuasion practice: nature, success and cognitive value of argumentation process. From a logical perspective, I understand argumentation as reasoning which, after initiation through the opponent’s disagreement, is deployed by the proponent in order to persuade the audience to believe his thesis. Furthermore, I attempt to determine the ways in which we succeed in persuading others. Lastly, I try to specify when an argument is cognitively valuable and when it is reliable, in the sense that it helps us to track the truth. In order to analyze these matters, I investigate argumentation on two independent levels. The subjective level of people’s beliefs is the essential foundation of all persuasion -- every time we aim to make the audience believe our opinions and /or change their decisions. The second level is the objective field of truthfulness, where we consider whether a given argumentation will lead us to true or false conclusions. (shrink)
We use a simple relational framework to develop the key notions and results on hidden variables and non-locality. The extensive literature on these topics in the foundations of quantum mechanics is couched in terms of probabilistic models, and properties such as locality and no-signalling are formulated probabilistically. We show that to a remarkable extent, the main structure of the theory, through the major No-Go theorems and beyond, survives intact under the replacement of probability distributions by mere relations.
The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years of age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer & J. Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (K. H. Onishi & R. Baillargeon, 2005; L. Surian, S. Caldi, & D. Sperber, 2007). Nonhuman animals also fail critical (...) tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behavior (e.g., J. Call & A Tomasello, 2005). Fluent social interaction in adult humans implies efficient processing of beliefs, yet direct tests suggest that belief reasoning is cognitively demanding, even for adults (e.g., I. A. Apperly, D. Samson, & G. W. Humphreys, 2009). The authors interpret these findings by drawing an analogy with the domain of number cognition, where similarly contrasting results have been observed. They propose that the success of infants and nonhuman animals on some belief reasoning tasks may be best explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. In humans, this capacity persists in parallel with a later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding theory-of-mind abilities. (shrink)
We show that a finitely generated protoalgebraic strict universal Horn class that is filter-distributive is finitely based. Equivalently, every protoalgebraic and filter-distributive multidimensional deductive system determined by a finite set of finite matrices can be presented by finitely many axioms and rules.
The paper is a critical discussion of Sneddon’s recent proposal to revive ascriptivism in philosophy of action. Despite his declarations, Sneddon fails in his central task of giving an account of the distinction between actions and mre happenings. His failure is due to three major problems. First, the account is based on a misconceived methodology of “type” necessary and “token” sufficient conditions. Second, the “type” necessary condition he proposed is so weak that the connection that obtains between action and responsibility (...) also obtains between action and lack of responsibility. Third, neither the idea of responsibility nor the idea of defeating conditions is elucidated sufficiently to play any role in understanding what it is to be an action. (shrink)
Very absent-minded persons in going to their bedroom to dress for dinner have been known to take off one garment after another and finally to get into bed, merely because that was the habitual issue of the first few movements when performed at a later hour. (James 1890/1983, p. 119).
We investigate the use of coalgebra to represent quantum systems, thus providing a basis for the use of coalgebraic methods in quantum information and computation. Coalgebras allow the dynamics of repeated measurement to be captured, and provide mathematical tools such as final coalgebras, bisimulation and coalgebraic logic. However, the standard coalgebraic framework does not accommodate contravariance, and is too rigid to allow physical symmetries to be represented. We introduce a fibrational structure on coalgebras in which contravariance is represented by indexing. (...) We use this structure to give a universal semantics for quantum systems based on a final coalgebra construction. We characterize equality in this semantics as projective equivalence. We also define an analogous indexed structure for Chu spaces, and use this to obtain a novel categorical description of the category of Chu spaces. We use the indexed structures of Chu spaces and coalgebras over a common base to define a truncation functor from coalgebras to Chu spaces. This truncation functor is used to lift the full and faithful representation of the groupoid of physical symmetries on Hilbert spaces into Chu spaces, obtained in our previous work, to the coalgebraic semantics. (shrink)
We construct a class K of algebras which are matrices of the logical system Z introduced in [4]. It is shown that algebras belonging to the class K are decomposable into disjoint subalgebras which are Boolean algebras.
Using various meanings of ?visit? and ?friend? this essay freely explores connections between Milton's cultivation of fame in Europe, leading to reports in the early lives of visits of scholarly foreigners to his door, and the extraordinary concentration on scenarios of human and divine visitation in the late poems. Social, political and religious strands are followed, from humanist self-presentation in the sonnets through to prophetic isolation in the late poems. Codes of friendship are rehearsed concerning confidentiality and betrayal, and attention (...) is paid to the effect of blindness on the activities of the humanist writer, the need for supporting visits, and an increasing interiority and preoccupation with the responsibilities of those engaged with God's special causes. The proto-humanist visit of Raphael to Adam in Paradise Lost and the many guiding visitations in that poem are contrasted with the situation in Samson Agonistes, where divine guidance is presented as clearer in the past than the present, and the reader is invited to share difficulties of discernment in the Restoration world, prefigured in Judges. The essay ends with the simultaneous publication of Milton's humanist legacy and sale of many of his foreign-language books. (shrink)
Interakcje na styku język-emocje pozostają w pragmatyce językoznawczej swoistego rodzaju „terra incognita”. Jednak emocje, postawy emocjonalne stanowią esencję codziennej komunikacji. Wydaje się więc, że zbadanie mechanizmów towarzyszących komunikowaniu i przetwarzaniu komunikatów wyrażających postawy emocjonalnie, szczególnie na poziomie mózg/umysł, pozwoli lepiej poznać i zrozumieć jak emocje i język wzajemnie na siebie oddziałują. W artykule omówiono interdyscyplinarną perspektywę badawczą jaką oferuje pragmatyka eksperymentalna i neuropragmatyka w badaniu interakcji towarzyszących komunikowaniu treści emocjonalnych za pomocą językowych środków wyrazu. Zarówno eksplicytne i implicytne, literalne i (...) nieliteralne środki komunikowania i rozumienia znaczeń niosących ładunek emocjonalny, w tym ironiczny, są przedmiotem analizy. W artykule podjęto próbę znalezienia odpowiedzi na zasadnicze pytanie o mechanizmy związane z komunikowaniem i przetwarzaniem znaczeń emocjonalnie nacechowanych. Szczególną uwagę skupiono na walencji emocjonalnej i jej roli w komunikowaniu i rozumieniu znaczeń ironicznych jako emocjonalnie nasączonych. (shrink)
The volume addresses a problem rarely discussed by philosophers - the question of provincialism in science (in the broadest sense of the term). There are only a few great centers of science, which attract funding and provide almost ideal opportunities for research and development. They also attract some of the best researchers. Some - but not all. For a variety of reasons, some of the best researchers, or ones who have that potential, may do science outside these centers, in the (...) provinces. The volume is devoted to the problems they face. What is an intellectual province? Who are the provincial thinkers? What is the mark of provincialism? Do provincial (or central) thinkers have any special duties? Are there ways of overcoming one's own provincialism? The authors address these questions across different disciplines, cultures, locations and time periods. -/- . (shrink)
Table of ContentsAndrzej KLAWITER, Krzystof #ASTOWSKI: Introduction: Originality, Courage and Responsibility List of Books by Leszek NowakSelected Bibliography of Leszek Nowak's WritingsScience and Idealization Theo A.F. KUIPERS: On Two ...
P-compatible identities are built up from terms with a special structure. We investigate a variety defined by a set ofP-compatible hybrid identities and answer the question whether a variety defined by a set ofP-compatible hyperidentities can be solid.
The lattices of varieties were studied in many works (see [4], [5], [11], [24], [31]). In this paper we describe the lattice of all subvarieties of the variety $G_{Ex}^n$ defined by so called externally compatible identities of Abelian groups and the identity xⁿ ≈ yxⁿ. The notation in this paper is the same as in [2].
The paper presents a rejoinder to Katarzyna Paprzycka's critique of my defence of Davidson's ontology. According to Paprzycka the epiphenomenalists objection to the doctrine of anomalous monism, considered as an internal objection, is unquestionably flawed, but when it comes to some external interpretations of the objection in question — it is justified. The text provides a couple of arguments and comments which are intended to show that in most cases the external objection to anomalous monism is in fact either (...) uncharitable or inaccurate, thus unsound one. (shrink)
