Search results for 'Katherine Hawley June' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Katherine Hawley June, Cut the Pie Any Way You Like? Cotnoir on General Identity.score: 870.0
    Aaron Cotnoir does all sorts of interesting things in his contribution to this volume. He makes a helpful distinction between syntactic and semantic objections to the thesis that composition is identity, and outlines some empirical points relevant to the syntactic issue. But the centrepiece is his development of a formal framework for addressing the semantic objections.
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  2. Katherine Hawley (2001). How Things Persist. Oxford University Press.score: 520.0
    Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
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  3. Katherine Hawley (2012). Trust: A Very Short Introduction. Oup Oxford.score: 520.0
    Katherine Hawley explores the key ideas about trust in this Very Short Introduction. Drawing on a wide range of disciplines including philosophy, psychology, and evolutionary biology, she emphasizes the nature and importance of trusting and being trusted, from our intimate bonds with significant others to our relationship with the state.
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  4. Katherine Hawley (2011). Trivial Truthmaking Matters. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):196 - 202.score: 240.0
    What is true and what is not depends upon how the world is: that there are no white ravens is true because there are no white ravens. That much, Trenton Merricks accepts. But he denies that principles about truthmaking can do any heavy lifting in metaphysics, and he provides powerful, sophisticated arguments for this denial. The hunt for individual truthmakers for specific truths is doomed once we consider negative existentials, and, on the other side of that coin, universal claims. But (...)
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  5. Katherine Hawley, Temporal Parts.score: 240.0
    Temporal parts are analogous to spatial parts: just as the conference has one spatial part which occupies the seminar room, and another which occupies the lecture hall, it has one temporal part which ‘occupies’ Friday and another which ‘occupies’ Saturday. These temporal parts of the conference have half-hour coffee-breaks as temporal parts of their own; these coffee-breaks are also temporal parts of the whole conference.
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  6. Katherine Hawley & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 240.0
    This volume collects together chapters that were originally delivered at a conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience that took place at the University of Glasgow in March 2006. The original papers were first published in a special edition of The Philosophy Quarterly (July 2009). -/- Introduction (Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow). -- 1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford). -- 2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick). -- 3. Experience (...)
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  7. Katherine Hawley (2006). Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):481 – 493.score: 240.0
  8. Katherine Hawley (2006). Science as a Guide to Metaphysics? Synthese 149 (3):451 - 470.score: 240.0
    Analytic metaphysics is in resurgence; there is renewed and vigorous interest in topics such as time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds. We who share this interest often pay lip-service to the idea that metaphysics should be informed by modern science; some take this duty very seriously.2 But there is also a widespread suspicion that science cannot really contribute to metaphysics, and that scientific findings grossly underdetermine metaphysical claims. For some, this prompts the thought ‘so much the worse for metaphysics’; (...)
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  9. Katherine Hawley (2010). Testimony and Knowing How. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):397-404.score: 240.0
    Sometimes we work out by ourselves how to do something. But often we rely upon the help, advice or example of others. To this extent learning how resembles learning that: sometimes you can see the truth for yourself, but sometimes you need to phone a friend. Do the similarities end there? When we are tempted to think that knowing how differs significantly from knowing that, it is often because knowing how seems to be transmitted, acquired, taught and learned in distinctive (...)
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  10. Katherine Hawley (2009). Identity and Indiscernibility. Mind 118 (469):101 - 119.score: 240.0
    Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.
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  11. Katherine Hawley (2010). Mereology, Modality and Magic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):117 – 133.score: 240.0
    If the property _being a methane molecule_ is a universal, then it is a structural universal: objects instantiate _being a methane molecule_ just in case they have the right sorts of proper parts arranged in the right sort of way. Lewis argued that there can be no satisfactory account of structural universals; in this paper I provide a satisfactory account.
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  12. Katherine Hawley (forthcoming). Ontologial Innocence. In Donald Baxter & Aaon Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
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  13. Katherine Hawley, Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater.score: 240.0
    Every Thing Must Go is wildly ambitious. It advances substantive views on the proper scope of metaphysics (unifying science), the nature of reality (things subservient to structures), the current state of play in quantum gravity (fragmented), and the connection between fundamental physics and the rest of science (hard to summarise). It is both fascinating and infuriating. A key theme is the dismissal of ‘neo-scholastic’ metaphysics and the promotion of ‘naturalised metaphysics’. I fear my own work qualifies as neoscholastic, and although (...)
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  14. Katherine Hawley (1998). Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Between Physical Objects and Times. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216.score: 240.0
    Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic (...)
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  15. Katherine Hawley (2002). Vagueness and Existence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):125-140.score: 240.0
    Vague existence can seem like the worst kind of vagueness in the world, or seem to be an entirely unintelligible notion. This bad reputation is based upon the rumour that if there is vague existence then there are non-existent objects. But the rumour is false: the modest brand of vague existence entailed by certain metaphysical theories of composition does not deserve its bad reputation.
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  16. Katherine Hawley (2013). 8. Cut the Pie Any Way You Like? Cotnoir on General Identity. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:323.score: 240.0
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  17. Katherine Hawley (1998). Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):841-843.score: 240.0
    Trenton Merricks argues against the following doctrine: Microphysical Supervenience (MS) Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. (Merricks 1998, p. 59) Imagine a person, _P_. Microphysical Supervenience entails that there is an object, the finger-complement, (...)
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  18. Katherine Hawley (2005). Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.score: 240.0
    Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. (...)
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  19. Katherine Hawley (2008). Persistence and Determination. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.score: 240.0
    Roughly speaking, perdurantism is the view that ordinary objects persist through time by having temporal parts, whilst endurantism is the view that they persist by being wholly present at different times. (Speaking less roughly will be important later.) It is often thought that perdurantists have an advantage over endurantists when dealing with objects which appear to coincide temporarily: lumps, statues, cats, tail-complements, bisected brains, repaired ships, and the like. Some cases – personal fission, for example – seem to involve (...)
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  20. Katherine Hawley (2011). The Structure of Objects. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):336-339.score: 240.0
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  21. Katherine Hawley (2003). Success and Knowledge-How. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):19 - 31.score: 240.0
    Modern epistemologists don’t often discuss knowledge-how - propositional knowledge has attracted the lion’s share of attention.2 Yet the notion of knowledge-how looks useful elsewhere in philosophy - philosophers of science discuss tacit knowledge and skills, philosophers of mind disagree about whether knowing what an experience is like is a matter of knowing how to imagine or recognise it, and philosophers of language and of value consider whether knowledge of meaning or morality is knowledge-how (to use words, to follow rules, to (...)
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  22. Katherine Hawley & Alexander Bird (2011). What Are Natural Kinds?1. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):205-221.score: 240.0
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  23. Katherine Hawley (2004). Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple. The Monist 87 (3):385-404.score: 240.0
    In his Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen distinguishes two questions about parthood. What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for some things jointly to compose a whole? What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for a thing to have proper parts? The first of these, the Special Composition Question (SCQ), has been widely discussed, and David Lewis has argued that an important constraint on any answer to the SCQ is that it should not permit borderline cases of composition. This is (...)
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  24. Katherine Hawley, Critical Study of Four-Dimensionalism, by Theodore Sider, Oxford University Press 2001, ISBN 0 19 924443 X, Hardback.score: 240.0
    Four-Dimensionalism is a thorough, lively and forceful defence of the claim that “necessarily, every spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment at which it exists” (59). The standard four-dimensionalist view is perdurance theory, according to which everyday things like boats are temporally extended. But Sider rejects perdurance theory, nicely disparaging it as the “worm view”, and he argues for the “stage view” version of fourdimensionalism instead. According to the stage view, everyday things like boats are instantaneous, and claims (...)
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  25. Katherine Hawley (2007). Neo‐Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):233 - 249.score: 240.0
    Sider argues that, of maximalism and quantifier variance, the latter promises to let us make better sense of neo-Fregeanism. I argue that neo-Fregeans should, and seemingly do, reject quantifier variance. If they must choose between these two options, they should choose maximalism.
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  26. Katherine Hawley (1998). Indeterminism and Indeterminacy. Analysis 58 (2):101–106.score: 240.0
    1. E.J. Lowe claims that quantum physics provides examples of ontic indeterminacy, of vagueness in the world. Any such claim must confront the Evans-Salmon argument to the effect that the notion of ontic indeterminacy is simply incoherent (Evans 1978, Salmon 1981: 243-46). Lowe argues that a standard version of the Evans-Salmon argument fails quite generally (Lowe 1994). Harold Noonan (1995) has outlined a non-standard version of the argument, but Lowe argues that this non-standard version fails for specifically quantum mechanical (...)
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  27. Katherine Hawley (2014). Trust, Distrust and Commitment. Noûs 48 (1):1-20.score: 240.0
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  28. Katherine Hawley, Fusion.score: 240.0
    ‘Fusion’ is a philosophical term of art, with a variety of uses. First, it is often a synonym for ‘sum’. In this sense, a is a fusion of b, c and d iff b, c and d are parts of a, and every part of a shares a part with b, c or d. So a cat is a fusion of the cells which compose it, and the same cat is a fusion of the molecules which compose it. Relatedly, ‘fusion’ (...)
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  29. Katherine Hawley (1999). Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations. Mind 108 (429):53-67.score: 240.0
    I claim that, if persisting objects have temporal parts, then there are non-supervenient relations between those temporal parts. These are relations which are not determined by intrinsic properties of the temporal parts. I use the Kripke-Armstrong 'rotating homogeneous disc' argument in order to establish this claim, and in doing so I defend and develop that argument. This involves a discussion of instantaneous velocity, and of the causes and effects of rotation. Finally, I compare alternative responses to the rotating disc argument, (...)
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  30. Katherine Hawley (2012). Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting. Synthese (9):1-17.score: 240.0
    You can trust your friends. You should trust your friends. Not all of your friends all of the time: you can reasonably trust different friends to different degrees, and in different domains. Still, we often trust our friends, and it is often reasonable to do so. Why is this? In this paper I explore how and whether friendship gives us reasons to trust our friends, reasons which may outstrip or conflict with our epistemic reasons. In the final section, I will (...)
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  31. Katherine Hawley (2006). Theodore Sider. Fourdimensionalism. Oxford University Press 2001. ISBN 0 19 924443 X, Hardback; ISBN 0 19 926352 3, Paperback. [REVIEW] Noûs 40 (2):380–394.score: 240.0
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  32. Katherine Hawley, Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis.score: 240.0
    Jointly, separately, and in collaboration with others, Steven French and Décio Krause have been central to recent debates about identity and individuality in modern physics; their new book draws together many threads, and is interesting in all sorts of ways. It’s not an easy read, because it ranges wide and digs deep: you’ll need some knowledge of physics to get anywhere, you’ll need an idea of Who Was Who amongst the Great Physicists to follow the historical sections, and you’ll need (...)
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  33. Katherine Hawley (1997). Types of Personal Identity. Cogito 11 (2):117-122.score: 240.0
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  34. Katherine Hawley (2006). Weak Discernibility. Analysis 66 (292):300–303.score: 240.0
    Simon Saunders argues that, although distinct objects must be discernible, they need only be weakly discernible (Saunders 2003, 2006a). I will argue that this combination of views is unmotivated: if there can be objects which differ only weakly, there can be objects which don’t differ at all.
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  35. P. Kyle Stanford, Paul Humphreys, Katherine Hawley, James Ladyman & Don Ross (2010). Protecting Rainforest Realism. Metascience 19 (2):161-185.score: 240.0
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  36. Katherine Hawley (1997). Review. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2).score: 240.0
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  37. Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.) (2003). Philosophy of Science Today. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Philosophy of Science Today offers a state-of-the-art guide to this fast-developing area. An eminent international team of authors covers a wide range of topics at the intersection of philosophy and the sciences, including causation, realism, methodology, epistemology, and the philosophical foundations of physics, biology, and psychology.
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  38. Katherine Hawley (2013). Knowledge on Trust. By Paul Faulkner. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 240. Price £37.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):170-171.score: 240.0
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  39. P. Kyle Stanford, Paul Humphreys, Katherine Hawley, James Ladyman & Don Ross (2010). Protecting Rainforest Realism. Metascience 19 (2):161-185.score: 240.0
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  40. Katherine Hawley (1999). It Could Be You—But Would It Be Fair? Cogito 13 (2):95-100.score: 240.0
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  41. K. Stanford, Paul Humphreys, Katherine Hawley, James Ladyman & Don Ross (2007). Protecting Rainforest Realism. Metascience 19:161-185.score: 240.0
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  42. Katherine Hawley (2014). Erratum To: Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting. Synthese 191 (9):2047-2047.score: 240.0
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  43. Katherine Hawley (2011). Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. 283.score: 240.0
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  44. Katherine Hawley (1999). Ej Lowe [1998]. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):478-482.score: 240.0
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  45. Katherine Hawley (2012). The Trust Game and the Testimony Game. Abstracta 6 (3):84-91.score: 240.0
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  46. Todd D. Little, Patricia H. Hawley, Christopher C. Henrich & Katherine W. Marsland (2002). 17: Three Views of the Agentic Self: A Developmental Synthesis. In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press.score: 240.0
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  47. Katherine Hawley (2009). Metaphysics and Relativity. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.score: 240.0
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  48. Katherine Hawley (2012). Part Four: Implications and Applications-12 Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice. Philosophical Inquiry 36 (1):283.score: 240.0
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  49. Katherine Hawley (2005). Pumped Up Physicalism. Metascience 14 (2):277-281.score: 240.0
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  50. Heather Dyke (2003). Review of Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (1).score: 140.0
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