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  1. Kathleen V. Wilkes (2002). Know Thyself. In Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 153-165.
    The burden of this article is that although the idea of `the self'which Galen Strawson decribes in his target article is initially very attractive, it eventually doesn't work. There is a lot of competition for a `pole position'notion -- `human', `person', psuche, `soul', even `sake'-- and the idea of `self'does not seem to deserve the prize. What Strawson wants to do with the notion of a `self'can be done equally well, and more economically, by the first-person pronoun. A question raised (...)
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  2. Kathleen V. Wilkes (2002). Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
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  3. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1999). Fnq0i Seayton. In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Models of the Self. Imprint Academic 25.
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  4. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1995). Losing Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh
     
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  5. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1991). How Many Selves Make Me? Philosophy 66:235-43.
  6. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1991). How Many Selves Make Me?1: Kathleen V. Wilkes. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:235-243.
    The answer to the title question which I want to defend in this paper is ‘none’. That is: I doubt strongly that the notion of ‘a self’ has any use whatsoever as part of an explanans for the explanandum ‘person’. Put another way: I shall argue that the question itself is misguided, pointing the inquirer in quite the wrong direction by suggesting that the term ‘self’ points to something which can sustain a philosophically interesting or important degree of reification.
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  7. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1991). The Long Past and the Short History. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press
  8. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1991). The Relationship Between Scientific Psychology and Common-Sense Psychology. Synthese 89 (October):15-39.
    This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) — which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many differences between the aims, interests, explananda, explanantia, methodology, conceptual frameworks, and relationships to the neurosciences, that divide CSP and SP. Each of the two is valid within its own territory, and there is no competition between (...)
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  9. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1990). Analysing Freud. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (59):241.
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  10. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1990). Review: Analysis Freud. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):241 - 254.
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  11. Patricia Kitcher & Kathleen V. Wilkes (1988). What Is Freud's Metapsychology? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62:101 - 137.
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  12. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1988). Od zarodka do osoby ludzkiej. Etyka 23.
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  13. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1988). Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments. Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of personDS a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity andx dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness, and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes (...)
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  14. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1988). Yishi, Duh, Um and Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press
     
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  15. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1986). Nemo Psychologus Nisi Physiologus. Inquiry 29 (June):168-185.
    This article finds little to disagree with in Neurophilosophy The sole area of disagreement is with Professor Churchland's attitude to common?sense psychology. Unfortunately, though, the author has already attempted to describe what should be the proper view of common?sense psychology in an earlier article in this very journal. Therefore the present article tries to build on the earlier one, advocating an instrumentalist constraal of many ordinary?language mental terms ? a construal with which Professor Churchland is unlikely to agree, but which, (...)
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  16. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1984). Is Consciousness Important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.
    The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of 'conscious', and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of 'consciousness'. It is thus suggested that 'the problem' allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term (...)
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  17. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1984). Pragmatics in Science and Theory in Common Sense. Inquiry 27 (December):339-61.
    Recent work in the philosophy of science has been debunking theory and acclaiming practice. Recent work in philosophical psychology has been neglecting practice and emphasizing theory, suggesting that common?sense psychology is in all essential respects like any scientific theory. The marriage of these two strands of thought would serve to make science and common sense virtually indistinguishable. My paper resists this conflation. The main target is the attempt to assimilate everyday psychology to a scientific theory; I argue that this is (...)
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  18. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1983). FODOR, JERRY A.: "Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science". [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34:175.
     
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  19. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1983). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):227-230.
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  20. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1982). BLOCK, N. : "Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I". [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33:227.
     
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  21. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1982). CLARK, A.: "Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms". [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33:230.
     
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  22. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1982). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):227-230.
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  23. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1981). Conscious Belief and Deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-107.
  24. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1981). Functionalism, Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):147-67.
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  25. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1981). Multiple Personalty and Personal Identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):331-48.
  26. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1980). Metaphysics and the Mind–Body Problem By Michael E. Levin Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, Xii + 278 Pp., £12.00. [REVIEW] Philosophy 55 (214):565-.
  27. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1980). More Brain Lesions. Philosophy 55 (214):455 - 470.
  28. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1980). Brain States. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):111-129.
  29. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1980). LEVIN, MICHAEL J. "Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem". [REVIEW] Philosophy 55:565.
  30. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1980). More Brain Lesions: Kathleen V. Wilkes. Philosophy 55 (214):455-470.
    As philosophers of mind we seem to hold in common no very clear view about the relevance that work in psychology or the neurosciences may or may not have to our own favourite questions—even if we call the subject ‘philosophical psychology’. For example, in the literature we find articles on pain some of which do, some of which don't, rely more or less heavily on, for example, the work of Melzack and Wall; the puzzle cases used so extensively in discussions (...)
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  31. Kathleen V. Wilkes & C. Wade Savage (1980). Perception and Cognition. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):266.
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  32. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1979). Women in "Philosophy". Philosophy 54 (208):236 - 238.
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  33. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1979). Conclusions in the Meno. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (2):143-153.
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  34. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1978). Memory and Mind By Norman Malcolm Cornell University Press, 1977, 277 Pp., £9.75. [REVIEW] Philosophy 53 (204):270-.
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  35. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1978). Consciousness and Commissurotomy. Philosophy 53 (April):185-99.
    Commissurotomy surgery has lately attracted considerable philosophical attention. It has seemed to some that the surgical scalpel that bisects the brain bisects consciousness and the mind as well; and that the ordinary concept of a person is thereby most seriously threatened. I shall assess the extent of the threat, arguing that it is overestimated. The argument begins with section III; section II, which describes the operation and its effects, should be omitted by those already familiar with these facts.
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  36. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1978). MALCOLM, NORMAN "Memory and Mind". [REVIEW] Philosophy 53:270.
     
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  37. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1978). No Title Available: New Books. [REVIEW] Philosophy 53 (204):270-272.
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  38. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1978). The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle's Ethics. Mind 87 (348):553-571.
    It is notorious that Aristotle gives two distinct and seemingly irreconcilable versions of man's eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics. These offer conflicting accounts not only of what the good man should do, but also of what it is good for a man to do. This paper discusses the incompatibility of these two pictures of eudaimonia, and explores the extent to which the notions of 'the life of a good man' and 'the life good for a man' can be successfully united (...)
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  39. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1975). Anthropomorphism and Analogy in Psychology. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (April):126-137.
    This article defends psychology and psychoanalysis against the accusation that their use of anthropomorphism in descriptions of brain and mind reintroduces the 'little man in the brain' and generates a viciously circular analysis. It queries the clarity of the concept 'anthropomorphic', And argues that many predicates which are allegedly 'characteristically human' are freely and literally attributable to machines, Parts of the brain, Etc.; this merely points out the unsurprising fact that non-Humans often perform tasks which humans can also perform. It (...)
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  40. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1973). Physicalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    The primary aim of this study is to dissolve the mind-body problem. It shows how the ‘problem’ separates into two distinct sets of issues, concerning ontology on the one hand, and explanation on the other, and argues that explanation – whether or not human behaviour can be explained in physical terms – is the more crucial. The author contends that a functionalist methodology in psychology and neurophysiology will prove adequate to explain human behaviour. Defence of this thesis requires: an examination (...)
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