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Katie Steele [12]Katie Siobhan Steele [4]
  1. Mark Colyvan & Katie Steele, Environmental Ethics and Decision Theory: Fellow Travellers or Bitter Enemies?
    On the face of it, ethics and decision theory give quite different advice about what the best course of action is in a given situation. In this paper we examine this alleged conflict in the realm of environmental decision-making. We focus on a couple of places where ethics and decision theory might be thought to be offering conflicting advice: environmental triage and carbon trading. We argue that the conflict can be seen as conflicts about other things (like appropriate temporal scales (...)
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  2. Katie Siobhan Steele (forthcoming). Bayesians Care About Stopping Rules Too. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
     
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  3. Charlotte Werndl & Katie Siobhan Steele (forthcoming). Climate Models, Confirmation and Calibration. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    We argue that concerns about double-counting -- using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate --deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelihood approach (...)
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  4. Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele (2013). Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation. Erkenntnis:1-17.
    Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.
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  5. Katie Steele (2013). Persistent Experimenters, Stopping Rules, and Statistical Inference. Erkenntnis 78 (4):937-961.
    This paper considers a key point of contention between classical and Bayesian statistics that is brought to the fore when examining so-called ‘persistent experimenters’—the issue of stopping rules, or more accurately, outcome spaces, and their influence on statistical analysis. First, a working definition of classical and Bayesian statistical tests is given, which makes clear that (1) once an experimental outcome is recorded, other possible outcomes matter only for classical inference, and (2) full outcome spaces are nevertheless relevant to both the (...)
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  6. Katie Steele (2012). Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):983-999.
    This paper considers a special case of belief updating—when an agent learns testimonial data, or in other words, the beliefs of others on some issue. The interest in this case is twofold: (1) the linear averaging method for updating on testimony is somewhat popular in epistemology circles, and it is important to assess its normative acceptability, and (2) this facilitates a more general investigation of what it means/requires for an updating method to have a suitable Bayesian representation (taken here as (...)
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  7. Katie Steele (2012). The Scientist Qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):893-904.
    Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that science advisors must, for deep-seated pragmatic reasons, make value judgments is further (...)
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  8. Mark Colyvan, Damian Cox & Katie Steele (2010). Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions. Noûs 44 (3):503-529.
  9. Kirsten M. Parris, Sarah C. McCall, Michael A. McCarthy, Ben A. Minteer, Katie Steele, Sarah Bekessy & Fabien Medvecky (2010). Assessing Ethical Trade-Offs in Ecological Field Studies. Journal of Applied Ecology 47 (1):227-234.
    Summary 1. Ecologists and conservation biologists consider many issues when designing a field study, such as the expected value of the data, the interests of the study species, the welfare of individual organisms and the cost of the project. These different issues or values often conflict; however, neither animal ethics nor environmental ethics provides practical guidance on how to assess trade-offs between them. -/- 2. We developed a decision framework for considering trade-offs between values in ecological research, drawing on the (...)
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  10. Katie Steele (2010). Challenges to Decision Theory. Metascience 19 (3):449-451.
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  11. Katie Siobhan Steele (2010). What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting. Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.
    There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, decision and rationality, 1988b; Theory Decis 25:25–78, 1988c) ‘consequentialist’ argument for the SEU (...)
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  12. Katie Steele (2009). Preference and Information , Dan Egonsson. Ashgate, 2007, XI+163 Pp. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):236-242.
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  13. Katie Siobhan Steele, Yohay Carmel, Jean Cross & Chris Wilcox, Uses and Misuses of Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in Environmental Decision Making.
    We focus on a class of multicriteria methods that are commonly used in environmental decision making--those that employ the weighted linear average algorithm (and this includes the popular analytic hierarchy process (AHP)). While we do not doubt the potential benefits of using formal decision methods of this type, we draw attention to the consequences of not using them well. In particular, we highlight a property of these methods that should not be overlooked when they are applied in environmental and wider (...)
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  14. Katie Steele (2007). Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief From “Risk-Averse” Preferences. Synthese 158 (2):189 - 205.
    I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief (as opposed to “imprecise” belief), such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain how an (...)
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  15. Katie Steele (2007). Review of Husain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).
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  16. Katie Steele, Helen M. Regan, Mark Colyvan & Mark A. Burgman (2007). Right Decisions or Happy Decision-Makers? Social Epistemology 21 (4):349 – 368.
    Group decisions raise a number of substantial philosophical and methodological issues. We focus on the goal of the group decision exercise itself. We ask: What should be counted as a good group decision-making result? The right decision might not be accessible to, or please, any of the group members. Conversely, a popular decision can fail to be the correct decision. In this paper we discuss what it means for a decision to be "right" and what components are required in a (...)
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