Online research in philosophy

Hence, the title The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz seems to reflect the general idea of this collection. Most papers collected here were specially ...

When discussing Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's role in philosophy, it is worthwhile recalling his participation in scholarly controversies. It was characteristic of his open mind that his taking part in debates was motivated by a vivid interest in various ways of thinking. Ajdukiewicz's intellectual power consisted, so to speak, in his ability of not to understand. This ability has brought him success in some important debates, concerning i.a. the classical logical concept of contradiction and the debate on universals raised in modern (...) Poland with the nominalistic program of Stanislaw Lesniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński. In this latter debate Ajdukiewicz shows that when one says that individuals exist, the word „exist" refers to something different that in the statement that universals exist. In other words, the functor „is" has a different category in the definition of an individual from that appearing in the definition of a universal; hence there must be two different senses of the word „exist". (shrink)

This volume portrays the Polish or Lvov-Warsaw School, one of the most influential schools in analytic philosophy, which, as discussed in the thorough introduction, presented an alternative working picture of the unity of science.

During the first semester of the academic year 1930/31 in the John Casimir University in Lvov Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz delivered a series of lectures on logical semantics. In eight of them, now published for the first time, he presents - in the very clear manner - his fractional method of identifying syntactic categories, and he shows how to use this method to eliminate the antynomies of classes, relations and properties. The Ajdukiewiczian method had been appreciated among logicians and it is (...) considered widely one of the starting points of so-called categorial grammars. (shrink)

This is a japanese translation of Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, "Von Brentano zu Ingarden. Die phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre", Husserl Studies 18 (2002), 3, pp. 185-208.

The position of Polish informatics, as well in research as in didactic, has its roots in achievements of Polish mathematicians of Warsaw School and logicians of Lvov-Warsaw School. Jan Lukasiewicz is considered in the world of computer science as the most famous Polish logician. The parenthesis-free notation, invented by him, is known as PN (Polish Notation) and RPN (Reverse Polish Notation). Lukasiewicz created many-valued logic as a separate subject. The idea of multi-valueness is applied to hardware design (many-valued or fuzzy (...) switching, analog computer). Many-valued approach to vague notions and commonsense reasoning is the method of expert systems, databases and knowledge-based systems. Stanis3aw Jaokowski's system of natural deduction is the base of systems of automatic deduction and theorem proving. He created a system of paraconsistent logic. Such logics are used in AI. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz with his categorial grammar participated in the development of formal grammars, the field significant for programming languages. Andrzej Grzegorczyk had an important contribution to the development of the theory of recursiveness. (shrink)

This paper is a part of a series of lectures on logic delivered by Kazimierz Twardowski in the John Casimir University in Lvov during the first semester of the academic year 1902-1903. This publication of the paper is a hommage to the founder of Lvov-Warsaw School in the centenary of his first lecture in Lvov University.

Stanislaw Lesniewski’s interests were, for the most part, more philosophical than mathematical. Prior to taking his doctorate at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov, Lesniewski had spent time at several continental universities, apparently becoming relatively attached to the philosophy of one of his teachers, Hans Comelius, to the chapters of John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic that dealt specifically with semantics, and, in general, to studies of general grammar and philosophy of language. In these several early interests are already to (...) be found the roots of the work that was to occupy Lesniewski’s life: a search for a definitive doctrine of what sorts of things there are in the world, or better, of what language must be like if it is adequately and efficiently to represent the world. (shrink)

This collection celebrates the centenary of the Lvov-Warsaw school, established by Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov in 1895.

. ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT OF THE PRESENTATION It is one of the best known positions of psychology, hardly contested by anyone, that every mental phenomenon ...

Sur le contenu et l’objet des représentations (1894) de Kazimierz Twardowski est un des textes les plus influents de la tradition autrichienne. Le manuscrit Logik (1894-1895) complète ce dernier et nous permet entre autres de reconstruire la théorie du jugement de Twardowski. Ces textes soulèvent plusieurs questions, en particulier si Twardowski acceptait les notions de propositions et d’etats de choses, et si sa théorie est acceptable. Cet article presente la théorie de Twardowski, montre qu’il acceptait les états de choses, (...) qu’il avait une notion de proposition et qu’il s’agit d’une theorie intéressante et raffinée.Twardowski’s On the Content and Object of Presentations (1894) is one of the most influential works that Austrian philosophy has lelt to posterity. The manuscript Logik (1894-1895) supplements that work and allows us to reconstruct Twardowski’s theory of judgement. These texts raise several issues, in particular whether Twardowski accepts propositions and states of affairs in his theory of judgement and whether his theory is acceptable. This article presents Twardowski’s theory, shows that he accepts states of affairs, that he has a notion of proposition, and that his theory is interesting and sophisticated. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to showing certain connections between normal modal logics and those strictly regular modal logics which have as a theorem. We extend some results of E. J. Lemmon (cf. [66]). In particular we prove that the lattice of the strictly regular modal logics with the axiom is isomorphic to the lattice of the normal modal logics.

In [60] N. Belnap presented an 8-element matrix for the relevant logic R with the following property: if in an implication A → B the formulas A and B do not have a common variable then there exists a valuation v such that v(A → B) does not belong to the set of designated elements of this matrix. A 6-element matrix of this kind can be found in: R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, V. Plumwood and R.T. Brady [82]. Below we prove (...) that the logics generated by these two matrices are the only maximal extensions of the relevant logic R which have the relevance property: if A → B is provable in such a logic then A and B have a common propositional variable. (shrink)

W artykule szkicuję czynniki sprzyjające przemianie kompleksowego ujęcia relacji kobieta ciężarna – płód, w dualny model tego odniesienia. W pierwszym modelu kobieta i płód są traktowani przez lekarzy jak jeden pacjent, natomiast w drugim także fazom prenatalnym ludzkiego życia przyznaje się moralny status samodzielnego pacjenta. Dualne podejście ma negatywne następstwa dla kobiet brzemiennych, sygnalizowane w tekście w polemice z Susan Mattingly. W drugiej części pracy analizuję podjętą przez Franka Chervenaka i Laurence McCullougha, teoretyczną próbę uzasadnienia statusu płodu jako pacjenta, przy (...) jednoczesnym zachowaniu elementów kompleksowego modelu relacji kobieta ciężarna – płód. Analizy ukazują jej fiasko. (shrink)

It was one of Brentano’s central ideas that all judgements are at bottom existential. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint he tried to show how all traditionally acknowledged judgement forms could be reinterpreted as existential statements. Existential propositions, therefore, were a central concern for the whole Brentano School. Kazimierz Twardowski, who also accepted this program, introduced the problem of the existential reduction to his Polish students, but not all of them found this idea plausible. In 1911 Stanisław Leśniewski (...) published a paper under the title “A Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Propositions” where he criticised Brentano’s translation. According to Leśniewski the consequences of Brentano’s program would be absurd because according to Leśniewski all positive existential propositions are analytically true and all negative ones are contradictory. In his later works Leśniewski repudiated all his early writings (1911–1914) as philosophically immature and formally imprecise. “[…] I regret that they have appeared in print,” he writes, “and formally ‘repudiate’ them herewith […]”. But in spite of this severe assessment, these early papers are worth considering not only from a historical standpoint. As we will see, Leśniewski’s critique of Brentano is unsound, but it casts an interesting light on his understanding of certain basic metaphysical concepts. (shrink)

Firstly, disregarding multiethnicity, it can refer to a philosophy cultivated in a feature of a nation, for instance, its religion or character. This meaning can be illustrated by ext of the distinction between philosophical superpowers (national philosophies playing the central role in the development of philosophy) and philosophical provinces (philosophies of a secondary, though sometimes remarkable, importance). Poland is taken as an example. The paper discusses the views of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founding father of the Polish analytic school. He (...) expressed interesting views concerning how philosophy of provinces should be done in order keep its originality. (shrink)

Kazimierz Twardowski was born in Vienna in 1866 and spent there almost thirty years - before removal to Lvov in 1895. However, the Viennese period of Twardowski's life is relatively poorly known. The article aims at throwing light on Twardowski's activities in Vienna. It is based on archival documents found in Viennese and Warsaw archives and libraries.

The aim of the paper is to provide a presentation and evaluation of Kazimierz Twardowski's conception, the subject matter and contents of which is delimited, roughly by (Twardowski 1965a). Since there is no separate problematization of the notion of action in Twardowski, it is maintained that the conception in question should be characterized rather as a conception of "products of actions" (hence the term "Twardowski's conception of products of actions") and not as a conception of "actions and products" - (...) contrary to what is suggested by the title of the above mentioned Twardowski's paper. Twardowski's conception of products of actions includes a conception which has the general notion of products of actions as its central notion, and which belongs to philosophy of action. This conception has been called "Twardowski's general conception of products of actions". It is supplemented by some conceptions which can be characterised, roughly, as based on it (I.3.). Among the theses that belong to the general conception are the theses that make together what has been called in the paper "the conception of nonpermanent products as events" (II.7.). There is also a thesis to the effect that each action has but one product (II.1.), and a thesis which eliminates the material of actions from their products (II.11.). As for the conceptions which are based on Twardowski's general conception of products of actions, all but one belong to the logic of language and semiotics. They include Twardowski's conception of meaning and, within its confines, his conception of proposition as the product of judgement. The presentation and evaluation of Twardowski's conception of products of actions often requires preparatory considerations of a purely ontological, epistemological and/or methodological character. A separate section (II.8.) is devoted entirely to some ontological problems of complexity with the question of "empty" parts as the question in focus. Twardowski's conception of products of actions has to be seen as making a contribution to the research on the ontological foundations of philosophy of action and philosophy of mind. If the objections that have been raised against it are correct, the importance of its contribution to this research may be questioned (IV.1.). Such is f.e. the import of the objections raised against Twardowski's conception of meaning: while this conception seems at first sight to substantially widen our perspectives in respect of the ontic status of meanings, the corrections proposed as a result of its critical appraisal reduce all that can have a claim to originality to a variant of the thesis to the effect that meanings are defective in respect of ontic autonomy (III.2.6.). The results presented in the paper have some bearing on the question of Twardowski's attitude towards psychologism, as well as his contribution to the battle against it: on the one hand there seems to be no reason to question Twardowski's position as a consistent antipsy. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the theory of plurality of realities introduced by Leon Chwistek. A critical analysis of this theory and an extensional interpretation of Chwistek’s axiomatic descriptions of four realities lead to an epistemological interpretation of this theory. The word “plurality” in the title is a result of different waysof understanding the same original set of sense-data. This interpretation is contrasted with Kazimierz Pasenkiewicz’s ontological version of this theory. In the final parts of the paper the most important (...) consequences of this theory are discussed. First, the ethical relativism postulated by Chwistek is criticized. Second, an attempt to illustrate the plurality of realities with an example of different styles of painting is discussed. Third, a critical rationalism in the form of a kind of practical attitude toward social reality, which results from the theory of plurality of realities, is outlined. (shrink)

Autor porusza zagadnienie struktury Peryta, która posiada tę właściwość, iż środkiem świata jest miejsce założone przez obserwatora. W ten sposób zmienia się charakter zjawisk geometrycznych, w tym perspektywy.

Geology is an example of the "historical-natural" sciences, and it combines methodological elements of typical natural sciences, as physics, and the methodological elements of history. As a result, there are some problems with placing it in the classification of sciences. The article consists of two parts. In the first one there is presented in short form process of developing of modern geology. Using as examples the ideas of James Hutton, Georges Cuvier and Charles Lyell the author shows how the opinion (...) about proper method and aims of geology was changing at the turn of 18th and 19th centuries. The final point of the process was the classification of sciences presented by William Whewell, who classified geology as a palaetiological science. The second part of the article is devoted to the place of geology in the contemporary classifications of sciences presented by main Polish methodologists. There are discussed the classifications of Kazimierz Twardowski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Władysław Krajewski and Adam Grobler. (shrink)

W latach 1931-1934 Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz sformułował dwie wersje teorii znaczenia. Tarski wykazał, że druga wersja teorii dopuszcza moż- liwość istnienia równoznacznych nazw o różnej denotacji. Cecha ta zo- stała uznana przez Tarskiego i Ajdukiewicza za dyskwalifikującą teorię. W artykule dokonuję porównania obu wersji teorii, przede wszystkim ze względu na podstawową definicję wzajemnej wymienialności wyrażeń. Pokazuję, że wbrew rozpowszechnionej opinii zarzut Tarskiego dotyczy także pierwszej wersji teorii. Siła argumentu Tarskiego opiera się na założeniu, że żadna adekwatna teoria znaczenia nie może (...) dopuszczać istnienia równoznacznych nazw o różnej denotacji. Podejmuję dyskusję z tym stanowiskiem. (shrink)

It is commonly known that the theory of intelligent design is anti-naturalistic. The anti- naturalism of this theory is usually interpreted as a methodological or metaphysical one. In other words, the theory of intelligent design is considered as a kind of creationism (“creationism in a cheap tuxedo”) and is also often named “neo-creationism.” In the paper I am arguing that this qualification is wrong and is implied by assuming an inappropriate sense of the ambiguous term “naturalism”.

Intelligent design theory is accused of being a hidden form of creationism. Evolutionism and creationism are formulated in different epistemic frameworks. The author wants to answer the question whether the accusation mentioned above is right. The theory does not indicate the source of design. It only postulates the possibility of detecting the design in nature. The identification of the designer is not possible with the help of scientific methods. Therefore, intelligent design theory is compatible both with naturalistic and creationist epistemic (...) frameworks. (shrink)