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  1. Keith Butler (2000). Problems for Semantic Externalism and A Priori Refutations of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.
  2. Keith Butler (1998). Content, Computation, and Individuation. Synthese 114 (2):277-92.
    The role of content in computational accounts of cognition is a matter of some controversy. An early prominent view held that the explanatory relevance of content consists in its supervenience on the the formal properties of computational states (see, e.g., Fodor 1980). For reasons that derive from the familiar Twin Earth thought experiments, it is usually thought that if content is to supervene on formal properties, it must be narrow; that is, it must not be the sort of content that (...)
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  3. Keith Butler (1998). Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):723-726.
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  4. Keith Butler (1998). Externalism and Skepticism. Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.
  5. Keith Butler (1998). Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism. Kluwer.
  6. Keith Butler (1997). Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
    Externalism holds, and internalism denies, that the individuation of many of an individual's mental states (e.g., thoughts about the physical world) depends necessarily on relations that individual bears to the physical and/or social environment. Many philosophers, externalists and internalists alike, believe that introspection yields knowledge of the contents of our thoughts that is direct and authoritative. It is not obvious, however, that the metaphysical claims of externalism are compatible with this epistemological thesis. Some (e.g., Burge, 1988; Falvey and Owens (F&O), (...)
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  7. Keith Butler (1996). Content, Computation, and Individualism in Vision Theory. Analysis 56 (3):146-54.
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  8. Keith Butler (1996). Content, Causal Powers, and Context. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.
    Owens (1993) argues that one cannot accept the anti-individualistic conclusions of arguments inspired by Twin Earth thought experiments and still maintain that folk psychological states causally explain behavior. Saidel (1994) has argued that Owens' argument illegitimately individuates the contents of folk psychological states widely and causal powers narrowly. He suggests that causal powers may well be wide, and that the conditions that militate in favor of wide content also militate in favor of wide causal powers; mutatis mutandis for narrow content (...)
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  9. Keith Butler (1996). Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision. Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.
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  10. Keith Butler (1995). Content, Context, and Compositionality. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):3-24.
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  11. Keith Butler (1995). Compositionality in Cognitive Models: The Real Issue. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 78 (2):153-62.
  12. Keith Butler (1995). Representation and Computation in a Deflationary Assessment of Connectionist Cognitive Science. Synthese 104 (1):71-97.
    Connectionism provides hope for unifying work in neuroscience, computer science, and cognitive psychology. This promise has met with some resistance from Classical Computionalists, which may have inspired Connectionists to retaliate with bold, inflationary claims on behalf of Connectionist models. This paper demonstrates, by examining three intimately connected issues, that these inflationary claims made on behalf of Connectionism are wrong. This should not be construed as an attack on Connectionism, however, since the inflated claims made on its behalf have the look (...)
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  13. Keith Butler (1994). Neural Constraints in Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 4 (2):129-62.
    The paper is an examination of the ways and extent to which neuroscience places constraints on cognitive science. In Part I, I clarify the issue, as well as the notion of levels in cognitive inquiry. I then present and address, in Part II, two arguments designed to show that facts from neuroscience are at a level too low to constrain cognitive theory in any important sense. I argue, to the contrary, that there are several respects in which facts from neurophysiology (...)
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  14. Keith Butler (1994). The Scope of Psychology. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:428 - 436.
    Descartes' conception of the mind as a private entity, separable (in various ways) from the body and the world around it, has come under increasingly vigorous attack in recent years. A new and very different sort of expansion of the scope of psychology has recently been advanced by John Haugeland, who argues quite ingeniously that the Cartesian divisions between mind, body, and world are psychologically otiose. I demur, citing several traditional individuative criteria that are immune to Haugeland's case.
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  15. Keith Butler (1993). Connectionism, Classical Cognitivism, and the Relation Between Cognitive and Implementational Levels of Analysis. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):321-33.
    This paper discusses the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. Chalmers (1990, 1993) argues that a connectionist implementation of a classical cognitive architecture possesses a compositional semantics, and therefore undercuts Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) argument that connectionist networks cannot possess a compositional semantics. I argue that Chalmers argument misconstrues the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. This paper clarifies the distinction, and shows that while Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument survives Chalmers' critique, it cannot be used to (...)
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  16. Keith Butler (1993). On Clark on Systematicity and Connectionism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):37-44.
  17. Keith Butler (1993). The Moral Status of Smoking. Social Theory and Practice 19 (1):1-26.
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  18. Keith Butler (1992). The Physiology of Desire. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (1):69-88.
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  19. Keith Butler (1991). Towards a Connectionist Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 6 (3):252-72.
  20. Keith Butler & Richard Chechile (1976). “Acid Bath” Effects on Storage and Retrieval PI. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 8 (5):349-352.
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