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Profile: Keith DeRose (Yale University)
  1. Keith DeRose, The Conditionals of Deliberation + Whither Middle Knowledge?
    Work in progress. Will probably split into two papers, and then, perhaps, later, will be brought back together, along with other material, into something larger. (All this only if it works out OK!).
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  2. Keith DeRose, I. The Problem.
    In some lottery situations, the probability that your ticket's a loser can get very close to 1. Suppose, for instance, that yours is one of 20 million tickets, only one of which is a winner. Still, it seems that (1) You don't know yours is a loser and (2) You're in no position to flat-out assert that your ticket is a loser. "It's probably a loser," "It's all but certain that it's a loser," or even, "It's quite certain that it's (...)
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  3. Keith DeRose, Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?
    This is the text for a presentation I gave at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, D.C. on December 28, 1998. It was written very quickly, and I haven't had time to go back and fix it up, but I probably won't have time to fix it up any time soon, and several people have requested copies, so I don't see any harm in making it available. Please remember that it is a draft, and don't (...)
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  4. Keith DeRose, Externalism and Skepticism.
    A few years back, I participated in the Spindell Conference in Memphis, and gave a paper, “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?” (available on-line at: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/Spindell.htm). The bulk of that paper concerned responses to skepticism. I pursued an unusually radical criticism of the often-criticized “Putnam-style” responses to skepticism. To put it rather enigmatically, I argued that such responses don’t work even if they work! And I compared such responses with the type of response I favor – (...)
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  5. Keith DeRose, Might God Have Reasons for Not Preventing Evils?
    Virtually all monotheistic religions profess that there is a divine being who is extremely powerful, knowledgeable, and good. The evils of this world present various challenges for such religions. The starkest challenge is directed toward views that posit a being whose power, knowledge, and goodness are not just immense, but are as great as can be: an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being (for short, an oopg being). For it would seem that such a being would have the power, the (...)
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  6. Keith DeRose, Responding to Skepticism.
    exactly as the essay appears in Skepticism. It's pretty close, though. In the version that appears in the book, page references to other essays in Skepticism refer to page numbers in the book, while below page references are, for the most part, to the original place of publication of the essays referred to. Also, I below make one correction (in red) of a factual error..
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  7. Keith DeRose, (2) There is Evil in the World.
    Plantinga construes the “atheologian” as claiming that “the conjunction of these two propositions is necessarily false, false in every possible world,” while Plantinga “aims to show that there is a possible world in which (1) and (2) are both true.”.
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  8. Keith DeRose, Review of T. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits.
    Though he’s perhaps best known for his work on vagueness, Timothy Williamson also produced a series of outstanding papers in epistemology in the late 1980's and the 1990's. Knowledge and its Limits brings this work together. The result is, in my opinion, the best book in epistemology to come out since 1975.
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  9. Keith DeRose, Universalism and the Bible.
    I should be clear at the outset about what I'll mean -- and won't mean -- by "universalism." As I'll use it, "universalism" refers to the position that eventually all human beings will be saved and will enjoy everlasting life with Christ. This is compatible with the view that God will punish many people after death, and many universalists accept that there will be divine retribution, although some may not. What universalism does commit one to is that such punishment won't (...)
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  10. Keith DeRose, Universalisme En de Bijbel.
    Laat me vanaf het begin duidelijk maken welke betekenis ik wel — en niet — aan de term “universalisme” zal hechten. Zoals ik de term gebruik, heeft “universalisme” betrekking op het standpunt dat alle menselijke wezens uiteindelijk gered zullen worden en bij Christus eeuwig leven zullen mogen genieten. Dit standpunt is verenigbaar met de opvatting dat God vele mensen na hun dood zal straffen. Vele universalisten nemen aan dat er van Goddelijke vergelding sprake zal zijn, hoewel enkelen daar wellicht niet (...)
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  11. Keith DeRose, Voodoo Epistemology.
    A critical examination of Alvin Plantinga's attempted defense against the dreaded "Great Pumpkin Objection" to his theistic-belief-as-properly-basic religious epistemology.
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  12. Keith DeRose (forthcoming). Forthcoming,'Single Scoreboard Semantics'. Philosophical Studies.
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  13. Keith Derose (2012). Précis of The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):675-677.
  14. Keith Derose (2012). Precis of The Case for Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):675-677.
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  15. Keith Derose (2012). Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):703-721.
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  16. Keith DeRose (2011). Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):81-110.
    I will here sharply oppose all the phases of the story Schaffer & Knobe tell. In Part 1 we will look at the supposed empirical case against standard contextualism, and in Part 2 we will investigate Schaffer & Knobe’s supposed empirical case for the superiority of contrastivism over standard contextualism.
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  17. Keith DeRose (2011). Questioning Evidentialism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
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  18. Keith DeRose (2010). Insensitivity is Back, Baby! Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):161-187.
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  19. Keith DeRose (2010). The Conditionals of Deliberation. Mind 119 (473):1 - 42.
    Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will (likely) happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between 'straightforward' future-directed conditionals like ' If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby' and * "w e r e ' ' e d F (...)
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  20. Keith DeRose (2010). ``The Conditionals of Deliberation&Quot. Mind 119:1-42.
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  21. Keith DeRose (2010). The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, by Terence Cuneo. Mind 119 (473):1-5.
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  22. Keith DeRose (2009). The Case for Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
    In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing ...
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  23. Keith DeRose (2009). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. OUP Oxford.
    It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute (...)
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  24. Keith DeRose (2008). Gradable Adjectives: A Defence of Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):141-160.
    This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a ?pluralist? approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the group-indexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory.
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  25. Keith DeRose (2007). Review of J. Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW] Mind 116:486-489.
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  26. Keith DeRose (2007). Review of Stanley (2005). [REVIEW] Mind 116 (2007):116.
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  27. Keith DeRose (2006). "Bamboozled by Our Own Words": Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):316 - 338.
    The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions are to be found in how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, nonphilosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as “knowledge” in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others. Contextualists typically appeal to pairs of cases that forcefully display the variability in the epistemic standards that govern ordinary usage: A “low standards” case (henceforth, “LOW”) in which a speaker seems quite appropriately and truthfully to ascribe knowledge (...)
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  28. Keith DeRose (2005). Direct Warrant Realism. In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.
    Direct Realism often emerges as a solution to a certain type of problem. Hume and, especially, Berkeley, wielding some of the most powerful arguments of 18th Century philosophy, forcefully attacked the notion that there could be good inferences from the occurrence of one’s sensations to the existence of external, mind-independent bodies (material objects). Given the success of these attacks, and also given the assumption, made by Berkeley and arguably by Hume as well, that our knowledge of and rational belief in (...)
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  29. Keith DeRose (2005). The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198.
    I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.
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  30. Keith DeRose (2004). Single Scoreboard Semantics. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):1-21.
    What happens to the "conversational score" when speakers in a conversation push the score for a context-sensitive term in different directions? In epistemology, contextualists are often construed as holding that both the skeptic ("You don't know!") and her opponent ("Oh, yes I do!") speak truthfully when they debate. This assumes a "multiple scoreboards" version of contextualism. But contextualists themselves typically opt for "single scoreboard" views on which such apparently competing claims really do conflict. This paper explores several single scoreboard options (...)
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  31. Keith DeRose (2004). Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses. In J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Blackwell. 22--41.
    Fortunately for those of us who work on the topic, Ernie Sosa has devoted much of his (seemingly inexhaustible) intellectual energy to the problem of philosophical skepticism. And to great effect. With the three exceptions of Peter Unger, whose 1975 Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism is a grossly under-appreciated classic of epistemology; Timothy Williamson, whose 2000 Knowledge and its Limits is, I hope, on its way to being a less underappreciated classic; and Thomas Reid, I have benefitted more from Sosa’s (...)
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  32. Keith DeRose (2004). The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
    Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards that (...)
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  33. Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
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  34. Keith DeRose (2002). ``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context&Quot. Philosophical Review 111:167-203.
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  35. Keith DeRose (2002). Knowledge and its Limits. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):573-577.
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  36. Keith DeRose (2002). Rezension von Williamson 2000. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53:573-577.
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  37. Keith DeRose (2000). How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats? Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
    This should be fairly close to the text of this paper as it appears in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
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  38. Keith DeRose (2000). Now You Know It, Now You Don't. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
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  39. Keith Derose (2000). Ought We to Follow Our Evidence? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.
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  40. Keith DeRose (1999). Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell Publishers. 187--205.
    In epistemology, “contextualism” denotes a wide variety of more-or-less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of “contextualism”. I’ll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and (...)
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  41. Keith DeRose (1999). Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been? Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):385-413.
    The score was tied in the bottom of the ninth, I was on third base, and there was only one out when Bubba hit a towering fly ball to deep left-center. Although I’m no speed-demon, the ball was hammered so far that I easily could have scored the winning run if I had tagged up. But I didn’t. I got caught up in the excitement and stupidly played it half way, standing between third and home until I saw the (...)
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  42. Keith DeRose & Richard E. Grandy (1999). Conditional Assertions and "Biscuit" Conditionals. Noûs 33 (3):405-420.
    kind of joke to ask what is the case if the antecedent is false—“And where are the biscuits if I don’t want any?”, “And what’s on PBS if I’m not interested?”, “And who shot Kennedy if that’s not what I’m asking?”. With normal indicative conditionals like.
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  43. Keith DeRose & Ted Warfield (eds.) (1999). Skepticism: Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) (1999). Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oxford University Press.
    Recently, new life has been breathed into the ancient philosophical topic of skepticism. The subject of some of the best and most provocative work in contemporary philosophy, skepticism has been addressed not only by top epistemologists but also by several of the world's finest philosophers who are most known for their work in other areas of the discipline. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader brings together the most important recent contributions to the discussion of skepticism. Covering major approaches to the skeptical problem, (...)
     
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  45. Keith Derose (1998). Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):238-241.
  46. Keith DeRose (1996). Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568 – 580.
  47. Keith Derose (1996). Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193-197.
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  48. Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
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  49. Keith DeRose (1994). Lewis on 'Might' and 'Would' Counterfactual Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):413 - 418.
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