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Kelly Becker [14]Kelly M. Becker [1]
  1. Kelly Becker (2014). Scepticism and Reliable Belief. Philosophical Review 123 (2):241-244.
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  2. Kelly Becker (2013). Why Reliabilism Does Not Permit Easy Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3751-3775.
    Reliabilism furnishes an account of basic knowledge that circumvents the problem of the given. However, reliabilism and other epistemological theories that countenance basic knowledge have been criticized for permitting all-too-easy higher-level knowledge. In this paper, I describe the problem of easy knowledge, look briefly at proposed solutions, and then develop my own. I argue that the easy knowledge problem, as it applies to reliabilism, hinges on a false and too crude understanding of ‘reliable’. With a more plausible conception of ‘reliable’, (...)
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  3. Kelly Becker (2012). Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding. Acta Analytica 27 (2):145-161.
    Reliabilism is a theory that countenances basic knowledge, that is, knowledge from a reliable source, without requiring that the agent knows the source is reliable. Critics (especially Cohen 2002 ) have argued that such theories generate all-too-easy, intuitively implausible cases of higher-order knowledge based on inference from basic knowledge. For present purposes, the criticism might be recast as claiming that reliabilism implausibly generates cases of understanding from brute, basic knowledge. I argue that the easy knowledge (or easy understanding) criticism rests (...)
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  4. Kelly Becker (ed.) (2012). New Essays on Sensitivity and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  5. Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.) (2012). The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    Provides new thinking on the compelling subject of 'sensitivity' - a principle typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge.
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  6. Kelly Becker (2009). Contrastivism and Lucky Questions. Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.
    There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, (...)
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  7. Kelly Becker (2009). Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.
    Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
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  8. Kelly Becker (2008). Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
    Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
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  9. Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
    Introduction: externalism and modalism -- Externalism -- Modalism -- What should the theory do? -- What's missing? -- Process reliabilism -- Goldman's causal theory -- Goldman's discrimination requirement and relevant alternatives -- Process reliabilism and why it is not enough -- Implications for skepticism -- Sensitivity -- Nozick's subjunctive conditional theory of knowledge -- Methods : an important refinement -- Objections to nozicks theory -- Safety -- Motivating safety -- Weak and strong safety : luck and induction -- Is safety (...)
     
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  10. Kelly Becker (2006). Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge? Dialectica 60 (1):79–84.
    Jonathan Vogel has recently argued that counterfactual reliabilism cannot account for higher‐level knowledge that one's belief is true, or not false. His particular argument for this claim is straightforward and valid. Interestingly, there is a parallel argument, based on an alternative but plausible reinterpretation of the main premise in Vogel's argument, which squares CR with higher‐level knowledge both that one's belief is true and that one's belief is not false. I argue that, while Vogel's argument reveals the incompatibility of CR (...)
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  11. Kelly Becker (2006). Reliabilism and Safety. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.
    : Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly committed to (...)
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  12. Kelly Becker (2004). Knowing and Possessing Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):21 - 36.
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  13. Kelly Becker (2002). Individualism and Self-Knowledge: Tu Quoque. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):289 - 295.
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  14. Kelly Becker (2002). Kuhn's Vindication of Quine and Carnap. History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (2):217 - 235.
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  15. Kelly M. Becker (1999). Meaning Holism: An Articulation and Defense. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Meaning holism says that the meaning of an expression depends on all of its inferential connections. This dissertation defends this view from the objections that its grounds are infirm and that any theory of meaning holism faces insuperable difficulties. I argue that there are indeed compelling Quinean grounds for holism . I explicate the debate between Quine and Carnap over the status of analyticity, concluding that Quine is right to deny the distinction between inferences that are constitutive of expression meanings (...)
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