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Ken Levy [12]Kenneth Levy [1]
  1. Ken Levy, Gonzales V. Oregon and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Ethical and Policy Issues.
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  2. Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism.
    For over a century now, American scholars (among others) have been debating the merits of “bad-samaritan” laws – laws punishing people for failing to attempt “easy rescues.” Unfortunately, the opponents of bad-samaritan laws have mostly prevailed. In the United States, the “no-duty-to-rescue” rule dominates. Only four states even have bad-samaritan laws, and these laws impose only the most minimal punishment – either sub-$500 fines or short-term imprisonment. This Article argues that this situation needs to be remedied. Every state should criminalize (...)
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  3. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy (2011). Insanity Defense. In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. 299--334.
     
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  4. Ken Levy (2009). On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.
    Gregory Kavka's 'Toxin Puzzle' suggests that I cannot intend to perform a counter-preferential action A even if I have a strong self-interested reason to form this intention. The 'Rationalist Solution,' however, suggests that I can form this intention. For even though it is counter-preferential, A-ing is actually rational given that the intention behind it is rational. Two arguments are offered for this proposition that the rationality of the intention to A transfers to A-ing itself: the 'Self-Promise Argument' and David Gauthier's (...)
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  5. Ken Levy (2009). The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
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  6. Ken Levy (2007). Baumann on the Monty Hall Problem and Single-Case Probabilities. Synthese 158 (1):139 - 151.
    Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann’s particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what (...)
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  7. Ken Levy (2007). Single Case Probabilities and the Case of Monty Hall: Baumann's View. Synthese 158:139-151.
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  8. Ken Levy (2005). Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (4):627 – 674.
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  9. Ken Levy (2005). The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm is Just as Punishable as the Wrongful Action That Causes It. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 24 (3):263-303.
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  10. Ken Levy (2005). Why It Is Sometimes Fair to Blame Agents for Unavoidable Actions and Omissions. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):93 - 104.
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  11. Ken Levy (2001). The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
    Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessaryfor free will. They think this in part because they hold both (1) thatmy being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary forfree will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this ``ultimateself-causation''. But seductive and intuitive as this ``USCLibertarianism'' may sound, it is untenable. In the end, nometaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception ofultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivatingthe USC Libertarian is ultimately (...)
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  12. Ken Levy (2000). Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections. Hume Studies 26 (1):41-75.
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  13. Kenneth Levy (1990). Music Reviews. Medioevo 279:96.
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