27 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Ken Levy [22]Kenneth Levy [6]Ken Michael Levy [1]Kenneth N. Levy [1]
See also:
Profile: Ken Levy (Louisiana State University)
  1.  43
    Ken Levy (2017). Why the Late Justice Scalia Was Wrong: The Fallacies of Constitutional Textualism. Lewis and Clark Law Review 21 (1).
    My article concerns constitutional interpretation and substantive due process, issues that played a central role in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), one of the two same-sex marriage cases. (The other same-sex marriage case was United States v. Windsor (2013).) -/- The late Justice Scalia consistently maintained that the Court “invented” substantive due process and continues to apply this legal “fiction” not because the Constitution supports it but simply because the justices like it. Two theories underlay his cynical conclusion. First is the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Ken Levy (2015). Does Situationism Excuse? The Implications of Situationism for Moral Responsibility and Criminal Responsibility. Arkansas Law Review 68:731-787.
    In this Article, I will argue that a person may be deserving of criminal punishment even in certain situations where she is not necessarily morally responsible for her criminal act. What these situations share in common are two things: the psychological factors that motivate the individual’s behavior are environmentally determined and her crime is serious, making her less eligible for sympathy and therefore less likely to be acquitted. -/- To get to this conclusion, I will proceed in four steps. In (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Ken Levy (2014). Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System. Rutgers Law Review 66:629-684.
    Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  93
    Ken Levy & Alex Cohen (2016). Commentary on Szmukler: Mental Illness, Dangerousness, and Involuntary Civil Commitment. In Daniel D. Moseley Gary J. Gala (ed.), Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives. Routledge 147-160.
    Prof. Cohen and I answer six questions: (1) Why do we lock people up? (2) How can involuntary civil commitment be reconciled with people's constitutional right to liberty? (3) Why don't we treat homicide as a public health threat? (4) What is the difference between legal and medical approaches to mental illness? (5) Why is mental illness required for involuntary commitment? (6) Where are we in our efforts to understand the causes of mental illness?
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Ken Levy (2007). The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common Link Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats. Connecticut Law Review 39:1051-1096.
    Disclosure of true but reputation-damaging information is generally legal. But threats to disclose true but reputation-damaging information unless payment is made are generally criminal. Many scholars think that this situation is paradoxical because it seems to involve illegality mysteriously arising out of legality, a criminal act mysteriously arising out of an independently legal threat to disclose conjoined with an independently legal demand for money. -/- But this formulation is not quite right. The real paradox raised by the different legal statuses (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  86
    Ken Levy (2011). Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention. San Diego Law Review 48:1299-1395.
    I argue for two propositions. First, contrary to the common wisdom, we may justly punish individuals who are not morally responsible for their crimes. Psychopaths – individuals who lack the capacity to feel sympathy – help to prove this point. Scholars are increasingly arguing that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their behavior because they suffer from a neurological disorder that makes it impossible for them to understand, and therefore be motivated by, moral reasons. These same scholars then infer from (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  12
    Ken Levy (2016). Blocking Blockage. Philosophia:1-18.
    The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt’s argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest “flicker of freedom”. -/- Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise is incompatible with (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  57
    Ken Levy (2007). Baumann on the Monty Hall Problem and Single-Case Probabilities. Synthese 158 (1):139-151.
    Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann's particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  9.  41
    Ken Levy (2014). It's Not Too Difficult: A Plea to Resurrect the Impossibility Defense. New Mexico Law Revview 45:225-274.
    Suppose you are at the gym trying to see some naked beauties by peeping through a hole in the wall. A policeman happens by, he asks you what you are doing, and you honestly tell him. He then arrests you for voyeurism. Are you guilty? We don’t know yet because there is one more fact to be considered: while you honestly thought that a locker room was on the other side of the wall, it was actually a squash court. Are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  6
    Ken Levy (forthcoming). Erratum To: Blocking Blockage. Philosophia:1-1.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  95
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy (2011). Insanity Defenses. In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press 299--334.
    We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Ken Levy (2009). On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.
    Gregory Kavka's 'Toxin Puzzle' suggests that I cannot intend to perform a counter-preferential action A even if I have a strong self-interested reason to form this intention. The 'Rationalist Solution,' however, suggests that I can form this intention. For even though it is counter-preferential, A-ing is actually rational given that the intention behind it is rational. Two arguments are offered for this proposition that the rationality of the intention to A transfers to A-ing itself: the 'Self-Promise Argument' and David Gauthier's (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  95
    Ken Levy (2009). The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  2
    Ken Levy (forthcoming). Blocking Blockage. Philosophia:1-18.
    The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt’s argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest “flicker of freedom”. Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise is incompatible with moral (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Ken Levy (2007). Gonzales V. Oregon and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Ethical and Policy Issues. Tulsa Law Review 42:699-729.
    The euthanasia literature typically discusses the difference between “active” and “passive” means of ending a patient’s life. Physician-assisted suicide differs from both active and passive forms of euthanasia insofar as the physician does not administer the means of suicide to the patient. Instead, she merely prescribes and dispenses them to the patient and lets the patient “do the rest” – if and when the patient chooses. One supposed advantage of this process is that it maximizes the patient’s autonomy with respect (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  87
    Ken Levy (2005). Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (4):627 – 674.
    I argue that Descartes' Second Causal Proof of God in the Third Meditation evidences, and commits him to, the belief that time is "strongly discontinuous" -- that is, that there is actually a gap between each consecutive moment of time. Much of my article attempts to reconcile this interpretation, the "received view," with Descartes' statements about time, space, and matter in his other writings, including his correspondence with various philosophers.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  92
    Ken Levy (2005). Why It Is Sometimes Fair to Blame Agents for Unavoidable Actions and Omissions. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):93 - 104.
    It is generally thought that ought implies can. If this maxim is correct, then my inability to do otherwise entails that I cannot be blamed for failing to do otherwise. In this article, however, I use Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) to show that the maxim is actually false, that I can be blamed for failing to do otherwise even in situations where I could not have done otherwise. In these situations, I do not (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Ken Levy (2005). The Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as Punishable as the Wrongful Action That Causes It. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 24 (3):263-303.
    A surprisingly large number of scholars believe that (a) we are blameworthy, and therefore punishable, only for what we have control over; (b) we have control only over our actions and intentions, not the consequences of our actions; and therefore (c) if two agents perform the very same action (e.g., attempting to kill) with the very same intentions, then they are equally blameworthy and deserving of equal punishment – even if only one of them succeeds in killing. This paper argues (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  79
    Ken Levy (2000). Hume, the New Hume, and Causal Connections. Hume Studies 26 (1):41-75.
    In this article, I weigh in on the debate between "Humeans" and "New Humeans" concerning David Hume's stance on the existence of causal connections in "the objects." According to New Humeans, Hume believes in causal connections; according to Humeans, he does not. -/- My argument against New Humeans is that it is too difficult to reconcile Hume's repeated claims that causal connections are inconceivable with any belief that they these inconceivable somethings still exist. Specifically, Hume either assumes or does not (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Ken Levy (2010). Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism. Georgia Law Review 44:607-695.
    For over a century now, American scholars (among others) have been debating the merits of “bad Samaritan” laws — laws punishing people for failing to attempt easy and safe rescues. Unfortunately, the opponents of bad Samaritan laws have mostly prevailed. In the United States, the “no-duty-to-rescue” rule dominates. Only four states have passed bad Samaritan laws, and these laws impose only the most minimal punishment — either sub-$500 fines or short-term imprisonment. -/- This Article argues that every state should criminalize (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  53
    Ken Levy (2007). Baumann on the Monty Hall Problem and Single-Case Probabilities. Synthese 158 (1):139 - 151.
    Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann’s particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  84
    Ken Levy (2001). The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
    There are two reasons to think that determinism is incompatible with responsibility. The first is that determinism negates the ability to do otherwise. The second is that determinism negates "ultimate self-causation" – that is, an agent’s being the ultimately self-caused originator of her action. My article responds to the second reason. I argue that ultimate self-causation is metaphysically impossible. Therefore if "source incompatibilists" like Robert Kane are right that responsibility requires ultimate self-causation, then responsibility is metaphysically impossible.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  2
    Kenneth Levy (1990). Music Reviews. Medioevo 279:96.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. John S. Auerbach, Kenneth N. Levy & Carrie E. Schaffer (eds.) (2016). Relatedness, Self-Definition and Mental Representation: Essays in Honor of Sidney J. Blatt. Routledge.
    Over the course of a long and distinguished career, psychologist and psychoanalyst Sidney J. Blatt has made major contributions to cognitive-developmental theory, psychoanalytic object relations theory, applied psychoanalysis, and current research in the areas of psychopathology and psychotherapy. This book presents chapters by Dr. Blatt's many colleagues and students who address the key areas in which Dr Blatt focuses his intellectual endeavours: *Personality development *Psychopathology *Issues in psychological testing and assessment *Psychotherapy and the treatment process *Applied psychoanalysis and broader cultural (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Kenneth Levy (1962). A History of Byzantine Music and HymnographyEgon Wellesz. Speculum 37 (3):467-469.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Kenneth Levy (1977). Gattungen der Musik in Einzeldarstellungen: Gedenkschrift Leo SchradeWulf Arlt Ernst Lichtenhahn Hans Oesch. Speculum 52 (4):915-916.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Kenneth Levy (1974). Les Tonaires. Inventaire, Analyse, comparaisonMichel Huglo. Speculum 49 (1):125-126.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography