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  1. Kenneth G. Ferguson (2009). Meaning and the External World. Erkenntnis 70 (3):299 - 311.
    Realism, defined as a justified belief in the existence of the external world, is jeopardized by ‘meaning rationalism,’ the classic theory of meaning that sees the extension of words as a function of the intensions of individual speakers, with no way to ensure that these intensions actually correspond to anything in the external world. To defend realism, Ruth Millikan ( 1984 , 1989a , b , 1993 , 2004 , 2005 ) offers a biological theory of meaning called ‘teleosemantics’ in (...)
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  2. Kenneth G. Ferguson (2007). Biological Function and Normativity. Philo 10 (1):17-26.
    Ruth Millikan and others adopt a normative definition of biological functions that is heavily used in areas such as Millikan’s teleosemantics, and also for emerging efforts to naturalize other areas of philosophy. I propose an experiment called the Lapse Test to determine exactly what form of normativity, if any, truly applies to biological functions. Millikan has not gone far enough in playing down as “impersonal” or “quasi” the precise mode of normativity that she attributes to biological functions. Further, her mode (...)
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  3. Kenneth G. Ferguson (2004). The Smuggler's Fallacy. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):648-660.
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  4. Kenneth G. Ferguson (2003). Monotonicity in Practical Reasoning. Argumentation 17 (3):335-346.
    Classic deductive logic entails that once a conclusion is sustained by a valid argument, the argument can never be invalidated, no matter how many new premises are added. This derived property of deductive reasoning is known as monotonicity. Monotonicity is thought to conflict with the defeasibility of reasoning in natural language, where the discovery of new information often leads us to reject conclusions that we once accepted. This perceived failure of monotonic reasoning to observe the defeasibility of natural-language arguments has (...)
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  5. Kenneth G. Ferguson (2001). Caller ID – Whose Privacy is It, Anyway? Journal of Business Ethics 29 (3):227 - 237.
    Caller ID or CND (Calling Number Display) is an internationally-available telecommunication service first introduced into the United States about ten years ago. Caller ID utilizes a new form of technology which enables telephone subscribers to identify the numbers (and/or names) of callers before picking up their telephones. This service has been widely assailed as an invasion of the caller''s right to anonymity, a right which allegedly subsists as an important component of the caller''s right to privacy. However, if privacy is (...)
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  6. Kenneth G. Ferguson (1992). An Intervention Into the Flew/Fogelin Debate. Hume Studies 18 (1):105-112.
    Robert Fogelin has forcefully argued that Hume intended to produce an "a priori" argument to show that miracles are logically impossible, while Anthony Flew is noted for a conflicting view that Hume intended merely to urge caution in accepting miracles solely on the basis of testimony. I furnish text ("Enquiry", Chapter X) which lends aid and comfort to both. But Fogelin’s interpretation forbids "miracles" only under a strict definition, whereas the empirical arguments favored by Flew are also needed if particular (...)
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  7. Kenneth G. Ferguson (1992). Existing by Convention. Religious Studies 28 (2):185 - 194.
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  8. Kenneth G. Ferguson (1991). Equivocation in the Surprise Exam Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):291-302.
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  9. Kenneth G. Ferguson (1987). Truth Conditions for "Might" Counterfactuals. Review of Metaphysics 40 (3):483 - 494.
    According to david lewis, When the conditional excluded middle is accepted for would-Asserting counterfactuals, It becomes difficult or impossible to define their might-Asserting counterparts. But I provide a definition of "might" counterfactuals that does agree with cem: a "might" counterfactual is true iff its consequent is true at some antecedent-World within a set whose membership is determined by appeal to various categories of possibility.
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  10. Kenneth G. Ferguson (1987). Truth Conditions For. Review of Metaphysics 40 (3):483-494.
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