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Profile: Kenneth R Westphal (University of East Anglia)
  1.  40
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2004). Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but (unqualified) realism regarding (...)
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  2.  24
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hackett.
    Though concise and introductory, this book argues inter alia that Dretske’s information-theoretic epistemology must take into account that many of our information channels are socially constructed, not least through learning concepts and information. These social aspects of human knowledge are consistent with realism about the objects of our empirical knowledge. It further argues that, though important, Margaret Gilbert’s social ontology in principle can neither accommodate nor account for the most fundamental social dimensions of human cognition.
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  3.  21
    Kenneth R. Westphal (forthcoming). The Beginning of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in Advance. The Owl of Minerva.
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  4. Kenneth R. Westphal (1993). ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. In F. C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge
    Hegel’s Philosophy of Right responds to two dichotomies. One is between the freedom of rational thought in its practical application and the givenness of natural impulses and desires. Against Kant Hegel argues that pure reason alone cannot determine the content of any maxim or principle of action. Thus Hegel must find a way in which the content of natural needs and impulses – the only source of content for maxims of action – can be transfigured into contents of rationally self-given (...)
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  5.  58
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2005). Kant, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Chaos. Philosophical Investigations 28 (4):303–323.
    Explicates and defends closely parallel, genuinely transcendental proofs of mental content externalism developed by Kant and by Wittgenstein. Both their proofs have been widely neglected, to our loss.
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  6.  10
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2015). Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic and Encyclopaedia. Dialogue 54 (2):333-369.
  7.  57
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2006). Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.
    Argues inter alia that Kant and Hegel identified necessary conditions for the possibility of singular cognitive reference that incorporate avant la lettre Evans’ (1975) analysis of identity and predication, that Kant’s and Hegel’s semantics of singular cognitive reference are crucial to McDowell’s account of singular thoughts, and that McDowell has neglected (to the detriment of his own view) these conditions and their central roles in Kant’s and in Hegel’s theories of knowledge. > Reprinted in: J. Lindgaard, ed., John McDowell: Experience, (...)
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  8.  3
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2016). Back to the 3 R's: Rights, Responsibilities and Reasoning. SATS 17 (1):21-60.
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  9. Kenneth R. Westphal (2008). ‘ ‘Philosophizing About Nature: Hegel’s Philosophical Project’. In F. C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Cambridge
    Henry Harris noted that ‘the Baconian applied science of this world is the solid foundation upon which Hegel’s ladder of spiritual experience rests’. Understanding the philosophical character of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature requires recognizing some basic legitimate philosophical issues embedded in the development of physics from Galileo to Newton (§2). These issues illuminate the character of Hegel’s analysis of philosophical issues regarding nature (§3) and the central aims and purposes of Hegel’s philosophy of nature (§4). Hegel recognized some key weaknesses (...)
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  10. Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt. In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer
    Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...)
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  11.  42
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2000). Hegel's Internal Critique of Naïve Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:173-229.
    This article reconstructs Hegel’s chapter “Sense Certainty” (Phenomenology of Spirit, chap. 1) in detail in its historical and philosophical context. Hegel’s chapter develops a sound internal critique of naive realism that shows that sensation is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge of sensed particulars. Cognitive reference to particulars also requires using a priori conceptions of space, spaces, time, times, self, and individuation. Several standard objections to and misinterpretations of Hegel’s chapter are rebutted. Hegel’s protosemantics is shown to accord in important (...)
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  12.  44
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2006). How Does Kant Prove That We Perceive, and Not Merely Imagine, Physical Objects? Review of Metaphysics 59 (4):781 - 806.
    This paper details the key steps in Kant’s transcendental proof that we perceive, not merely imagine, physical objects. These steps begin with Kant’s method (§II) and highlight the spatio-temporal character of our representational capacities (§III), Kant’s two transcendental proofs of mental content externalism (§IV), his proof that we can only make causal judgments about spatial substances (§§V, VI), the transcendental conditions of our self-ascription of experiences (§VII), Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§VIII), perceptual synthesis (§IX), Kant’s justificatory fallibilism (§X), (...)
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  13.  33
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2015). Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights From Hegel. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (2):281-317.
    The term ‘realism’ and its contrasting terms have various related senses, although often they occlude as much as they illuminate, especially if ontological and epistemological issues and their tenable combinations are insufficiently clarified. For example, in 1807 the infamous ‘idealist’ Hegel argued cogently that any tenable philosophical theory of knowledge must take the natural and social sciences into very close consideration, which he himself did. Here I argue that Hegel ably and insightfully defends Newton’s causal realism about gravitational force, in (...)
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  14.  47
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). Epistemic Reflection and Cognitive Reference in Kant's Transcendental Response to Skepticism. Kant-Studien 94 (2):135-171.
    Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ plainly has an anti-Cartesian conclusion: ‘inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general’ (B278). Due to wide-spread preoccupation with Cartesian skepticism, and to the anti-naturalism of early analytic philosophy, most of Kant’s recent commentators have sought to find a purely conceptual, ‘analytic’ argument in Kant’s Refutation of Idealism – and then have dismissed Kant when no such plausible argument can be reconstructed from his text. Kant’s argument supposedly cannot eliminate all relevant alternatives, (...)
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  15.  70
    Kenneth R. Westphal (forthcoming). ‘Constructivism, Contractarianism and Basic Obligations: Kant and Gauthier’. In J.-C. Merle (ed.), Reading Kant’s Doctrine of Right.
    Gauthier’s contractarianism begins with an idea of a rational deliberator but ‘finds no basis for postulating a moral need for the justification of one’s actions to others. The role of agreement is to address each person’s demand that the constraints of society be justified to him, not a concern that he justify himself to his fellows’ (Gauther 1997, 134–5). He contrasts his view with Scanlon’s contractualism, according to which agreement with others is the core of morality and each agent has (...)
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  16. Kenneth R. Westphal (1996). Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Material Conditions of Possible Experience. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 33:23-41.
    I argue that Hegel is aware of a crucial problem in Kant’s transcendental account of the conditions of human knowledge. Unless the matter of sensation is sufficiently ordered (and sufficiently varied) we could not make any cognitive judgments. In that case we could not distinguish ourselves from objects we know, and so could not be self-conscious. This is a necessary, formal and transcendental condition of possible human experience. However, it is also (as Kant acknowledged) a material – not a conceptual (...)
     
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  17.  27
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). Kant's Dynamic Constructions. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:381-429.
    According to Kant, justifying the application of mathematics to objects in natural science requires metaphysically constructing the concept of matter. Kant develops these constructions in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN). Kant’s specific aim is to develop a dynamic theory of matter to replace corpuscular theory. In his Preface Kant claims completely to exhaust the metaphysical doctrine of body, but in the General Remark to MAdN ch. 2, “Dynamics,” Kant admits that once matter is reconceived as basic forces, it (...)
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  18.  20
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2015). Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (8).
    This article examines how Quine and Sellars develop informatively contrasting responses to a fundamental tension in Carnap’s semantics ca. 1950. Quine’s philosophy could well be styled ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’; his assay of radical empiricism is invaluable for what it reveals about the inherent limits of empiricism. Careful examination shows that Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s semantics in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ fails, that at its core Quine’s semantics is for two key reasons incoherent and that his hallmark Thesis of Extensionalism (...)
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  19.  36
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2009). ‘Hegel’s Phenomenological Method and Analysis of Consciousness’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Blackwell 1--36.
    This chapter argues that Hegel is a major (albeit unrecognized) epistemologist: Hegel’s Introduction provides the key to his phenomenological method by showing that the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion refutes traditional coherentist and foundationalist theories of justification. Hegel then solves this Dilemma by analyzing the possibility of constructive self- and mutual criticism. ‘Sense Certainty’ provides a sound internal critique of ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, thus undermining a key tenet of Concept Empiricism, a view Hegel further undermines by showing that a series (...)
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  20. Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). ‘Can Pragmatic Realists Argue Transcendentally?’. In John Shook (ed.), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism. Prometheus
    Kant’s and Hegel’s transcendental argument for mental-content externalism breaks the deadlock between ‘internal’ and genuine realists. This argument shows that human beings can only be self-conscious in a world that provides a humanly recognizable regularity and variety among the things (or events) we sense. This feature of the world cannot result from human thought or language. Hence semantic arguments against realism can only be developed if realism about the world is true. Some of Putnam’s arguments for internal realism are taken (...)
     
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  21.  32
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2001). Freedom and the Distinction Between Phenomena and Noumena: Is Allison's View Methodological, Metaphysical, or Equivocal? Journal of Philosophical Research 26:593-622.
    Henry Allison [1983; cf. 1990, 1996] criticizes and rejects naturalism because the idea of freedom is constitutive of rational spontaneity, which alone enables and entitles us to judge or to act rationally, and only transcendental idealism can justify our acting under the idea of freedom. Allison’s critique of naturalism is unclear because his reasons for claiming that free rational spontaneity requires transcendental idealism are inadequate and because his characterization of Kant’s idealism is ambiguous. Recognizing this reinforces the importance of the (...)
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  22. Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). Practical Reason: Categorical Imperative, Maxims, Laws. In W. Dudley & K. Engelhard (eds.), Kant: Key Concepts. Acumen
    This chapter considers the centrality of principles in Kant’s moral philosophy, their distinctively ‘Kantian’ character, why Kant presents a ‘metaphysical’ system of moral principles and how these ‘formal’ principles are to be used in practice. These points are central to how Kant thinks pure reason can be practical. These features have often puzzled Anglophone readers, in part due to focusing on Kant’s Groundwork, to the neglect of his later works in moral philosophy, in which the theoretical preliminaries of that first (...)
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  23. Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). Buchdahl’s “Phenomenological” View of Kant: A Critique. Kant-Studien 89 (3):335-352.
    In Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Gerd Buchdahl proposes to solve Jacobi’s objection to Kant’s metaphysics – one needs a ‘thing-in-itself’ to enter the Critical Philosophy, but one cannot uphold both that philosophy and the ‘thing-in-itself’ – by interpreting Kant in terms of a phenomenological ‘reduction’ of objects to their transcendental conditions and their subesequent ‘realization’ in various theoretical or practical contexts. I summarize Buchdahl’s interpretation and argue: (1) Buchdahl’s view faces an exact analog of Jacobi’s problem; (2) Buchdahl’s (...)
     
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  24. Kenneth R. Westphal (1989). Hegel's Epistemological Realism a Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.
     
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  25.  33
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). From 'Convention' to 'Ethical Life': Hume's Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1):105-132.
    Hume and contemporary Humeans contend that moral sentiments form the sole and sufficient basis of moral judgments. This thesis is criticised by appeal to Hume’s theory of justice, which shows that basic principles of justice are required to form and to maintain society, which is indispensable to human life, and that acting according to, or violating, these principles is right, or wrong, regardless of anyone’s sentiments, motives or character. Furthermore, Hume’s theory of justice shows how the principles of justice are (...)
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  26.  43
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1991). Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral World View. Philosophical Topics 19 (2):133-176.
    Few if any of Kant’s critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient attention, the chapter titled ‘the Moral World View’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Kant holds virtually all the tenets Hegel ascribes to ‘the moral world view’. I concentrate on five of Hegel’s main objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics. First, Kant’s problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) (...)
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  27.  37
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2000). Hegel, Harris, and Sextus Empiricus. The Owl of Minerva 31 (2):155-172.
    I argue that Henry Harris’s magnificent commentary, Hegel’s Ladder, so focuses on the cultural significance of Hegel’s Phenomenology that it neglects Hegel’s concerns with philosophical issues in the history of philosophy. In particular, it neglects issues central to Hegel’s phenomenological method about the assessment and internal criticism of alternative philosophical views, which are central to Hegel’s method for justifying his own view by ‘determinate negation’ of those alternatives. This neglect is manifest in three important regards: (1) Harris disregards a plethora (...)
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  28.  49
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). Noumenal Causality Reconsidered: Affection, Agency, and Meaning in Kant. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):209 - 245.
    The idea that noumena or things in themselves causally affect our sensibility, and thus provide us with sensations, has been rejected on two basic grounds: It is unintelligible because distinguishes between appearance and reality in such a way that things cannot in principle appear as they really are, and it requires applying the concept of causality trans-phenomenally, contra Kant’s Schematism. I argue that noumenal causality is intelligible and is required out of fidelity to Kant’s texts and doctrines. Kant’s theory of (...)
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  29.  40
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). Intelligenz and the Interpretation of Hegel's Idealism. The Owl of Minerva 39 (1-2):95-134.
    Hegel’s idealism and his epistemology have been seriously misunderstood due to various deep-set preconceptions of Hegel’s expositors. Thesepreconceptions include: Idealism is inherently subjective; Hegel’s epistemology invokes intellectual intuition; Hegel was not much concerned with natural science; Natural science has no basic role to play in Hegel’s Logic. In criticizing these notions, I highlight four key features of Hegel’s account of intelligence: (1) Human cognition is active, and forges genuine cognitive links to objects that exist and have intrinsic characteristics, regardless of (...)
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  30. Kenneth R. Westphal (2009). ‘Consciousness, Scepticism and the Critique of Categorial Concepts in Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit’. In M. Bykova & M. Solopova (eds.), Сущность и Слово. Сборник научных статей к юбилею профессора Н.В.Мотрошиловой. Phenomenology & Hermeneutics Press
    This paper (in English) highlights a hitherto neglected feature of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit: its critique of the content of our basic categorial concepts. It focusses on Hegel’s semantics of cognitive reference in ‘Sense Certainty’ and his use of this semantics also in ‘Perception’ and ‘Force and Understanding’. Explicating these points enables us to understand how Hegel criticizes Pyrrhonian Scepticism on internal grounds.
     
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  31.  35
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2009). Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Dialogue 48 (4):753-99.
    : This paper explicates and defends the thesis that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification, whether in cognition or in morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. This puts paid to the traditional distinction, still influential today, between ‘rational’ and ‘historical’ knowledge. The present analysis highlights and defends key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including four fundamental features of the ‘autonomy’ of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of (...)
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  32. Kenneth R. Westphal (2002). A Kantian Justification of Possession. In M. Timmons (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Ethics: Interpretive Essays. Oxford
    Kant’s justification of possession appears to assume rather than prove its legitimacy. This apparent question-begging has been recapitulated or exacerbated but not resolved in the literature. However, Kant provides a sound justification of limited rights to possess and use things (qualified choses in possession), not of private property rights. Kant’s argument is not purely a priori; it is in Kant’s Critical sense ‘metaphysical’ because it applies the pure a priori ‘Universal Principles of Right’ to the concept of finite rational human (...)
     
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  33.  37
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1993). Übergang. The Owl of Minerva 24 (2):235-242.
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  34.  34
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). Affinity, Idealism and Naturalism: The Stability of Cinnabar and the Possibility of Experience. Kant-Studien 88 (2):139-189.
    In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced both transcendental idealism and transcendental arguments into philosophy. Transcendental arguments in general aim to establish conditions necessary for our having self-conscious experience at all. Transcendental idealism holds that such conditions do not hold independently of human subjects; those conditions obtain or are satisfied because they are generated or fulfilled by the structure or functioning of the subject’s cognitive capacities. Is transcendental idealism the only possible explanation of such conditions? I pursue this question (...)
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  35.  16
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1999). ‘Hegel’s Epistemology? Reflections on Some Recent Expositions’. Clio 28 (3):303-323.
    The notion that Hegel repudiated epistemology has had dire consequences for our understanding of Hegel. By disregarding epistemology, Hegel’s expositors often disregarded the general issues central to epistemology of how one can establish or justify a philosophical view. If Hegel did address epistemological issues and tried to justify (not simply to expound) ‘absolute knowledge’, then that disregard would produce skewed interpretations of Hegel. Recent attention to Hegel’s epistemology (e.g., by Klaus Hartmann, Joseph Flay, Robert Pippin, Michael Forster, Terry Pinkard, and (...)
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  36. Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.) (1998). Pragmatism, Reason & Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham University Press.
    This collection of essays examines the issue of norms and social practices both in epistemology and in moral and social philosophy. The contributors examine the issue across an unprecedented range of issues, including epistemology (realism, perception, testimony), logic, education, foundations of morality, philosophy of law, the pragmatic account of norms and their justification, and the pragmatic character of reason itself.
     
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  37.  68
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). Hegel and Hume on Perception and Concept-Empiricism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (1):99-123.
    This article shows that Hegel’s analysis of ‘Perception’ (PhdG, ch. 2) is a critique of Hume’s analysis, ‘Of Scepticism with regard to the senses’ (Treatise, I.iv §2). To extend his concept-empiricism to handle the non-logical concept of the identity of a perceptible thing, Hume must appeal to several psychological ‘propensities’ to generate, in effect, a priori concepts; he must confront a ‘contradiction’ in the concept of the identity of a perceptible thing; and he must regard this concept as a ‘fiction’. (...)
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  38.  31
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). Kant's Anti-Cartesianism. Dialogue 46 (04):709-.
  39. Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). ‘Hegel’ (Hegel's Moral Philosophy). In J. Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics.
    A 5,000-word conspectus of Hegel’s moral philosophy which considers the theoretical context of his moral philosophy (§1), his accounts of legal, personal, moral and social freedom (§2), the structure of Hegel’s analysis in his Philosophy of Justice (or »Rechtsphilosophie«) (§3), his account of role obligations as a central component of social freedom (§4), and his integrated account of individual autonomy and social reconciliation (§5).
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  40.  49
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1992). Kant on the State, Law, and Obedience to Authority in the Alleged 'Anti-Revolutionary' Writings. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:383-426.
    The tension between Kant’s egalitarian conception of persons as ends in themselves and his rejection of the right of revolution has been widely discussed. The crucial issue is more fundamental: Is Kant’s defense of absolute obedience consistent with his own principle of legitimate law, that legitimate law is compatible with the Categorical Imperative? Resolving this apparent inconsistency resolves the subsidiary inconsistencies that have been debated in the literature. I argue that Kant’s legal principles contain two distinct grounds of obligation to (...)
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  41. Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). Kant’s Critique of Determinism in Empirical Psychology. In H. Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress. Marquette University Press
    The debate about the relation between the (phenomenal) psychological realm and our (noumenal) rational freedom is moot because Kant in fact argues that psychological determinism is undemonstrable, even in the phenomenal realm. Kant contends that causality is strictly related to substance. Also, the three Analogies form a mutually integrated set of principles. Kant’s Paralogisms show we have no knowledge of a substantial self. If we have no evidence of a substantial self, then we cannot apply any of the Principles of (...)
     
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  42. Kenneth R. Westphal (1992). Review: Mulholland, Leslie A., Kant's System of Rights. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 12 (2):126-128.
  43.  54
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). Does Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Fill a Gap in the Critique of Pure Reason? Synthese 103 (1):43 - 86.
    In 1792 and 1798 Kant noticed two basic problems with hisMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN) which opened a crucial gap in the Critical system as a whole. Why is theMAdN so important? I show that the Analogies of Experience form an integrated proof of transeunt causality. This is central to Kant's answer to Hume. This proof requires explicating the empirical concept of matter as the moveable in space, it requires the specifically metaphysical principle that every physical event has an (...)
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  44. Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). Do Kant’s Principles Justify Property or Usufruct? Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 5:141-194.
    Kant’s justification of possession appears to beg the question (petitio principii) by assuming rather than proving the legitimacy of possession. The apparent question-begging in Kant’s argument has been recapitulated or exacerbated but not resolved in the secondary literature. A detailed terminological, textual, and logical analysis of Kant’s argument reveals that he provides a sound justification of limited rights to possess and use things (qualified choses in possession), not of private property rights. Kant’s argument is not purely a priori; it is (...)
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  45. Kenneth R. Westphal (2008). ‘Force, Understanding and Ontology’. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 57:1-29.
    This paper examines Hegel’s ontological revolution in ‘Force and Understanding’. I argue that understanding Hegel’s critical engagement with natural science is important for understanding Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit as well as his mature philosophy as a whole. Already in this chapter Hegel argues that philosophical theory of knowledge must take the natural sciences into close consideration. Hegel disambiguates the standard concept of substance in order to show that relational properties can be essential to particular individuals. He further argues that (...)
     
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  46.  34
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1993). ‘Hegel on Political Representation: Laborers, Corporations, and the Monarch’. The Owl of Minerva 25 (1):111-116.
    Hegel holds that members of a society can only be fully free and autonomous if they enjoy political representation. Hegel grants political representation to the landed aristocracy and to members of corporations. Causal day laborers fall outside both of these groups. Consequently, they lack political representation in Hegel’s state; hence they lack the political resources for full freedom and autonomy. This is a serious problem, but not so serious as Hegel’s marxist critics maintain. I propose two solutions based on Hegel’s (...)
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  47.  29
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1989). Hegel's Attitude Toward Jacobi in the “Third Attitude of Thought Toward Objectivity”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):135-156.
    In the conceptual preliminaries of his philosophical Encyclopedia Hegel discusses three approaches to epistemology under the headings of three ‘Attitudes of Thought Toward Objectivity’. The third of these is Jacobi’s doctrine of ‘immediate’ or intuitive knowledge. Hegel’s discussion presumes great familiarity with Jacobi’s highly polemical and now seldom read texts. In this essay I disambiguate and reconstruct Hegel’s discussion of Jacobi, in close consideration of Jacobi’s texts, showing why Hegel finds him important and what Hegel’s objections to his doctrines are. (...)
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  48.  31
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):149–178.
    For many reasons mainstream Hegel scholarship has disregarded Hegel's interests in epistemology, hence also his response to scepticism. From the points of view of defenders and critics alike, it seems that 'Hegel' and 'epistemology' have nothing to do with one another. Despite this widespread conviction, Hegel was a very sophisticated epistemologist whose views merit contemporary interest. This article highlights several key features and innovations of Hegel's epistemology-including his anti-Cartesianism, fallibilism, realism (sic) and externalism both about mental content and about justification-by (...)
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  49. Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). How "Full" is Kant's Categorical Imperative? Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 3:465-509.
    Through a careful examination of two detailed investigations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative as a criterion for determining correct action I show that Hegel’s widely castigated critique of Kant’s CI has significant merit. Kant holds that moral imperatives are categorical because the obligations they express do not depend upon our contingent ends or desires and he holds that the CI is the supreme normative principle. However, his actual illustrations show that Kant repeatedly appeals to contingent ends and desires in deriving our (...)
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  50.  33
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1993). Hegel, Idealism, and Robert Pippin. International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):263-272.
    In Hegel’s Idealism, Robert Pippin contends that Hegel develops a more adequate version of Fichte’s idealism, where the key to idealism lies in the general thesis that there are conditions presupposed by self-conscious judgments about objects. Focusing on this thesis led post-Kantian German idealists to dismiss Kant’s doctrine that space and time are a priori forms of intuition and to develop views of the autonomy of human reason in terms of thought’s self-determination. While Pippin and I agree on some fundamentals, (...)
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