This article addresses Franklin Gamwell's critique of Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the nature of rational justification. I argue that MacIntyreans have good reasons to take seriously Gamwell's critique, and thus to reformulate MacIntyre's position to make clear that that position does not rest on a denial of all a priori claims. The author outlines such a reformulation, drawing heavily on MacIntyre's account (in his 1990 Aquinas Lecture) of the place of a priori claims within the development of rational traditions of (...) inquiry. When thus rethought, MacIntyre's position grounds a twofold response to Gamwell's critique. (shrink)

This paper responds to Swinburne’s recent article “Dualism Intact,” which defends his argument for a body/soul dualism. It pays particular attention to his defense against the charges of Alston and Smythe, especially the appeal to the “quasi-Aristotelian assumption,” on which the essence of a thing is necessary to its being the thing that it is. I argue that this defense does not save the argument, but only makes clear that its apparent plausibility rests on an ambiguity between two understandings of (...) the nature of logical possibility. Swinburne’s argument draws on and requires both understandings at different points in his argument, but the two are incompatible at the key point. (shrink)

This article addresses Franklin Gamwell's critique of Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the nature of rational justification. I argue that MacIntyreans have good reasons to take seriously Gamwell's critique, and thus to reformulate MacIntyre's position to make clear that that position does not rest on a denial of all a priori claims. The author outlines such a reformulation, drawing heavily on MacIntyre's account (in his 1990 Aquinas Lecture) of the place of a priori claims within the development of rational traditions of (...) inquiry. When thus rethought, MacIntyre's position grounds a twofold response to Gamwell's critique. (shrink)