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Profile: Kevin Falvey (University of California at Santa Barbara)
  1. Kevin Falvey (2010). The View From Nowhen: The Mctaggart-Dummett Argument for the Unreality of Time. Philosophia 38 (2):297-312.
    Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs (...)
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  2. Kevin Falvey (2003). Memory and Knowledge of Content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  3. Kevin Falvey (2000). Knowledge in Intention. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.
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  4. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Basis of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.
    This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
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  5. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142.
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  6. Kevin Falvey (1999). A Natural History of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):324-345.
    Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by a conception of our propositional attitude concepts as comprising a proto-scientific causal-explanatory theory of behavior. This conception has given rise to a spate of recent worries about the prospects for “naturalizing” the theory. In this paper I return to the roots of the “theory-theory” of the attitudes in Wilfrid Sellars’s classic “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” I present an alternative to the theory-theory’s account of belief in the form of a parody of (...)
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  7. Kevin Falvey & Joseph Owens (1994). Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.