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Profile: Kevin Magill (University of Wolverhampton)
  1. Kevin Magill (2000). Blaming, Understanding and Justification. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer. 183--197.
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  2. Kevin Magill (1998). The Idea of a Justification for Punishment. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1):86-101.
    The argument between retributivists and consequentialists about what morally justifies the punishment of offenders is incoherent. If we were to discover that all of the contending justifications were mistaken, there is no realistic prospect that this would lead us to abandon legal punishment. Justification of words, beliefs and deeds, can only be intelligible on the assumption that if one's justification were found to be invalid and there were no alternative justification, one would be prepared to stop saying, believing or doing (...)
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  3. Kevin Magill (1997). Experience and Freedom: Self-Determination Without Illusions. Macmillan.
     
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  4. Kevin Magill (1997). Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions. St. Martin's Press/Palgrave Macmillan.
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
     
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  5. Kevin Magill (1992). Epicurus, Determinism and the Security of Knowledge. Theoria 58 (2-3):183-196.
    The article criticises various interpretations of Epicurus's claim that belief in determinism is self-invalidating: -/- - 'The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticise one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity, for he admits that this too happens of necessity.' - -/- especially Ted Honderich's argument that the real force of the Epicurean claim is that if belief acquisition is causally necessitated, we will be excluded from possible facts and inquiries (...)
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