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Kevin Morris [18]Kevin L. Morris [9]
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Profile: Kevin Morris
Profile: Kevin Morris (Tulane University)
  1.  74
    Kevin Morris & Consuelo Preti (2015). How to Read Moore's "Proof of an External World". Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (1).
    We develop a reading of Moore’s “Proof of an External World” that emphasizes the connections between this paper and Moore’s earlier concerns and strategies. Our reading has the benefit of explaining why the claims that Moore advances in “Proof of an External World” would have been of interest to him, and avoids attributing to him arguments that are either trivial or wildly unsuccessful. Part of the evidence for our view comes from unpublished drafts which, we believe, contain (...)
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  2.  19
    Kevin Morris (forthcoming). The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms, as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a (...)
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  3.  66
    Kevin Morris (2012). A Defense of Lucky Understanding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):357-371.
    It is plausible to think that the epistemic benefit of having an explanation is understanding. My focus in this article is on the extent to which explanatory understanding, perhaps unlike knowledge, is compatible with certain forms of luck—the extent to which one can understand why something is the case when one is lucky to truly believe an explanatorily relevant proposition. I argue, contra Stephen Grimm ([2006]) and Duncan Pritchard ([2008], [2009]), that understanding quite generally is compatible with luckily believing a (...)
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  4.  42
    Kevin Morris (2010). Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
    Realization can be roughly understood as a kind of role-playing, a relationship between a property that plays a role and a property characterized by that role. This rough sketch previously received only moderate elaboration; recently, however, several substantive theories of realization have been proposed. But are there any general constraints on a theory of realization? What is a theory of realization supposed to accomplish? I first argue that a view of realization is viable, in part, to the extent that physical (...)
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  5.  56
    Kevin Morris (2011). Subset Realization, Parthood, and Causal Overdetermination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):363-379.
    Defenders of the subset view of realization have claimed that we can resolve well-known worries about mental-physical causal overdetermination by holding that mental properties are subset realized by physical properties, that instances of subset realized properties are parts of physical realizers, and that part-whole overdetermination is unproblematic. I challenge the claim that the overdetermination generated by the subset view can be legitimated by appealing to more mundane part-whole overdetermination. I conclude that the subset view does not provide a unique solution (...)
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  6.  34
    Kevin Morris (2014). Causal Closure, Causal Exclusion, and Supervenience Physicalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):72-86.
    This article considers the recent defense of the supervenience approach to physicalism due to Jaegwon Kim. Kim argues that supervenience supports physical causal closure, and that causal closure supports physicalism – indeed, a kind of reductive physicalism – and thus that supervenience suffices for physicalism. After laying out Kim's argument, I ask whether its success would truly vindicate the role of supervenience in defining physicalist positions. I argue that it would not, and that insofar as Kim's defense of supervenience physicalism (...)
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  7.  55
    Kevin Morris (2011). Theoretical Identities as Explanantia and Explananda. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):373-385.
  8.  54
    Kevin Morris (2011). Subset Realization and Physical Identification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):317-335.
    According to a prominent line of thought, we can be physicalists, but not reductive physicalists, by holding that mental and other ‘higher-level’ or ‘nonbasic’ properties — properties that are not obviously physical properties — are all physically realized. Spelling this out requires an account of realization, an account of what it is for one property to realize another. And while several accounts of realization have been advanced in recent years,1 my interest here is in the ‘subset view,’ which has often (...)
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  9.  44
    Kevin Morris (2014). Supervenience Physicalism, Emergentism, and the Polluted Supervenience Base. Erkenntnis 79 (2):351-365.
    A prominent objection to supervenience physicalism is that a definition of physicalism in terms of supervenience allows for physicalism to be compatible with nonphysicalist outlooks, such as certain forms of emergentism. I take as my starting point a recent defense of supervenience physicalism from this objection. According to this line of thought, the subvenient base for emergent properties cannot be said to be purely physical; rather, it is “polluted” with emergent features in virtue of necessarily giving rise to them. Thus, (...)
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  10.  45
    Kevin Morris (2009). Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657.
    In his recent article ‘Consciousness and Reduction’, Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws. Introduction Nagelian Reduction, Functional Reduction, and Bridge Laws Marras on Functional Reduction (...)
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  11.  46
    Kevin Morris (2013). On Two Arguments for Subset Inheritance. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):197-211.
    A physicalist holds, in part, that what properties are instantiated depends on what physical properties are instantiated; a physicalist thinks that mental properties, for example, are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical “realizer” properties. One issue that arises in this context concerns the relationship between the “causal powers” of instances of physical properties and instances of dependent properties, properties that are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical properties. After explaining the significance of this issue, I evaluate (...)
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  12.  24
    Kevin Morris (2015). Against Disanalogy-Style Responses to the Exclusion Problem. Philosophia 43 (2):435-453.
    This paper focuses on an influential line of response to the <span class='Hi'>exclusion</span> problem for nonreductive physicalism, one defended with the most subtlety by Karen Bennett. According to this line of thought, a successful nonreductive response to the <span class='Hi'>exclusion</span> problem, a response that allows one to maintain each of the core components of nonreductive physicalism, may consist in showing that the manner in which the effects of mental causes also have distinct and sufficient physical causes is disanalogous to other (...)
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  13.  10
    Kevin L. Morris (1992). Chesterton's Conversion. The Chesterton Review 18 (3):371-383.
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  14.  9
    Kevin L. Morris (1987). Reflections on Chesterton's Zionism. The Chesterton Review 13 (2):163-176.
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  15.  9
    Kevin L. Morris (1994). G. K. Chesterton and the James Brothers. The Chesterton Review 20 (4):475-485.
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  16.  7
    Kevin Morris (2014). The Exclusion Problem, Without the Exclusion Principle. Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):259-270.
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  17.  8
    Kevin L. Morris (1999). Fascism and British Catholic Writers. The Chesterton Review 25 (1/2):21-51.
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  18.  9
    Kevin Morris (2012). Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 32 (2):124-126.
  19.  9
    Kevin L. Morris (1985). Chesterton and Kenelm Henry Digby. The Chesterton Review 11 (3):332-337.
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  20.  5
    Kevin Morris (2012). Eric Schwitzgebel , Perplexities of Consciousness . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 32 (4):332-334.
  21.  4
    Kevin L. Morris (1995). Chesterton Sees Red. The Chesterton Review 21 (4):505-517.
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  22.  3
    Kevin Morris (1996). Father Brown: A Selection," by G. K. Chesterton, Edited by W.W. Robson Et Al.; and "The Napoleon of Notting Hill," by G. K. Chesterton, Edited by Bernard Bergonzi". [REVIEW] The Chesterton Review 22 (1):139-145.
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  23.  3
    Kevin Morris (1996). Father Vincent McNabb, OP. The Chesterton Review 22 (1/2).
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  24.  3
    Kevin Morris (2009). REVIEW: Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):239-242.
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  25.  2
    Kevin L. Morris (1995). Christianity Untried. The Chesterton Review 21 (1/2):275-275.
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  26.  1
    Kevin L. Morris (1996). The Mirror of Perfection. The Chesterton Review 22 (4):445-473.
  27. Kevin L. Morris (1996). The Mirror of Perfection: G. K. Chesterton's Interpretation of "St. Francis of Assisi". The Chesterton Review 22 (4):445-473.
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