How do our brains represent distinct objects in consciousness? In order to consciously distinguish between objects, our brains somehow selectively bind together activity patterns of spatially intermingled neurons that simultaneously represent similar and dissimilar features of distinct objects. Gamma-band synchronous oscillations of neuroelectrical activity have been hypothesized to be a mechanism used by our brains to generate and bind conscious sensations to represent distinct objects. Most experiments relating GSO to specific features of consciousness have been published only in the last (...) several years. This brief review focuses on a wide variety experiments in which animals, including humans, discriminate between sensory stimuli and make these discriminations evident in their behavior. Performance of these tasks, in humans, is invariably accompanied by conscious awareness of both stimuli and behavior. Results of these experiments indicate that specific patterns of GSO correlate closely with specific aspects of conscious sensorimotor processing. That is, GSO appear to be closely correlated with neural generation of our most paradigmatic cognitive state: consciousness. (shrink)

In Morals by Agreement David Gauthier proposes four criteria for classifying a society's advancement toward ‘higher stages of human development.' Significantly, these criteria — material well-being, breadth of opportunity, average life-span, and density of population — do not include as an equally valuable achievement the society's capacity to sustain its standard of living. Nonetheless Gauthier presents three arguments intended to show that a community founded on his distributive theory will view depletionary resource policies as unreasonable and unacceptable. I shall contend (...) that these arguments do not succeed in motivating sustainable rates of resource exploitation. Furthermore, I argue that if truly just and rational resource use policies can be arrived at, such policies could only succeed by employing a conception of property rights substantially different from Gauthier's. (shrink)

Filled-in sensations exhibit a distinctive mélange of causal features, resembling perceptual sensations in some respects and imagery in others. This commentary identifies several of these shared causal features and advances the hypothesis that filled-in sensations may constitute the primordial species of imagery, the evolutionary neurofunctional precursor of paradigmatic forms of imagery.