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  1. Kevin W. Sharpe (forthcoming). Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism. Philosophia:1-21.
    Compatibilists respond to the problem of causal exclusion for nonreductive physicalism by rejecting the exclusionist’s ban on overdetermination. By the compatibilist’s lights there are two forms of overdetermination, one that’s problematic and another that is entirely benign. Furthermore, multiple causation by “tightly related” causes requires only the benign form of overdetermination. Call this the tight relation strategy for avoiding problematic forms of overdetermination. To justify the tight relation strategy, modal compatibilists appeal to a widely accepted counterfactual test. The argument of (...)
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  2. Kevin W. Sharpe (2015). Animalism and Person Essentialism. Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.
    Animalism is the view that human persons are human animals – biological organisms that belong to the species Homo sapiens. This paper concerns a family of modal objections to animalism based on the essentiality of personhood (persons and animals differ in their persistence conditions; psychological considerations are relevant for the persistence of persons, but not animals; persons, but not animals, are essentially psychological beings). Such arguments are typically used to support constitutionalism, animalism’s main neo-Lockean rival. The problem with such arguments (...)
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  3. Kevin W. Sharpe (2014). Comments on Kevin Morris’ “The Exclusion Problem, Without the Exclusion Principle. Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):79-83.
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  4. Kevin W. Sharpe (2012). Structural Properties and Parthood. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):111-120.
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  5. Kevin W. Sharpe (2005). Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed consistency with (...)
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