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Profile: Kirk Ludwig (Indiana University, Bloomington)
  1. Kirk A. Ludwig (2006). Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
     
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  2. Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Mind/Body Problem I. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  3. Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8).
    _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to.
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  4. Kirk A. Ludwig (1998). Functionalism, Causation and Causal Relevance. Psyche 4 (3).
    causal relevance, a three-place relation between event types, and circumstances, and argue for a logical independence condition on properties standing in the causal relevance relation relative to circumstances. In section 3, I apply these results to show that functionally defined states are not causally relevant to the output or state transitions in terms of which they are defined. In section 4, I extend this result to what that output in turn causes and to intervening mechanisms. In section 5, I examine (...)
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  5. Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Duplicating Thoughts. Mind and Language 11 (1):92-102.
    Suppose that a physical duplicate of me, right down to the arrangements of subatomic particles, comes into existence at the time at which I finish this sentence. Suppose that it comes into existence by chance, or at least by a causal process entirely unconnected with me. It might be so situated that it, too, is seated in front of a computer, and finishes this paragraph and paper, or a corresponding one, just as I do. (i) Would it have the same (...)
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  6. Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
    How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it is possible (...)
     
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  7. Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Shape Properties and Perception. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. 325-350.
    We can perceive shapes visually and tactilely, and the information we gain about shapes through both sensory modalities is integrated smoothly into and functions in the same way in our behavior independently of whether we gain it by sight or touch. There seems to be no reason in principle we couldn't perceive shapes through other sensory modalities as well, although as a matter of fact we do not. While we can identify shapes through other sensory modalities—e.g., I may know by (...)
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  8. Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind. Noûs 30 (4):434-460.
    (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
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  9. Kirk A. Ludwig, The Myth of Social Content.
    Social externalism is the view that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are logically determined at least in part by her linguistic community's standards for the use of her words. If social externalism is correct, its importance can hardly be overemphasized. The traditional Cartesian view of psychological states as essentially first personal and non-relational in character, which has shaped much theorizing about the nature of psychological explanation, would be shown to be deeply flawed.
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  10. Kirk A. Ludwig (1995). Trying the Impossible. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:563-570.
    This paper defends the autonomy thesis, which holds that one can intend to do something even though one believes it to be impossible, against attacks by Fred Adams. Adams denies the autonomy thesis on the grounds that it cannot, but must, explain what makes a particular trying, a trying for the aim it has in view. If the autonomy thesis were true, it seems that I could try to fly across the Atlantic ocean merely by typing out this abstract, a (...)
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  11. Kirk A. Ludwig (1995). Why the Difference Between Quantum and Classical Mechanics is Irrelevant to the Mind-Body Problem. Psyche 2 (16).
    I argue that the logical difference between classical and quantum mechanics that Stapp (1995) claims shows quantum mechanics is more amenable to an account of consciousness than is classical mechanics is irrelevant to the problem.
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  12. John I. Biro & Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). Are There More Than Minimal a Priori Limits on Irrationality? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):89-102.
    Our concern in this paper is with the question of how irrational an intentional agent can be, and, in particular, with an argument Stephen Stich has given for the claim that there are only very minimal a priori requirements on the rationality of intentional agents. The argument appears in chapter 2 of The Fragmentation of Reason.1 Stich is concerned there with the prospects for the ‘reform-minded epistemologist’. If there are a priori limits on how irrational we can be, there are (...)
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  13. Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). Blueprint for a Science of Mind: A Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke's a Study of Concepts. Mind and Language 9 (4):469-491.
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  14. Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). Causal Relevance and Thought Content. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):334-353.
    It is natural to think that our ordinary practices in giving explanations for our actions, for what we do, commit us to claiming that content properties are causally relevant to physical events such as the movements of our limbs and bodies, and events which these in turn cause. If you want to know why my body arnbulates across the street, or why my arm went up before I set out, we suppose I have given you an answer when I say (...)
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  15. Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). First-Person Knowledge and Authority. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Language Mind and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Let us call a thought or belief whose content would be expressed by a sentence of subject-predicate form (by the thinker or someone attributing the thought to the thinker) an ‘ascription’. Thus, the thought that Madonna is middle-aged is an ascription of the property of being middle-aged to Madonna. To call a thought of this form an ascription is to emphasize the predicate in the sentence that gives its content. Let us call an ‘x-ascription’ an ascription whose subject is x, (...)
     
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  16. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). A Dilemma for Searle's Argument for the Connection Principle. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):194-5.
    Objections to Searle's argument for the Connection Principle and its consequences (Searle 1990a) fall roughly into three categories: (1) those that focus on problems with the _argument_ for the Connection Principle; (2) those that focus on problems in understanding the _conclusion_ of this argument; (3) those that focus on whether the conclusion has the _consequences_ Searle claims for it. I think the Connection Principle is both true and important, but I do not think that Searle's argument establishes it. The problem (...)
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  17. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Causal Relevance and Thought Content. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (176):334-53.
    It is natural to think that our ordinary practices in giving explanations for our actions, for what we do, commit us to claiming that content properties are causally relevant to physical events such as the movements of our limbs and bodies, and events which these in turn cause. If you want to know why my body arnbulates across the street, or why my arm went up before I set out, we suppose I have given you an answer when I say (...)
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  18. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Dretske on Explaining Behavior. Acta Analytica 11 (11):111-124.
    Fred Dretske has recently argued, in a highly original book and a series of articles, that action explanations are a very special species of historical explanation, in opposition to the traditional view that action explanations cite causes of actions, which are identical with bodily movements. His account aims to explain how it is possible for there to be a genuine explanatory role for reasons in a world of causes, and, in particular, in a world in which we have available in (...)
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  19. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Direct Reference in Thought and Speech. Communication and Cognition 26 (1):49-76.
    I want to begin by distinguishing between what I will call a pure Fregean theory of reference and a theory of direct reference. A pure Fregean theory of reference holds that all reference to objects is determined by a sense or content. The kind of theory I have in mind is obviously inspired by Frege, but I will not be concerned with whether it is the theory that Frege himself held.1 A theory of direct reference, as I will understand it, (...)
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  20. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Externalism, Naturalism, and Method. Philosophical Issues 4:250-264.
    Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.
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  21. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Is Content Holism Incoherent? Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:173-195.
    There is a great deal of terminological confusion in discussions of holism. While some well-known authors, such as Davidson and Quine, have used “holism” in various of their writings,2 it is not clear that they have held views attributed to them under that label, views that are said to have wildly counterintuitive results.3 In Davidson’s case, it is not clear that he is describing the same doctrine in each of his uses of “holism” or “holistic.” Critics of holism show a (...)
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