112 found
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  1. Kit Fine (2015). Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):296-311.
  2. Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
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  3. Kit Fine (2007). Semantic Relationism. Blackwell Pub..
    Introducing a new and ambitious position in the field, Kit Fine’s _Semantic Relationism_ is a major contribution to the philosophy of language. Written by one of today’s most respected philosophers Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves Forms part of the prestigious new _Blackwell/Brown (...)
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  4. Kit Fine (2012). Guide to Ground. In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press 37--80.
    A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition to scientific or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination. I myself have long been sympathetic to this idea of constitutive determination or ‘ontological ground’; and it is the aim of the present paper to help put the idea on a firmer (...)
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  5. Kit Fine (2005). Modality and Tense. Oxford University Press.
  6. Kit Fine (2001). The Question of Realism. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (1):1-30.
    This paper distinguishes two kinds of realist issue -- the issue of whether the propositions of a given domain are factual and the issue of whether they are fundamental. It criticizes previous accounts of what these issues come to and suggests that they are to be understood in terms of a basic metaphysical concept of reality. This leaves open the question of how such issues are to be resolved; and it is argued that this may be done through consideration of (...)
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  7. Kit Fine (2012). The Pure Logic of Ground. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):1-25.
    I lay down a system of structural rules for various notions of ground and establish soundness and completeness.
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  8. Kit Fine (2003). The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter. Mind 112 (446):195-234.
    There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this ‘opacity’ defence has intolerable consequences for (...)
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  9. Kit Fine (1975). Vagueness, Truth and Logic. Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
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  10. Kit Fine (2016). Identity Criteria and Ground. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):1-19.
    I propose formulating identity criteria as generic statements of ground, thereby avoiding objections that have been made to the more usual formulations.
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  11. Kit Fine (2009). The Question of Ontology. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press 157--177.
  12. Kit Fine (2010). Some Puzzles of Ground. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):97-118.
    I describe some paradoxes of ground and relate them to the semantic paradoxes.
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  13. Kit Fine (1995). Ontological Dependence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:269 - 290.
  14. Kit Fine (2002). The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford University Press.
    Kit Fine develops a Fregean theory of abstraction, and suggests that it may yield a new philosophical foundation for mathematics, one that can account for both our reference to various mathematical objects and our knowledge of various mathematical truths. The Limits of Abstraction breaks new ground both technically and philosophically.
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  15. Kit Fine (2012). Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds. Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):221-246.
  16. Kit Fine (2010). Towards a Theory of Part. Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):559-589.
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  17. Kit Fine (1999). Things and Their Parts. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):61–74.
  18. Kit Fine (2014). Truth-Maker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):549-577.
    I propose a new semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is a cross between the construction-oriented semantics of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov and the condition-oriented semantics of Kripke. The new semantics shows how there might be a common semantical underpinning for intuitionistic and classical logic and how intuitionistic logic might thereby be tied to a realist conception of the relationship between language and the world.
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  19.  10
    Kit Fine (forthcoming). The Possibility of Vagueness. Synthese.
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  20. Kit Fine (2012). A Difficulty for the Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactuals. Synthese 189 (1):29-57.
    I present a puzzle concerning counterfactual reasoning and argue that it should be solved by giving up the principle of substitution for logical equivalents.
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  21. Kit Fine (2002). Varieties of Necessity. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford Up 253-281.
    It is argued that there are three main forms of necessity --the metaphysical, the natural and the normative--and that none of them is reducible to the others or to any other form of necessity. In arguing for a distinctive form of natural necessity, it is necessary to refute a version of the doctrine of scientific essentialism; and in arguing for a distinctive form of normative necessity, it is necessary to refute certain traditional and contemporary versions of ethical naturalism.
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  22.  44
    Kit Fine (forthcoming). Angellic Content. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-28.
    I provide a truthmaker semantics for Angell’s system of analytic implication and establish completeness.
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  23. Kit Fine (2000). Neutral Relations. Philosophical Review 109 (1):1-33.
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  24. Kit Fine (2013). Fundamental Truth and Fundamental Terms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):725-732.
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  25. Kit Fine (1995). The Logic of Essence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241 - 273.
  26. Kit Fine (2008). Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.
    How can a statue and a piece of alloy be coincident at any time at which they exist and yet differ in their modal properties? I argue that this question demands an answer and that the only plausible answer is one that posits a difference in the form of the two objects.
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  27. Kit Fine (2008). In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (62):1-16.
  28.  10
    Kit Fine (1985). Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects. B. Blackwell.
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  29. Kit Fine (2003). The Problem of Possibilia. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press
    Are there, in addition to the various actual objects that make up the world, various possible objects? Are there merely possible people, for example, or merely possible electrons, or even merely possible kinds? We certainly talk as if there were such things. Given a particular sperm and egg, I may wonder whether that particular child which would result from their union would have blue eyes. But if the sperm and egg are never in fact brought together, then there is no (...)
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  30. Kit Fine (2008). The Impossibility of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
    I wish to present a proof that vagueness is impossible. Of course, vagueness is possible; and so there must be something wrong with the proof. But it is far from clear where the error lies and, indeed, all of the assumptions upon which the proof depends are ones that have commonly been accepted. This suggests that we may have to radically alter our current conception of vagueness if we are to make proper sense of what it is.
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  31. Kit Fine (2006). Relatively Unrestricted Quantification. In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute Generality. Oxford University Press 20-44.
    There are four broad grounds upon which the intelligibility of quantification over absolutely everything has been questioned—one based upon the existence of semantic indeterminacy, another on the relativity of ontology to a conceptual scheme, a third upon the necessity of sortal restriction, and the last upon the possibility of indefinite extendibility. The argument from semantic indeterminacy derives from general philosophical considerations concerning our understanding of language. For the Skolem–Lowenheim Theorem appears to show that an understanding of quanti- fication over absolutely (...)
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  32.  55
    Kit Fine (2000). A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis. The Monist 83 (3):357-361.
  33. Kit Fine (1991). The Study of Ontology. Noûs 25 (3):263-294.
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  34.  5
    Kit Fine (2008). Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.
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  35.  59
    Kit Fine (2009). The Role of Variables. Journal of Philosophy 100 (12):605 - 631.
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  36. Kit Fine (2005). Tense and Reality. In Modality and Tense. Oxford University Press 261--320.
    There is a common form of problem, to be found in many areas of philosophy, concerning the relationship between our perspective on reality and reality itself. We make statements (or form judgements) about how things are from a given standpoint or perspective. We make the statement ‘it is raining’ from the standpoint of the present time, for example, or the statement‘it is here’ from the standpoint of where we are, or the statement ‘I am glad’ from the standpoint of a (...)
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  37. Kit Fine (1970). Propositional Quantifiers in Modal Logic. Theoria 36 (3):336-346.
    In this paper I shall present some of the results I have obtained on modal theories which contain quantifiers for propositions. The paper is in two parts: in the first part I consider theories whose non-quantificational part is S5; in the second part I consider theories whose non-quantificational part is weaker than or not contained in S5. Unless otherwise stated, each theory has the same language L. This consists of a countable set V of propositional variables pl, pa, ... , (...)
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  38. Kit Fine (2011). An Abstract Characterization of the Determinate/Determinable Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):161-187.
  39.  95
    Kit Fine (2013). A Note on Partial Content. Analysis 73 (3):413-419.
    It is shown that certain natural constraints trivialize the concept of partial content and it is suggested, in the light of this difficulty, that the principle that partial content is preserved under the substitution of logical equivalents should be given up.
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  40. Kit Fine (2000). Semantics for the Logic of Essence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (6):543-584.
    This paper provides a possible worlds semantics for the system of the author's previous paper 'The Logic of Essence '. The basic idea behind the semantics is that a statement should be taken to be true in virtue of the nature of certain objects just in case it is true in any possible world compatible with the nature of those objects. It is shown that a slight variant of the original system is sound and complete under the proposed semantics.
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  41.  57
    Kit Fine (2014). Permission and Possible Worlds. Dialectica 68 (3):317-336.
    I attempt to argue that if statements of permission are to serve as a guide to action then no possible worlds account of their truth-conditions can be correct.
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  42.  70
    Kit Fine (2006). In Defense of Three-Dimensionalism. Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):699-714.
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  43. Kit Fine (2012). Aristotle's Megarian Manoeuvres. Mind 120 (480):993-1034.
    Towards the end of Theta.4 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle appears to endorse the obviously invalid modal principle that the truth of A will entail the truth of B if the possibility of A entails the possibility of B. I attempt to show how Aristotle's endorsement of the principle can be seen to arise from his accepting a non-standard interpretation of the modal operators and I indicate how the principle and its interpretation are of independent interest, quite apart from their role (...)
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    Kit Fine (2013). Recurrence: A Rejoinder. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):1-4.
    I am grateful to Nathan Salmon [in Salmon (2012)] for being willing to spill so much ink over my monograph on semantic relationism (2007), even if what he has to say is not altogether complimentary. There is a great deal in his criticisms to which I take exception but I wish to focus on one point, what he calls my ‘formal disproof’ of standard Millianism. He believes that ‘the alleged hard result is nearly demonstrably false’ (p. 420) and that the (...)
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  45. Kit Fine (1978). Model Theory for Modal Logic Part I—the de Re/de Dicto Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):125 - 156.
  46. Kit Fine (2006). The Reality of Tense. Synthese 150 (3):399 - 414.
    I argue for a version of tense-logical realism that privileges tensed facts without privileging any particular temporal standpoint from which they obtain.
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  47.  30
    Kit Fine (1975). Critical Notice of Lewis, Counterfactuals. [REVIEW] Mind 84 (335):451 - 458.
  48.  71
    Kit Fine (2006). Arguing for Non-Identity: A Response to King and Frances. Mind 115 (460):1059-1082.
    I defend my paper ‘The Non-identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter’ against objections from Bryan Frances and Jeffrey King.
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  49. Kit Fine (2002). The Limits of Abstraction. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Kit Fine develops a Fregean theory of abstraction, and suggests that it may yield a new philosophical foundation for mathematics, one that can account for both our reference to various mathematical objects and our knowledge of various mathematical truths. The Limits ofion breaks new ground both technically and philosophically, and will be essential reading for all who work on the philosophy of mathematics.
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  50. Kit Fine (1982). First-Order Modal Theories III — Facts. Synthese 53 (1):43-122.
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