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Klaas J. Kraay [26]Klaas Kraay [3]
  1. Klaas J. Kraay, Theistic Replies to the a PRioriArgument for Atheism.
    In the central chapter of Can God Be Free? , William Rowe offers what amounts to an a priori argument for atheism. In what follows, I first clarify this argument, and I then defend it against recent criticisms due to William Hasker. Next, however, I outline four ways in which theists might plausibly reply to Rowe’s argument.
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  2. Klaas Kraay (ed.) (2014). God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives. Routledge.
    In recent decades, scientific theories have postulated the existence of many universes beyond our own. The details and implications of these theories are hotly contested. Some philosophers argue that these scientific models count against the existence of God. Others, however, argue that if God exists, a multiverse is precisely what we should expect to find. Moreover, these philosophers claim that the idea of a divinely created multiverse can help believers in God respond to certain arguments for atheism. These proposals are, (...)
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  3. Klaas Kraay (2013). Can God Satisfice? American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):399-410.
    Three very prominent arguments for atheism are (1) the argument from sub-optimality, (2) the problem of no best world, and (3) the evidential argument from gratuitous evil. To date, it has not sufficiently been appreciated that several important criticisms of these arguments have all relied on a shared strategy. Although the details vary, the core of this strategy is to concede that God either cannot or need not achieve the best outcome in the relevant choice situation, but to insist that (...)
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  4. Klaas J. Kraay (2013). Megill's Multiverse Meta-Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):235-241.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Jason Megill (2011) offers an innovative meta-argument which deploys considerations about multiple universes in an effort to block all arguments from evil. In what follows, I contend that Megill has failed to establish a key premise in his meta-argument. I also offer a rival account of the effect of multiverse models on the debate about evil.
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  5. Klaas J. Kraay (2013). Peter van Inwagen on Gratuitous Evil. Religious Studies:1-18.
    Defenders and critics of the evidential argument from evil typically agree that if theism is true, no gratuitous evil occurs. But Peter van Inwagen has challenged this orthodoxy by urging that for all we know, given God's goals, it is impossible for God to prevent all gratuitous evil, in which case God is not required do so. If van Inwagen is right, the evidential argument from evil fails. After setting out this striking and innovative move, I examine three responses found (...)
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  6. Klaas J. Kraay & Chris Dragos (2013). On Preferring God's Non-Existence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):157-178.
    (2013). On preferring God's non-existence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 157-178.
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  7. Klaas J. Kraay (2012). The Theistic Multiverse: Problems and Prospects. In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan. 143--162.
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  8. Klaas J. Kraay (2011). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and God's Choice of a World. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2):91 - 102.
    Anselmian theism holds that there necessarily exists a being, God, who is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. This being is also understood to be the creator and sustainer of all that is. In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, this role is generally understood as follows: God surveys the array of possible worlds, and in his wisdom selects exactly one for actualization, based on its axiological properties. In this paper, I discuss an under-appreciated challenge for this account of (...)
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  9. Klaas J. Kraay (2011). Theism and Modal Collapse. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):361.
    God is traditionally taken to be a necessarily existing being who is unsurpassably powerful, knowledgeable, and good. The familiar problem of actual evil claims that the presence of gratuitous suffering in the actual world constitutes evidence against the existence of such a being. In contrast, the problem of possible evil claims that the possibility of bad worlds constitutes evidence against theism. How? It seems plausible to suppose that there are very bad possible worlds. But if God exists in every world, (...)
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  10. Klaas J. Kraay (2010). The Problem of No Best World. In Charles Taliaferro & Paul Draper (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition. Blackwell.
    This paper surveys recent literature on the Problem of No Best World.
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  11. Klaas J. Kraay (2010). Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):355 - 368.
    God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments (...)
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  12. Klaas J. Kraay (2010). Theistic Replies to Rowe's a Priori Argument for Atheism. Philo 8 (1):23-37.
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  13. Klaas Kraay & Luke Gelinas (2010). God, the Best, and Evil – Bruce Langtry. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):432-446.
  14. Klaas J. Kraay (2009). Can God Choose a World at Random? In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan.
    On what basis does God choose a possible world to make actual? Theists typically claim that God freely selects exactly one world on the basis of its axiological characteristics. But suppose that (a) there are infinitely many unsurpassable worlds from which to choose; or else that (b) there are no unsurpassable worlds, but instead an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. On each of these scenarios, philosophers have alleged that God is unable rationally to choose a world (...)
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  15. Klaas J. Kraay (2008). Creation, Actualization and God's Choice Among Possible Worlds. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):854-872.
    God is traditionally understood to be a perfect being who is the creator and sustainer of all that is. God's creative and sustaining activity is often thought to involve choosing a possible world for actualization. It is generally said that either there is (a) exactly one best of all possible worlds, or there are (b) infinitely many increasingly better worlds, or else there are (c) infinitely many unsurpassable worlds within God's power to actualize. On each view, critics have offered arguments (...)
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  16. Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Absense of Evidence and Evidence of Absence. Faith and Philosophy 24 (2):203-228.
    I defend the first premise of William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil against influential criticisms due to William Alston. I next suggest that the central inference in Rowe’s arguments is best understood to move from the claim that we have an absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to the claim that we have evidence of absence of such a theodicy. I endorse the view which holds that this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that (roughly) if (...)
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  17. Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence. Faith and Philosophy 24 (2):203-228.
    I defend the first premise of William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil against influential criticisms due to William Alston. I next suggest that the central inference in Rowe’s arguments is best understood to move from the claim that we have an absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to the claim that we have evidence of absence of such a theodicy. I endorse the view which holds that this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that (roughly) if (...)
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  18. Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Divine Unsurpassability. Philosophia 35 (3-4):293-300.
    One historically significant model of God holds that God is a perfect being. Analytic philosophers of religion have typically understood this to mean that God is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. Recently, however, several philosophers have argued that this is inconsistent with another common theistic position: the view that for any world that God can create, there is a better world that God could have created instead. The argument runs (roughly) as follows: if, no matter which world (...)
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  19. Klaas J. Kraay (2006). God and the Hypothesis of No Prime Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (1):49-68.
    Many theists hold that for any world x that God has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y, that God had the power to actualize instead of x. Recently, however, it has been suggested that this scenario is incompatible with traditional theism: roughly, it is claimed that no being can be essentially unsurpassable on this view, since no matter what God does in actualizing a world, it is possible for God (or some other being) to do better, (...)
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  20. Klaas J. Kraay (2005). William L. Rowe's a Priori Argument for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 22 (2):211-234.
    The hypothesis of no prime worlds (NPW) holds that for any possible world x that an omnipotent being has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y , that the omnipotent being could have actualized instead of x . NPW is generally deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to do his best in actualizing this world. Sometimes this view is deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to do better in actualizing (...)
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  21. Klaas J. Kraay (2005). Theistic Replies to the A Priori Argument for Atheism. Philo 8 (1):22-36.
    In the central chapter of Can God Be Free?, William Rowe offers what amounts to an a priori argument for atheism. In what follows, I first clarify this argument, and I then defend it against recent criticisms due to William Hasker. Next, however, I outline four ways in which theists might plausibly reply to Rowe’s argument.
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  22. Klaas J. Kraay (2003). Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, Eds., Divine Hiddenness: New Essays Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (1):33-35.
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  23. Klaas J. Kraay (2003). Philo's Argument for Divine Amorality Reconsidered. Hume Studies 29 (2):283-304.
    A central tactic in Philo’s criticism of the design argument is the introduction of several alternative hypotheses, each of which is alleged to explain apparent design at least as well as Cleanthes’ analogical inference to an intelligent designer. In Part VI, Philo proposes that the world “…is an animal, and the Deity is the soul of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it” (DNR 6.3; 171); in Part VII, he suggests that “…it is a palpable and egregious partiality” to (...)
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  24. Klaas J. Kraay (2002). Externalism and Self-Knowledge Peter Ludlow and Norah Martin, Editors Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 1998, X + 382 Pp., $40.60. [REVIEW] Dialogue 41 (01):177-.
  25. Klaas J. Kraay (2002). Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Dialogue 41 (1):177-179.
     
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  26. Klaas J. Kraay (2002). Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317.
    Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I (...)
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  27. Klaas J. Kraay (2002). Reason for the Hope Within. Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):131-134.
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  28. Klaas J. Kraay (2000). Peter Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 20 (1):10-11.
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