Online research in philosophy

There has been a long tradition of characterizing man as the animal that talks. However, the remarkable ability of using pictures also only belongs to human beings, after all we know empirically so far. Are there conceptual reasons for that coincidence? The paper is dedicated to a philosophical programme of “concept-genetic” considerations dealing in particular with the dependencies between those two abilities: The conceptual relation between the competence to use assertive language and the faculty of employing pictures must be conceived (...) of as being much closer than usually expected. Indeed we conclude, there cannot be creatures with only one of them. (shrink)

There has been a long tradition of characterizing man as the animal that talks. However, the remarkable ability of using pictures also only belongs to human beings, after all we know empirically so far. Are there conceptual reasons for that coincidence? Such a question belongs to the philosophy of language just as well as to philosophical visualistics. Comparing the two abilities to use words or pictures yields several similarities as well as distinctions. A well-known conceptual disparity between pictures and words (...) appears in their relation to perception: the difference can be further determined in an act-theoretic manner by four modes of use of the sign vehicles during the corresponding sign acts. Furthermore, the figure/ground dichotomy means something different for language uses and picture uses. In both cases, however, there is a close relation to the function of context building, by which humans are able to communicate not only with respect to the present situation of behavior but with respect to arbitrary contexts as well. Although the structural comparison does clarify the conceptual relations, it cannot explain that the conceptual structure ought to be like that. Therefore, the paper concludes with the programme of a "concept-genetic" consideration of the two abilities (i.e., to use propositional language or to use pictures) that is able to give us such a foundation. (shrink)

There is a long tradition of characterizing man as the talking animal. However, the remarkable ability of using pictures also belongs to human beings, after all we know empirically so far. Are there conceptual reasons for that coincidence? Such a question belongs to the general science of language (linguistics) and philosophy of language just as well as to general visualistics (image science) - a discipline just emancipating itself from art history. We here take the visualistics point of view. A first (...) recapitulation of the two abilities to use words or pictures lists several similarities and distinctions. A well-known disparity between pictures and words in the relation to perception can be determined by differences in the modes of usage during the corresponding sign acts. Furthermore, there are distinct ways for splitting up the pictorial or verbal sign acts into figure and ground. Such a structural comparison can only clarify conceptual relations; it cannot explain that the conceptual structure ought to be like that, in contrast to concept-genetic considerations. Correspondingly the discussion is extended to a concept-genetic sketch of the abilities to use language or pictures. This shifts the focus of attention to the concept of sortal objects and the concept of contexts of behavior. They allow us to analyze more precisely the relation between the two abilities in question, in particular as something depending on the function of context building, which enables human beings to communicatively access contexts apart from the actual situation of behavior. We finally gain arguments that characterize that relation as one of mutual dependency, and even lead to an understanding of the concept of inner images - or rather: a concept of imagination. (shrink)