Search results for 'Knowing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 391--428.
    We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report our mental (...)
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  2. Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
    Stanley and Williamson (The Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–444 2001 ) reject the fundamental distinction between what Ryle once called ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. They claim that knowledge-how is just a species of knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge, and try to establish their claim relying on the standard semantic analysis of ‘knowing-how’ sentences. We will undermine their strategy by arguing that ‘knowing-how’ phrases are under-determined such that there is not only one semantic analysis and by critically discussing and (...)
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  3.  41
    Alison Bailey, The Unlevel Knowing Field: An Engagement with Kristie Dotson's Third-Order Epistemic Oppression. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, No. 10.
    My engagement with Dotson’s essay begins with an overview of first- and second-order epistemic exclusions. I develop the concept of an "unlevel knowing field." I use examples from the epistemic injustice literature, and some of my own, to highlight the important distinction she makes between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. Next, I turn my attention to her account of third-order epistemic exclusions. I offer a brief explanation of why her sketch of at this level makes an important (...)
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  4. Jessica Brown (2013). Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science. Analysis 73 (2):220-227.
    Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.
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  5.  37
    Carlo Penco, Between Knowing How and Knowing That. Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    I wonder whether the idea of knowing how as kind of knowing that with a peculiar mode of presentation really helps in the debate between philosophers and scientists.
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  6.  17
    Gloria Dall'Alba & Robyn Barnacle (2005). Embodied Knowing in Online Environments. Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):719–744.
    In higher education, the conventional design of educational programs emphasises imparting knowledge and skills, in line with traditional Western epistemology. This emphasis is particularly evident in the design and implementation of many undergraduate programs in which bodies of knowledge and skills are decontextualised from the practices to which they belong. In contrast, the notion of knowledge as foundational and absolute has been extensively challenged. A transformation and pluralisation has occurred: knowledge has come to be seen as situated and localized into (...)
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  7. T. Parent (2015). Externalism and “Knowing What” One Thinks. Synthese 192 (5):1337-1350.
    Some worry that semantic externalism is incompatible with knowing by introspection what content your thoughts have. In this paper, I examine one primary argument for this incompatibilist worry, the slow-switch argument. Following Goldberg , I construe the argument as attacking the conjunction of externalism and “skeptic immune” knowledge of content, where such knowledge would persist in a skeptical context. Goldberg, following Burge :649–663, 1988), attempts to reclaim such knowledge for the externalist; however, I contend that all Burge-style accounts vindicate (...)
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  8.  70
    Chien-Hsing Ho (2014). Meaning, Understanding, and Knowing-What: An Indian Grammarian Notion of Intuition (Pratibha). Philosophy East and West 64 (2):404-424.
    For Bhartrhari, a fifth-century Indian grammarian-philosopher, all conscious beings—beasts, birds and humans—are capable of what he called pratibha, a flash of indescribable intuitive understanding such that one knows what the present object “means” and what to do with it. Such an understanding, if correct, amounts to a mode of knowing that may best be termed knowing-what, to distinguish it from both knowing-that and knowing-how. This paper attempts to expound Bhartrhari’s conception of pratibha in relation to the (...)
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  9.  8
    Per Norström (forthcoming). Knowing How, Knowing That, Knowing Technology. Philosophy and Technology:1-13.
    A wide variety of skills, abilities and knowledge are used in technological activities such as engineering design. Together, they enable problem solving and artefact creation. Gilbert Ryle’s division of knowledge into knowing how and knowing that is often referred to when discussing this technological knowledge. Ryle’s view has been questioned and criticised by those who claim that there is only one type, for instance, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson who claim that knowing how is really a form (...)
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  10.  59
    Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
    Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how has recently been challenged. The paper first briefly defends the distinction and then proceeds to address the question of classifying moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is special in that it is practical, that is, it is essentially a motive. Hence the way we understand moral knowledge crucially depends on the way we understand motivation. The Humean theory of motivation is wrong in saying that reason cannot be a motive, but right in (...)
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  11.  15
    Alessandro Capone (2011). Knowing How and Pragmatic Intrusion. Intercultural Pragmatics 8 (4):543-570.
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  12.  68
    Hagit Benbaji (2008). Two-Dimensionalism and the “Knowing Which” Requirement. Acta Analytica 23 (1):55-67.
    Two-dimensional semantics aims to eliminate the puzzle of necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths. Recently many argue that even assuming two-dimensional semantics we are left with the puzzle of necessary and a posteriori propositions. Stephen Yablo (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 98–122, 2000) and Penelope Mackie (Analysis, 62(3), 225–236, 2002) argue that a plausible sense of “knowing which” lets us know the object of such a proposition, and yet its necessity is “hidden” and thus a posteriori. This paper (...)
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  13.  38
    Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak (2011). Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing (...)
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  14.  9
    Roxana Baiasu (2014). Knowing How to Talk About What Cannot Be Said: Objectivity and Epistemic Locatedness. Sophia 53 (2):215-229.
    I take it that A. W. Moore is right when he said that ‘Wittgenstein was right: some things cannot be put into words. Moreover, some things that cannot be put into words are of the utmost philosophical importance’. There is, however, a constant threat of self-stultification whenever an attempt is made to put the ineffable into words. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes in Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion: reason, love, and epistemic locatedness, certain recent approaches to ineffability—including Moore’s approach—attempt (...)
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  15.  13
    Keith Lehrer & Joseph Richard (1975). Remembering Without Knowing. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:121-126.
    Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that i f a man remembers that p, then he knows that p and formerly knew that p. Remembering something is plausibly construed as a f o rm of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We (...)
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  16.  33
    Tim Ray (2009). Rethinking Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge: From Personal Knowing to Imagined Institutions. [REVIEW] Minerva 47 (1):75-92.
    Half a century after Michael Polanyi conceptualised ‘the tacit component’ in personal knowing, management studies has reinvented ‘tacit knowledge’—albeit in ways that squander the advantages of Polanyi’s insights and ignore his faith in ‘spiritual reality’. While tacit knowing challenged the absurdities of sheer objectivity, expressed in a ‘perfect language’, it fused rational knowing, based on personal experience, with mystical speculation about an un-experienced ‘external reality’. Faith alone saved Polanyi’s model from solipsism. But Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism (...)
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  17.  9
    Saul Traiger (1978). Some Remarks on Lehrer and Richard's 'Remembering Without Knowing'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:107-111.
    This paper examines the four counterexamples offered by Lehrer and Richard in 'Remembering Without Knowing'. The analysis which Lehrer and Richard's purported counterexamples attempt to discredit is that remembering p requires knowing that p and believing that p. The counterexamples are considered individually and all are rejected as counterexamples to knowing as a necessary condition of remembering.
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  18. David Morris (2001). Lived Time and Absolute Knowing: Habit and Addiction From Infinite Jest to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Clio 30:375-415.
    A study of habit and other unconscious backgrounds of action shows how shapes of spiritual life in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit each imply correlative senses of lived time. The very form of time thus gives spirit a sensuous encounter with its own concept. The point that conceptual content is manifest in the sensuous form of time is key to an interpretation of Hegel's infamous and puzzling remarks about time and the concept in ``absolute knowing.'' The article also shows how (...)
     
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  19.  36
    Garry Young (2009). Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How To: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology. Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.
    Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF (...)
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  20.  24
    Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth. Synthese 183 (1):27 - 45.
    The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano's epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano's notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one's assertions and to do (...)
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  21.  14
    Gaile Pohlhaus (2006). Knowing (with) Others. Social Philosophy Today 22:187-198.
    Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have argued that our efforts to know the world are always situated, accompanied by such things as desires, beliefs, and interests that guide and shape what it is we discover and perhaps even what we can know. If this is the case, how is one to be receptive to that which is outside of the purview of one’s current understanding of the world? Some feminists have argued that in order to know more effectively (...)
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  22.  1
    Morgan Luck (forthcoming). Against Norström’s Argument for Technological Knowing How Not Being an Instance of Knowing That. Philosophy and Technology:1-7.
    In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson’s proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think (...)
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  23.  10
    Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth. Synthese 183 (1):27-45.
    The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do (...)
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  24.  2
    Jorge Aurelio Díaz (2011). Absoluteness in absolute knowing. [Spanish]. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 11:10-34.
    Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} This paper addresses ‘Absolute knowing’, the process whereby the experiences of consciousness reach heir highest point, as Hegel discusses in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The objective is to analyze this concept both in its epistemological and (...)
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  25.  46
    Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
  26. Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. (...)
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  27.  4
    Stephen G. Henry (2010). Polanyi's Tacit Knowing and the Relevance of Epistemology to Clinical Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):292-297.
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  28. Mark Schroeder (2012). Showing How to Derive Knowing How. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):746-753.
    Jason Stanley's Know How aims to offer an attractive intellectualist analysis of knowledge how that is compositionally predicted by the best available treatments of sentences like 'Emile knows how to make his dad smile.' This paper explores one significant way in which Stanley's compositional treatment fails to generate his preferred account, and advocates a minimal solution.
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  29. Yuri Cath (2011). Knowing How Without Knowing That. In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press 113.
    In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view (...)
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  30.  59
    Philip Robbins (2004). Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection. In Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 129-143.
    Does the ability to know one's own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the 'theory theory' of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the 'monitoring theory', suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes , I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can (...)
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  31. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  32.  99
    C. McMullen (1985). Knowing What It's Like' and the Essential Indexical. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):211-33.
  33.  46
    Joseph Shieber (2003). What Our Rylean Ancestors Knew: More on Knowing How and Knowing That. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 11:328-330.
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  34.  67
    Gustav Bergmann (1949). Professor Ayer's Analysis of Knowing. Analysis 9 (June):98-106.
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  35.  11
    Tang Refeng (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
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  36. Hendrik Hart (1997). Conceptual Understanding and Knowing Other-Wise: Reflections on Rationality and Spirituality in Philosophy. In James H. Olthuis (ed.), Knowing Other-Wise: Philosophy at the Threshold of Spirituality. Fordham University Press 19--53.
    Conceptual understanding and knowing other-wise: Reflections on rationality and spirituality in philosophy.
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  37.  50
    Bernard W. Kobes (1997). Metacognition and Consciousness: Review Essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. Shimamura (Eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.
    The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us (...)
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  38.  44
    John G. Gammack (2002). Synaesthesia and Knowing. In Language, Vision, and Music. Amsterdam: J Benjamins
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  39.  8
    Maarit Mäkelä (2007). Knowing Through Making: The Role of the Artefact in Practice-Led Research. Knowledge, Technology & Policy 20 (3):157-163.
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  40.  7
    Mauri Kaipainen & Pasi Karhu (2000). Bringing Knowing-When and Knowing-What Together: Periodically Tuned Categorization and Category-Based Timing Modeled with the Recurrent Oscillatory Self-Organizing Map (ROSOM). [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (2):203-229.
    The study addresses the cyclically temporal aspect of sequence recognition, storage and recall using the Recurrent Oscillatory Self-Organizing Map (ROSOM), first introduced by Kaipainen, Papadopoulos and Karhu (1997). The unique solution of the network is that oscillatory States are assigned to network units, corresponding to their `readiness-to-fire''. The ROSOM is a categorizer, a temporal sequence storage system and a periodicity detector designed for use in an ambiguous cyclically repetitive environment. As its external input, the model accepts a multidimensional stream of (...)
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  41.  19
    Jerry H. Gill (1980). Of Split Brains and Tacit Knowing. International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (March):49-58.
  42.  12
    Rick Fairbanks (1995). Knowing More Than We Can Tell: Resolving the Dynamic Paradox of Self-Deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):431-459.
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  43.  0
    Gregory M. Simon (2005). Shame, Knowing, and Anthropology: On Robert I. Levy and the Study of Emotion. Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 33 (4):493-498.
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  44. G. J. Warnock (1970). Seeing and Knowing. Mind 79 (April):281-287.
  45.  99
    Miranda Fricker (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
    Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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  46. Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
    How should one understand knowledge-wh ascriptions? That is, how should one understand claims such as ‘‘I know where the car is parked,’’ which feature an interrogative complement? The received view is that knowledge-wh reduces to knowledge that p, where p happens to be the answer to the question Q denoted by the wh-clause. I will argue that knowledge-wh includes the question—to know-wh is to know that p, as the answer to Q. I will then argue that knowledge-that includes a contextually (...)
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  47.  91
    John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) (2011). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This is the book on knowing how-an invaluable resource for philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and others concerned with knowledge, mind, and action.
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  48. C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, (...)
     
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  49.  5
    Cleide Maria de Oliveira (2010). O aprendizado do não-saber na mística de Angelus Silesius (The learnig of the not-knowing in the mystique of Angelus Silesius) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2010v8n18p196. [REVIEW] Horizonte 8 (18):196-213.
    A linguagem apofática é um gênero discursivo estreitamente relacionado à Teologia Negativa, cuja formulação mais acabada se encontra na obra do Pseudo-Dionísio (séc. V), místico que funda uma tradição negativa que se perpetuará durante toda a Idade Média e Moderna. Na contemporaneidade diversos autores (DERRIDA, 1995 e 1997; FRANKE, 2007; PONDÉ, 2003; VEGA, 2004 e 2009 e outros) têm destacado a retomada desse gênero discursivo nas artes, na literatura e nas ciências humanas de forma geral. A linguagem apofática é, portanto, (...)
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  50.  44
    Paulina Sliwa (2015). IV—Understanding and Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):57-74.
    What is the relationship between understanding and knowing? This paper offers a defence of reductionism about understanding: the view that instances of understanding reduce to instances of knowing. I argue that knowing is both necessary and sufficient for understanding. I then outline some advantages of reductionism.
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