Search results for 'Knowing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 391--428.score: 21.0
    We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report our mental (...)
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  2. Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.score: 18.0
    Stanley and Williamson (The Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–444 2001 ) reject the fundamental distinction between what Ryle once called ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. They claim that knowledge-how is just a species of knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge, and try to establish their claim relying on the standard semantic analysis of ‘knowing-how’ sentences. We will undermine their strategy by arguing that ‘knowing-how’ phrases are under-determined such that there is not only one semantic analysis and by critically discussing and (...)
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  3. T. Parent, Externalism and "Knowing What" You Think.score: 18.0
    Some worry that semantic externalism is incompatible with knowing by introspection what content your thoughts have. In this paper, I examine one primary argument for this incompatibilist worry, the slow-switch argument. Following Goldberg (2006), I construe the argument as attacking the conjunction of externalism and skeptic-proof knowledge of content, where such knowledge would be immune to skeptical doubt. Goldberg, following Burge (1988), attempts to reclaim such knowledge for the externalist; however, I contend that all Burge-style accounts (at best) vindicate (...)
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  4. Hagit Benbaji (2008). Two-Dimensionalism and the “Knowing Which” Requirement. Acta Analytica 23 (1):55-67.score: 18.0
    Two-dimensional semantics aims to eliminate the puzzle of necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths. Recently many argue that even assuming two-dimensional semantics we are left with the puzzle of necessary and a posteriori propositions. Stephen Yablo (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 98–122, 2000) and Penelope Mackie (Analysis, 62(3), 225–236, 2002) argue that a plausible sense of “knowing which” lets us know the object of such a proposition, and yet its necessity is “hidden” and thus a posteriori. This paper (...)
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  5. Chien-Hsing Ho (2014). Meaning, Understanding, and Knowing-What: An Indian Grammarian Notion of Intuition (Pratibha). Philosophy East and West 64 (2):404-424.score: 18.0
    For Bhartrhari, a fifth-century Indian grammarian-philosopher, all conscious beings—beasts, birds and humans—are capable of what he called pratibha, a flash of indescribable intuitive understanding such that one knows what the present object “means” and what to do with it. Such an understanding, if correct, amounts to a mode of knowing that may best be termed knowing-what, to distinguish it from both knowing-that and knowing-how. This paper attempts to expound Bhartrhari’s conception of pratibha in relation to the (...)
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  6. Jessica Brown (2013). Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science. Analysis 73 (2):220-227.score: 18.0
    Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.
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  7. Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.score: 18.0
    Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how has recently been challenged. The paper first briefly defends the distinction and then proceeds to address the question of classifying moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is special in that it is practical, that is, it is essentially a motive. Hence the way we understand moral knowledge crucially depends on the way we understand motivation. The Humean theory of motivation is wrong in saying that reason cannot be a motive, but right in (...)
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  8. Garry Young (2009). Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How To: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology. Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.score: 18.0
    Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF (...)
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  9. Tim Ray (2009). Rethinking Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge: From Personal Knowing to Imagined Institutions. [REVIEW] Minerva 47 (1):75-92.score: 18.0
    Half a century after Michael Polanyi conceptualised ‘the tacit component’ in personal knowing, management studies has reinvented ‘tacit knowledge’—albeit in ways that squander the advantages of Polanyi’s insights and ignore his faith in ‘spiritual reality’. While tacit knowing challenged the absurdities of sheer objectivity, expressed in a ‘perfect language’, it fused rational knowing, based on personal experience, with mystical speculation about an un-experienced ‘external reality’. Faith alone saved Polanyi’s model from solipsism. But Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism (...)
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  10. Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak (2011). Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.score: 18.0
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing (...)
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  11. Carlo Penco, Between Knowing How and Knowing That. Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.score: 18.0
    I wonder whether the idea of knowing how as kind of knowing that with a peculiar mode of presentation really helps in the debate between philosophers and scientists.
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  12. Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth. Synthese 183 (1):27 - 45.score: 18.0
    The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano's epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano's notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one's assertions and to do (...)
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  13. Gloria Dall'Alba & Robyn Barnacle (2005). Embodied Knowing in Online Environments. Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):719–744.score: 18.0
    In higher education, the conventional design of educational programs emphasises imparting knowledge and skills, in line with traditional Western epistemology. This emphasis is particularly evident in the design and implementation of many undergraduate programs in which bodies of knowledge and skills are decontextualised from the practices to which they belong. In contrast, the notion of knowledge as foundational and absolute has been extensively challenged. A transformation and pluralisation has occurred: knowledge has come to be seen as situated and localized into (...)
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  14. Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2011). Bolzanian Knowing: Infallibility, Virtue and Foundational Truth. Synthese 183 (1):27-45.score: 18.0
    The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do (...)
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  15. Gaile Pohlhaus (2006). Knowing (with) Others. Social Philosophy Today 22:187-198.score: 18.0
    Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have argued that our efforts to know the world are always situated, accompanied by such things as desires, beliefs, and interests that guide and shape what it is we discover and perhaps even what we can know. If this is the case, how is one to be receptive to that which is outside of the purview of one’s current understanding of the world? Some feminists have argued that in order to know more effectively (...)
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  16. Roxana Baiasu (2014). Knowing How to Talk About What Cannot Be Said: Objectivity and Epistemic Locatedness. Sophia 53 (2):215-229.score: 18.0
    I take it that A. W. Moore is right when he said that ‘Wittgenstein was right: some things cannot be put into words. Moreover, some things that cannot be put into words are of the utmost philosophical importance’. There is, however, a constant threat of self-stultification whenever an attempt is made to put the ineffable into words. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes in Re-visioning gender in philosophy of religion: reason, love, and epistemic locatedness, certain recent approaches to ineffability—including Moore’s approach—attempt (...)
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  17. Keith Lehrer & Joseph Richard (1975). Remembering Without Knowing. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:121-126.score: 18.0
    Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that i f a man remembers that p, then he knows that p and formerly knew that p. Remembering something is plausibly construed as a f o rm of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We (...)
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  18. Alessandro Capone (2011). Knowing How and Pragmatic Intrusion. Intercultural Pragmatics 8 (4):543-570.score: 18.0
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  19. Saul Traiger (1978). Some Remarks on Lehrer and Richard's 'Remembering Without Knowing'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:107-111.score: 18.0
    This paper examines the four counterexamples offered by Lehrer and Richard in 'Remembering Without Knowing'. The analysis which Lehrer and Richard's purported counterexamples attempt to discredit is that remembering p requires knowing that p and believing that p. The counterexamples are considered individually and all are rejected as counterexamples to knowing as a necessary condition of remembering.
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  20. Jacob Blumenfeld (2014). The Abolition of Time in Hegel's "Absolute Knowing" (and Its Relevance for Marx). Idealistic Studies 43 (1-2).score: 18.0
    In the history of interpretations of Hegel, how one reads the chapter on ‘Absolute Knowing’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit deter­mines one’s whole perspective. In fact, Marx’s only comments on the Phenomenology concern this final chapter, taking it as the very “secret” of Hegel’s philosophy. But what is the secret hidden within the thicket of this impenetrable prose? My suggestion is that it turns on a very specific meaning of the “abolition of time” that Hegel describes in the very (...)
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  21. Jorge Aurelio Díaz (2011). Absoluteness in absolute knowing. [Spanish]. Eidos 11:10-34.score: 18.0
    Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} This paper addresses ‘Absolute knowing’, the process whereby the experiences of consciousness reach heir highest point, as Hegel discusses in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The objective is to analyze this concept both in its epistemological and (...)
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  22. David Morris (2001). Lived Time and Absolute Knowing: Habit and Addiction From Infinite Jest to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Clio 30:375-415.score: 18.0
    A study of habit and other unconscious backgrounds of action shows how shapes of spiritual life in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit each imply correlative senses of lived time. The very form of time thus gives spirit a sensuous encounter with its own concept. The point that conceptual content is manifest in the sensuous form of time is key to an interpretation of Hegel's infamous and puzzling remarks about time and the concept in ``absolute knowing.'' The article also shows how (...)
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  23. Mark Schroeder (2012). Showing How to Derive Knowing How. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):746-753.score: 16.0
    Jason Stanley's Know How aims to offer an attractive intellectualist analysis of knowledge how that is compositionally predicted by the best available treatments of sentences like 'Emile knows how to make his dad smile.' This paper explores one significant way in which Stanley's compositional treatment fails to generate his preferred account, and advocates a minimal solution.
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  24. Yuri Cath (2011). Knowing How Without Knowing That. In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 113.score: 15.0
    In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view (...)
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  25. C. McMullen (1985). 'Knowing What It's Like' and the Essential Indexical. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):211-33.score: 15.0
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  26. Bernard W. Kobes (1997). Metacognition and Consciousness: Review Essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. Shimamura (Eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.score: 15.0
    The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us (...)
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  27. Philip Robbins (2004). Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection. In Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (eds.), Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume 2. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 129-143.score: 15.0
  28. John G. Gammack (2002). Synaesthesia and Knowing. In Language, Vision, and Music. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.score: 15.0
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  29. Gustav Bergmann (1949). Professor Ayer's Analysis of Knowing. Analysis 9 (June):98-106.score: 15.0
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  30. Joseph Shieber (2003). What Our Rylean Ancestors Knew: More on Knowing How and Knowing That. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 11:328-330.score: 15.0
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  31. Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.score: 15.0
  32. Rick Fairbanks (1995). Knowing More Than We Can Tell: Resolving the Dynamic Paradox of Self-Deception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):431-459.score: 15.0
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  33. Jerry H. Gill (1980). Of Split Brains and Tacit Knowing. International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (March):49-58.score: 15.0
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  34. Mauri Kaipainen & Pasi Karhu (2000). Bringing Knowing-When and Knowing-What Together: Periodically Tuned Categorization and Category-Based Timing Modeled with the Recurrent Oscillatory Self-Organizing Map (ROSOM). [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (2):203-229.score: 15.0
    The study addresses the cyclically temporal aspect of sequence recognition, storage and recall using the Recurrent Oscillatory Self-Organizing Map (ROSOM), first introduced by Kaipainen, Papadopoulos and Karhu (1997). The unique solution of the network is that oscillatory States are assigned to network units, corresponding to their `readiness-to-fire''. The ROSOM is a categorizer, a temporal sequence storage system and a periodicity detector designed for use in an ambiguous cyclically repetitive environment. As its external input, the model accepts a multidimensional stream of (...)
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  35. Stephen G. Henry (2010). Polanyi's Tacit Knowing and the Relevance of Epistemology to Clinical Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):292-297.score: 15.0
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  36. Maarit Mäkelä (2007). Knowing Through Making: The Role of the Artefact in Practice-Led Research. Knowledge, Technology and Policy 20 (3):157-163.score: 15.0
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  37. Tang Refeng (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.score: 15.0
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  38. Gregory M. Simon (2005). Shame, Knowing, and Anthropology: On Robert I. Levy and the Study of Emotion. Ethos 33 (4):493-498.score: 15.0
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  39. G. J. Warnock (1970). Seeing and Knowing. Mind 79 (April):281-287.score: 15.0
     
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  40. Cleide Maria de Oliveira (2010). O aprendizado do não-saber na mística de Angelus Silesius (The learnig of the not-knowing in the mystique of Angelus Silesius) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2010v8n18p196. [REVIEW] Horizonte 8 (18):196-213.score: 14.0
    A linguagem apofática é um gênero discursivo estreitamente relacionado à Teologia Negativa, cuja formulação mais acabada se encontra na obra do Pseudo-Dionísio (séc. V), místico que funda uma tradição negativa que se perpetuará durante toda a Idade Média e Moderna. Na contemporaneidade diversos autores (DERRIDA, 1995 e 1997; FRANKE, 2007; PONDÉ, 2003; VEGA, 2004 e 2009 e outros) têm destacado a retomada desse gênero discursivo nas artes, na literatura e nas ciências humanas de forma geral. A linguagem apofática é, portanto, (...)
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  41. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.score: 12.0
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  42. Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.score: 12.0
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is (...)
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  43. Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.score: 12.0
    How should one understand knowledge-wh ascriptions? That is, how should one understand claims such as ‘‘I know where the car is parked,’’ which feature an interrogative complement? The received view is that knowledge-wh reduces to knowledge that p, where p happens to be the answer to the question Q denoted by the wh-clause. I will argue that knowledge-wh includes the question—to know-wh is to know that p, as the answer to Q. I will then argue that knowledge-that includes a contextually (...)
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  44. Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.score: 12.0
    Knowing-how is currently a hot topic in epistemology. But what is the proper subject matter of a study of knowing-how and in what sense can such a study be regarded as epistemological? The aim of this paper is to answer such metaepistemological questions. This paper offers a metaepistemology of knowing-how, including considerations of the subject matter, task, and nature of the epistemology of knowing-how. I will achieve this aim, first, by distinguishing varieties of knowing-how and, (...)
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  45. Paul Snowdon (2003). Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):1–29.score: 12.0
    The purpose of this paper is to raise some questions about the idea, which was first made prominent by Gilbert Ryle, and has remained associated with him ever since, that there are at least two types of knowledge (or to put it in a slightly different way, two types of states ascribed by knowledge ascriptions) identified, on the one hand, as the knowledge (or state) which is expressed in the ‘knowing that’ construction (sometimes called, for fairly obvious reasons, ‘propositional’ (...)
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  46. Stephen Hetherington (2008). Knowing-That, Knowing-How, and Knowing Philosophically. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.score: 12.0
    This paper outlines how we may understand knowing-that as a kind of knowing-how-to, and thereby as an ability. (Contrast this form of analysis with the more commonly attempted reduction, of knowing-how-to to knowing-that.) The sort of ability in question has much potential complexity. In general, questioning can, but need not, be part of this complexity. However, questioning is always an element in the complexity that is philosophical knowing. The paper comments on the nature of this (...)
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  47. David Wiggins (2012). Practical Knowledge: Knowing How To and Knowing That. Mind 121 (481):97-130.score: 12.0
    Ryle’s account of practical knowing is much controverted. The paper seeks to place present disputations in a larger context and draw attention to the connection between Ryle’s preoccupations and Aristotle’s account of practical reason, practical intelligence, and the way in which human beings enter into the way of being and acting that Aristotle denominates ethos . Considering matters in this framework, the author finds inconclusive the arguments that Stanley and Williamson offer for seeing knowing how to as a (...)
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  48. Torin Alter (2001). Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis. Theoria 67 (3):229-39.score: 12.0
    David Lewis (1983, 1988) and Laurence Nemirow (1980, 1990) claim that knowing what an experience is like is knowing-how, not knowing-that. They identify this know-how with the abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize experiences, and Lewis labels their view ‘the Ability Hypothesis’. The Ability Hypothesis has intrinsic interest. But Lewis and Nemirow devised it specifically to block certain anti-physicalist arguments due to Thomas Nagel (1974, 1986) and Frank Jackson (1982, 1986). Does it?
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  49. Timothy Williamson (2011). Improbable Knowing. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t (...)
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  50. Alex Byrne, Knowing What I Want.score: 12.0
    Vendler, Res Cogitans Knowing that one wants to go to the movies is an example of self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s mental states. It may be foolish to ask the man on the Clapham Omnibus how he knows what he wants, but the question is nonetheless important — albeit neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer. Before getting to that, the familiar claim that we enjoy “privileged access” to our mental states needs untwining (section 1). A sketch of a (...)
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