Search results for 'Knowing our own minds' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality (...)
     
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  2. Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge, such as knowledge of other people's mental attributes: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The first six chapters examine philosophical questions raised by these features of self-knowledge. The (...)
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  3. Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality (...)
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  4.  68
    Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. This volume offers a powerful and comprehensive look at current work on this topic, featuring closely interlinked essays by leading figures in the field that examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist theories of psychological content, and knowledge (...)
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  5. Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 391--428.
    We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report (...)
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  6.  69
    Richard Boyd (2013). Semantic Externalism and Knowing Our Own Minds: Ignoring Twin‐Earth and Doing Naturalistic Philosophy. Theoria 79 (3):204-228.
    In this article I offer a naturalistic defence of semantic externalism. I argue against the following: (1) arguments for externalism rest mainly on conceptual analysis; (2) the community conceptual norms relevant to individuation of propositional attitudes are quasi-analytic; (3) externalism raises serious questions about knowledge of propositional attitudes; and (4) externalism might be OK for “folk psychology” but not for cognitive science. The naturalist alternatives are as follows. (1) Community norms are not anything like a priori; sometimes they are incoherent. (...)
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  7.  61
    C. J. G. Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
  8.  51
    Michael McKinsey (2002). On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-16.
    This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection.
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  9.  85
    Anita Avramides (2002). Knowing Our Own Minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):465-471.
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  10.  57
    Jessica Brown (2001). Book Review. Knowing Our Own Minds Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia MacDonald. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):586-588.
  11.  7
    Tadeusz Szubka (2000). Wright, Crispin, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, Eds. Knowing Our Own Minds. Review of Metaphysics 53 (3):739-740.
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  12.  2
    Michael McKinsey (2002). Review: On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107 - 116.
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  13. A. Hamilton (2000). WRIGHT, C., SMITH, BC and MACDONALD, C.(Eds.)-Knowing Our Own Minds. Philosophical Books 41 (3):196-198.
     
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  14.  11
    Roger C. Schank (2004). Making Minds Less Well Educated Than Our Own. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    In the author's words: "This book is an honest attempt to understand what it means to be educated in today's world." His argument is this: No matter how important science and technology seem to industry or government or indeed to the daily life of people, as a society we believe that those educated in literature, history, and other humanities are in some way better informed, more knowing, and somehow more worthy of the descriptor "well educated." This 19th-century conception of (...)
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  15.  3
    Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas (...)
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  16.  22
    Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1).
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas (...)
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  17.  45
    Joel Smith (2011). Review of Radu Bogdan, Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
    Our Own Minds presents an account of the nature and development of self-consciousness. Bogdan describes the mind of the infant as outward looking, turning in on itself only at a relatively late stage of development. This it does as a response to the increasingly sophisticated sociocultural pressures it faces throughout infancy and early childhood. The book is difficult to follow (about which, more later) but the main line of argument is this: to begin with, infants are attuned to their (...)
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  18.  1
    Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas (...)
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  19.  1
    Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas (...)
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  20.  1
    Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas (...)
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  21.  1
    Shelley Weinberg (2015). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas (...)
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  22.  71
    Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.
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  23.  6
    Radu J. Bogdan (2010). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. A Bradford Book.
    An argument that in response to sociocultural pressures, human minds develop self-consciousness by activating a complex machinery of self-regulation.
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  24.  18
    Péter Hartl (2011). Knowing Our Own Concepts: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):488-498.
    Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticiz-ing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? I present and examine the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claim that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. My argument will (...)
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  25. James Higginbotham (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Clarendon Press
     
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  26.  1
    Shelley Weinberg (forthcoming). Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:n/a-n/a.
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  27.  51
    Pierre Jacob (2004). Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter
  28.  30
    Santiago Arango Muñoz (2012). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):767-770.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  29.  38
    Pierre Jacob, Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet?
  30.  10
    Åsa Wikforss (2013). Our Own Minds. Socio‐Cultural Grounds for Self‐Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):814-816.
  31.  2
    Shuhei Shimamura (2012). Why Should We Know Our Own Minds? Kagaku Tetsugaku 45 (2):29-46.
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  32.  8
    Åsa Wikforss (2013). Our Own Minds. Socio‐Cultural Grounds for Self‐Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):814-816.
  33. Pierre Jacob, Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet?
    In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.
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  34.  19
    G. G. Gallup (1985). Do Minds Exist in Species Other Than Our Own? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:631-41.
  35.  24
    Ted A. Warfield (1998). A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):127 - 147.
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  36.  44
    Ted A. Warfield (1995). Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):525-545.
  37. Alex Byrne (2005). Knowing Our Minds. Boston Review.
    ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
     
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  38.  14
    Edrie Sobstyl (2011). Minds of Our Own: Inventing Feminist Scholarship and Women's Studies in Canada and Quebec, 1966-1976. Edited by Wendy Robbins, Meg Luxton, Margrit Eichler, and Francine Descarries. [REVIEW] Hypatia 26 (2):446-448.
  39.  12
    Keith Gunderson (2000). The Dramaturgy of Dreams in Pleistocene Minds and Our Own. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):946-947.
    The notion of simulation in dreaming of threat recognition and avoidance faces difficulties deriving from (1) some typical characteristics of dream artifacts (some “surreal,” some not) and (2) metaphysical issues involving the need for some representation in the theory of a perspective subject making use of the artifact. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo].
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  40.  69
    David J. Owens (2003). Knowing Your Own Mind. Dialogue 42 (4):791-798.
    What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. (...)
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  41.  32
    Peter Mitchell, Ulrich Teucher, Mark Bennett, Fenja Ziegler & Rebecca Wyton (2009). Do Children Start Out Thinking They Don't Know Their Own Minds? Mind and Language 24 (3):328-346.
    Various researchers have suggested that below 7 years of age children do not recognize that they are the authority on knowledge about themselves, a suggestion that seems counter-intuitive because it raises the possibility that children do not appreciate their privileged first-person access to their own minds. Unlike previous research, children in the current investigation quantified knowledge and even 5-year-olds tended to assign relatively more to themselves than to an adult (Studies 1 and 2). Indeed, children's estimations were different from (...)
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  42.  94
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  43. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53.
    Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked to form a visual (...)
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  44.  55
    H. H. Price (1938). Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds. Philosophy 13 (52):425-56.
    In ordinary life everyone assumes that he has a great deal of knowledge about other minds or persons. This assumption has naturally aroused the curiosity of philosophers; though perhaps they have not been as curious about it as they ought to have been, for they have devoted many volumes to our consciousness of the material world, but very few to our consciousness of one another. It was thought at one time that each of us derives his knowledge of other (...)
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  45.  33
    Robert Dunn (1998). Knowing What I'm About to Do Without Evidence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):231 – 252.
    J. David Velleman casts foreknowledge of one's own next move as psychologically active. As agents, we form prior intentions about what we will do next. Such prior intentions are licensed self-fulfilling beliefs or directive cognitions. These cognitions differ from ordinary predictions in their psychological relation to the evidence, in that they precede that crucial part of the evidence which consists in the fact that they have been formed. However, once formed, these cognitions are epistemologically unremarkable: they are directly justified by (...)
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  46.  52
    Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 321-363.
    This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome (...)
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  47.  12
    Sinan Dogramaci (2016). Knowing Our Degrees of Belief. Episteme 13 (3):269-287.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
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  48.  38
    Sinan Dogramaci (forthcoming). Knowing Our Degrees of Belief. Episteme:1-19.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
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  49. Lisa L. Fuller (2011). Knowing Their Own Good: Preferences & Liberty in Global Ethics. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan 210--230.
    Citizens of liberal, affluent societies are regularly encouraged to support reforms meant to improve conditions for badly-off people in the developing world. Our economic and political support is solicited for causes such as: banning child labor, implementing universal primary education, closing down sweatshops and brothels, etc. But what if the relevant populations or individuals in the developing world do not support these particular reforms or aid programs? What if they would strongly prefer other reforms and programs, or would rank the (...)
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  50. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.
    The idea that introspection is transparent—that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item—seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages—for example, it is thought to (...)
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