Search results for 'Knowing our own minds' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 1232.0
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality (...)
     
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  2. Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 1076.0
    Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. This volume offers a powerful and comprehensive look at current work on this topic, featuring closely interlinked essays by leading figures in the field that examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist theories of psychological content, and knowledge (...)
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  3. Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 391--428.score: 1056.0
    We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report (...)
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  4. C. J. G. Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (2000). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 1028.0
  5. Michael McKinsey (2002). On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-16.score: 1028.0
    This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection.
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  6. Richard Boyd (2013). Semantic Externalism and Knowing Our Own Minds: Ignoring Twin‐Earth and Doing Naturalistic Philosophy. Theoria 79 (3):204-228.score: 1024.0
    In this article I offer a naturalistic defence of semantic externalism. I argue against the following: (1) arguments for externalism rest mainly on conceptual analysis; (2) the community conceptual norms relevant to individuation of propositional attitudes are quasi-analytic; (3) externalism raises serious questions about knowledge of propositional attitudes; and (4) externalism might be OK for “folk psychology” but not for cognitive science. The naturalist alternatives are as follows. (1) Community norms are not anything like a priori; sometimes they are incoherent. (...)
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  7. Jessica Brown (2001). Book Review. Knowing Our Own Minds Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia MacDonald. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):586-588.score: 1024.0
  8. Anita Avramides (2002). Knowing Our Own Minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):465-471.score: 1020.0
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  9. Michael McKinsey (2002). Review: On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107 - 116.score: 1020.0
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  10. A. Hamilton (2000). WRIGHT, C., SMITH, BC and MACDONALD, C.(Eds.)-Knowing Our Own Minds. Philosophical Books 41 (3):196-198.score: 1020.0
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  11. Tadeusz Szubka (2000). Wright, Crispin, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, Eds. Knowing Our Own Minds. Review of Metaphysics 53 (3):739-740.score: 1020.0
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  12. Roger C. Schank (2004). Making Minds Less Well Educated Than Our Own. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 768.0
    In the author's words: "This book is an honest attempt to understand what it means to be educated in today's world." His argument is this: No matter how important science and technology seem to industry or government or indeed to the daily life of people, as a society we believe that those educated in literature, history, and other humanities are in some way better informed, more knowing, and somehow more worthy of the descriptor "well educated." This 19th-century conception of (...)
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  13. Pierre Jacob (2004). Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.score: 632.5
  14. Pierre Jacob, Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet?score: 632.5
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  15. Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.score: 632.5
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  16. Joel Smith (2011). Review of Radu Bogdan, Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).score: 526.5
    Our Own Minds presents an account of the nature and development of self-consciousness. Bogdan describes the mind of the infant as outward looking, turning in on itself only at a relatively late stage of development. This it does as a response to the increasingly sophisticated sociocultural pressures it faces throughout infancy and early childhood. The book is difficult to follow (about which, more later) but the main line of argument is this: to begin with, infants are attuned to their (...)
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  17. Radu J. Bogdan (2010). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. A Bradford Book.score: 447.8
    An argument that in response to sociocultural pressures, human minds develop self-consciousness by activating a complex machinery of self-regulation.
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  18. James Higginbotham (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Clarendon Press.score: 444.0
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  19. Santiago Arango Muñoz (2012). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):767-770.score: 438.8
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  20. Åsa Wikforss (2013). Our Own Minds. Socio‐Cultural Grounds for Self‐Consciousness. By Radu J. Bogdan. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010. Pp. Ix + 210. Price US$32.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):814-816.score: 438.8
  21. Åsa Wikforss (2013). Our Own Minds. Socio‐Cultural Grounds for Self‐Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):814-816.score: 438.8
  22. Péter Hartl (2011). Knowing Our Own Concepts: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy. Organon F 18 (4):488-498.score: 438.8
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  23. Ted A. Warfield (1995). Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):525-545.score: 433.5
  24. Alex Byrne (2005). Knowing Our Minds. Boston Review.score: 427.5
    ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
     
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  25. Ted A. Warfield (1998). A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):127 - 147.score: 427.5
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  26. G. G. Gallup (1985). Do Minds Exist in Species Other Than Our Own? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:631-41.score: 427.5
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  27. Edrie Sobstyl (2011). Minds of Our Own: Inventing Feminist Scholarship and Women's Studies in Canada and Quebec, 1966-1976. Edited by Wendy Robbins, Meg Luxton, Margrit Eichler, and Francine Descarries. [REVIEW] Hypatia 26 (2):446-448.score: 427.5
  28. Keith Gunderson (2000). The Dramaturgy of Dreams in Pleistocene Minds and Our Own. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):946-947.score: 427.5
    The notion of simulation in dreaming of threat recognition and avoidance faces difficulties deriving from (1) some typical characteristics of dream artifacts (some “surreal,” some not) and (2) metaphysical issues involving the need for some representation in the theory of a perspective subject making use of the artifact. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo].
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  29. Christopher Scanlon & John Adlam (2013). Knowing Your Place and Minding Your Own Business: On Perverse Psychological Solutions to the Imagined Problem of Social Exclusion. Ethics and Social Welfare 7 (2):170-183.score: 393.0
    We draw on ancient Greek philosophy and contemporary psychosocial theorists to analyse the ethical implications of social policies implemented through the welfare state with the espoused objective of achieving social inclusion. We argue that many such policies establish a boundary between domains of inclusion and exclusion that perversely maintains the very problem such policies are designed to solve. They then also provide ?rationalisations? for social exclusion which imply that such states can be explained?that they are ethical, and so legitimate. We (...)
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  30. David J. Owens (2003). Knowing Your Own Mind. Dialogue 42 (4):791-798.score: 373.5
    What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. (...)
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  31. Peter Mitchell, Ulrich Teucher, Mark Bennett, Fenja Ziegler & Rebecca Wyton (2009). Do Children Start Out Thinking They Don't Know Their Own Minds? Mind and Language 24 (3):328-346.score: 369.8
    Various researchers have suggested that below 7 years of age children do not recognize that they are the authority on knowledge about themselves, a suggestion that seems counter-intuitive because it raises the possibility that children do not appreciate their privileged first-person access to their own minds. Unlike previous research, children in the current investigation quantified knowledge and even 5-year-olds tended to assign relatively more to themselves than to an adult (Studies 1 and 2). Indeed, children's estimations were different from (...)
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  32. Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.score: 339.8
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  33. Eric Schwitzgebel (2002). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53.score: 299.3
  34. J. Edwards (1999). Interpreted Logical Forms and Knowing Your Own Mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):169-90.score: 275.5
    An attractive semantic theory presented by Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow takes a report of propositional attitudes, e.g 'Tom believes Judy Garland sang', to report a believing relation between Tom and an interpreted logical form constructed from 'Judy Garland sang'. We briefly outline the semantic theory and indicate its attractions. However, the definition of interpreted logical forms given by Larson and Ludlow is shown to be faulty, and an alternative definition is offered which matches their intentions. This definition is (...)
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  35. Derek Browne (2004). Do Dolphins Know Their Own Minds? Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):633-53.score: 258.3
    Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of (...)
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  36. Robert Dunn (1998). Knowing What I'm About to Do Without Evidence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):231 – 252.score: 258.0
    J. David Velleman casts foreknowledge of one's own next move as psychologically active. As agents, we form prior intentions about what we will do next. Such prior intentions are licensed self-fulfilling beliefs or directive cognitions. These cognitions differ from ordinary predictions in their psychological relation to the evidence, in that they precede that crucial part of the evidence which consists in the fact that they have been formed. However, once formed, these cognitions are epistemologically unremarkable: they are directly justified by (...)
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  37. Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 321-363.score: 258.0
    This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome (...)
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  38. Melissa Frankel (2009). Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds. Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.score: 255.5
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  39. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.score: 255.0
    The idea that introspection is transparent—that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item—seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages—for example, it is thought to (...)
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  40. Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2005). Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology. In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 297-339.score: 250.5
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises (...)
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  41. Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols (2004). Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology. In R. Stanton, M. Ezcurdia & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30. University of Calgary Press. 297-339.score: 250.5
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises (...)
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  42. Keith Frankish (2009). How We Know Our Conscious Minds: Introspective Access to Conscious Thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.score: 239.3
    Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
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  43. Lisa L. Fuller (2011). Knowing Their Own Good: Preferences & Liberty in Global Ethics. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan. 210--230.score: 238.5
    Citizens of liberal, affluent societies are regularly encouraged to support reforms meant to improve conditions for badly-off people in the developing world. Our economic and political support is solicited for causes such as: banning child labor, implementing universal primary education, closing down sweatshops and brothels, etc. But what if the relevant populations or individuals in the developing world do not support these particular reforms or aid programs? What if they would strongly prefer other reforms and programs, or would rank the (...)
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  44. Christopher Bobonich (2007). Plato on Akrasia and Knowing Your Own Mind. In Christopher Bobonich & Pierre Destrée (eds.), Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus. Brill. 41--60.score: 236.3
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  45. Michael S. Gordon (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? Philosophical Topics 28 (2):235-246.score: 236.3
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  46. Linda Radzik (2012). On the Virtue of Minding Our Own Business. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):173-182.score: 232.5
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  47. Lauren Swiney & Paulo Sousa (2013). When Our Thoughts Are Not Our Own: Investigating Agency Misattributions Using the Mind-to-Mind Paradigm. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):589-602.score: 232.5
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  48. Sven Bernecker (1997). On Knowing One's Own Mind. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 231.5
     
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  49. Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.score: 228.5
  50. Sydney Shoemaker (1988). On Knowing One's Own Mind. Philosophical Perspectives 2:183-209.score: 228.5
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