Search results for 'Knowing our own minds' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 391--428.score: 960.0
    We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report (...)
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  2. C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 824.0
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality (...)
     
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  3. Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 668.0
    Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. This volume offers a powerful and comprehensive look at current work on this topic, featuring closely interlinked essays by leading figures in the field that examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist theories of psychological content, and knowledge (...)
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  4. C. J. G. Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (2000). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 620.0
  5. Michael McKinsey (2002). On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-16.score: 620.0
    This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection.
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  6. Richard Boyd (2013). Semantic Externalism and Knowing Our Own Minds: Ignoring Twin‐Earth and Doing Naturalistic Philosophy. Theoria 79 (3):204-228.score: 616.0
    In this article I offer a naturalistic defence of semantic externalism. I argue against the following: (1) arguments for externalism rest mainly on conceptual analysis; (2) the community conceptual norms relevant to individuation of propositional attitudes are quasi-analytic; (3) externalism raises serious questions about knowledge of propositional attitudes; and (4) externalism might be OK for “folk psychology” but not for cognitive science. The naturalist alternatives are as follows. (1) Community norms are not anything like a priori; sometimes they are incoherent. (...)
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  7. Jessica Brown (2001). Book Review. Knowing Our Own Minds Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia MacDonald. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):586-588.score: 616.0
  8. Anita Avramides (2002). Knowing Our Own Minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):465-471.score: 612.0
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  9. Michael McKinsey (2002). Review: On Knowing Our Own Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107 - 116.score: 612.0
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  10. A. Hamilton (2000). WRIGHT, C., SMITH, BC and MACDONALD, C.(Eds.)-Knowing Our Own Minds. Philosophical Books 41 (3):196-198.score: 612.0
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  11. Tadeusz Szubka (2000). Wright, Crispin, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, Eds. Knowing Our Own Minds. Review of Metaphysics 53 (3):739-740.score: 612.0
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  12. Roger C. Schank (2004). Making Minds Less Well Educated Than Our Own. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 540.0
    In the author's words: "This book is an honest attempt to understand what it means to be educated in today's world." His argument is this: No matter how important science and technology seem to industry or government or indeed to the daily life of people, as a society we believe that those educated in literature, history, and other humanities are in some way better informed, more knowing, and somehow more worthy of the descriptor "well educated." This 19th-century conception of (...)
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  13. Pierre Jacob (2004). Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.score: 379.5
  14. Pierre Jacob, Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet?score: 379.5
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  15. Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.score: 379.5
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  16. Joel Smith (2011). Review of Radu Bogdan, Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).score: 351.0
    Our Own Minds presents an account of the nature and development of self-consciousness. Bogdan describes the mind of the infant as outward looking, turning in on itself only at a relatively late stage of development. This it does as a response to the increasingly sophisticated sociocultural pressures it faces throughout infancy and early childhood. The book is difficult to follow (about which, more later) but the main line of argument is this: to begin with, infants are attuned to their (...)
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  17. James Higginbotham (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Clarendon Press.score: 348.0
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  18. Christopher Scanlon & John Adlam (2013). Knowing Your Place and Minding Your Own Business: On Perverse Psychological Solutions to the Imagined Problem of Social Exclusion. Ethics and Social Welfare 7 (2):170-183.score: 273.0
    We draw on ancient Greek philosophy and contemporary psychosocial theorists to analyse the ethical implications of social policies implemented through the welfare state with the espoused objective of achieving social inclusion. We argue that many such policies establish a boundary between domains of inclusion and exclusion that perversely maintains the very problem such policies are designed to solve. They then also provide ?rationalisations? for social exclusion which imply that such states can be explained?that they are ethical, and so legitimate. We (...)
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  19. Radu J. Bogdan (2010). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. A Bradford Book.score: 272.3
    An argument that in response to sociocultural pressures, human minds develop self-consciousness by activating a complex machinery of self-regulation.
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  20. Santiago Arango Muñoz (2012). Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):767-770.score: 263.3
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  21. Åsa Wikforss (2013). Our Own Minds. Socio‐Cultural Grounds for Self‐Consciousness. By Radu J. Bogdan. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010. Pp. Ix + 210. Price US$32.00.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):814-816.score: 263.3
  22. Åsa Wikforss (2013). Our Own Minds. Socio‐Cultural Grounds for Self‐Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):814-816.score: 263.3
  23. Péter Hartl (2011). Knowing Our Own Concepts: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy. Organon F 18 (4):488-498.score: 263.3
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  24. Ted A. Warfield (1995). Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):525-545.score: 262.5
  25. David J. Owens (2003). Knowing Your Own Mind. Dialogue 42 (4):791-798.score: 261.0
    What is it to “know your own mind”? In ordinary English, this phrase connotes clear headed decisiveness and a firm resolve but in the language of contemporary philosophy, the indecisive and the susceptible can know their own minds just as well as anybody else. In the philosopher’s usage, “knowing your own mind” is just a matter of being able to produce a knowledgeable description of your mental state, whether it be a state of indecision, susceptibility or even confusion. (...)
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  26. Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 321-363.score: 258.0
    This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome (...)
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  27. Peter Mitchell, Ulrich Teucher, Mark Bennett, Fenja Ziegler & Rebecca Wyton (2009). Do Children Start Out Thinking They Don't Know Their Own Minds? Mind and Language 24 (3):328-346.score: 257.3
    Various researchers have suggested that below 7 years of age children do not recognize that they are the authority on knowledge about themselves, a suggestion that seems counter-intuitive because it raises the possibility that children do not appreciate their privileged first-person access to their own minds. Unlike previous research, children in the current investigation quantified knowledge and even 5-year-olds tended to assign relatively more to themselves than to an adult (Studies 1 and 2). Indeed, children's estimations were different from (...)
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  28. Alex Byrne (2005). Knowing Our Minds. Boston Review.score: 256.5
    ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
     
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  29. Ted A. Warfield (1998). A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):127 - 147.score: 256.5
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  30. Edrie Sobstyl (2011). Minds of Our Own: Inventing Feminist Scholarship and Women's Studies in Canada and Quebec, 1966-1976. Edited by Wendy Robbins, Meg Luxton, Margrit Eichler, and Francine Descarries. [REVIEW] Hypatia 26 (2):446-448.score: 256.5
  31. G. G. Gallup (1985). Do Minds Exist in Species Other Than Our Own? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:631-41.score: 256.5
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  32. Keith Gunderson (2000). The Dramaturgy of Dreams in Pleistocene Minds and Our Own. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):946-947.score: 256.5
    The notion of simulation in dreaming of threat recognition and avoidance faces difficulties deriving from (1) some typical characteristics of dream artifacts (some “surreal,” some not) and (2) metaphysical issues involving the need for some representation in the theory of a perspective subject making use of the artifact. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo].
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  33. Robert Dunn (1998). Knowing What I'm About to Do Without Evidence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):231 – 252.score: 234.0
    J. David Velleman casts foreknowledge of one's own next move as psychologically active. As agents, we form prior intentions about what we will do next. Such prior intentions are licensed self-fulfilling beliefs or directive cognitions. These cognitions differ from ordinary predictions in their psychological relation to the evidence, in that they precede that crucial part of the evidence which consists in the fact that they have been formed. However, once formed, these cognitions are epistemologically unremarkable: they are directly justified by (...)
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  34. Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 123-155.score: 228.0
    Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.<sup>1</sup> In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation (...)
     
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  35. Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.score: 227.3
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  36. Melissa Frankel (2009). Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds. Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.score: 211.5
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  37. Tyler Burge (2000). Reason and the First Person. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 204.0
     
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  38. Christopher Peacocke (1998). Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 83.score: 204.0
    What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are constitutive (...)
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  39. Akeel Bilgrami (2000). Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.score: 204.0
    Once this integrated position is fully in place, the book closes with a postscript on how one might fruitfully view the kind of self-knowledge that is pursued ...
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  40. Michael G. F. Martin (1998). An Eye Directed Outward. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 204.0
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  41. Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge. In C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 285--320.score: 204.0
  42. Elizabeth Fricker (1998). Self-Knowledge: Special Access Vs. Artefact of Grammar -- A Dichotomy Rejected. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & 1998 Self-knowledge: Special access vs. artefact of grammar -- A dichotomy rejected. (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 155--206.score: 204.0
  43. J. Edwards (1998). The Simple Theory of Colour and the Transparency of Sense Experience. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the transparency of sense experience. The simple theory of colour (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 371.score: 204.0
  44. C. J. G. Wright (2000). Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 101-122.score: 204.0
  45. Diana Raffman (1998). First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 204.0
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  46. T. Burge (1998). Reason and the First Person U Knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. And Macdonald, C. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 204.0
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  47. Elizabeth Fricker (2000). Self-Knowledge: Special Access Versus Artefact of Grammar—A Dichotomy. In C. J. G. Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 155.score: 204.0
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  48. John McDowell (1998). Response to Crispin Wright. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 47--62.score: 204.0
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  49. Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2005). Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology. In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 297-339.score: 202.5
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises (...)
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  50. Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols (2004). Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology. In R. Stanton, M. Ezcurdia & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30. University of Calgary Press. 297-339.score: 202.5
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises (...)
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