Search results for 'Knowing what we mean' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  3
    Raymond E. Olson (1959). Knowing What We Mean. Journal of Philosophy 56 (11):473-485.
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  2. Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 391--428.
    We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report our (...)
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  3. Barry C. Smith (2010). What We Mean, What We Think We Mean, and How Language Surprises Us. In E. Romero & B. Soria (eds.), Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston's Pragmatics. Palgrave
    In uttering a sentence we are often taken to assert more than its literal meaning — though we sometimes assert less. Robyn Carston and others take this phenomenon to show that what is said or asserted by a speaker on an occasion of utterance is usually a contextuallyenriched version of the semantic content of the sentence. I shall argue that we can resist this conclusion if we recognize that what we think we are asserting, or take others to (...)
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  4. Kuang-Ming Cheng (2005). Must We Know What We Mean? Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):21-33.
    In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses— that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, (...)
     
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  5.  2
    Sandra Laugier (2011). Introduction to the French Edition of Must We Mean What We Say? Critical Inquiry 37 (4):627-651.
    Must We Mean What We Say? is Stanley Cavell's first book, and, in a sense, it is his most important. It contains all the themes that Cavell continues to develop masterfully throughout his philosophy. There is a renewed usage of J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, and, in the classic essay “The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy,” he establishes the foundations of a radical reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein , the connections among skepticism, acknowledgement, and Shakespearean tragedy ; (...)
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  6. Ian Ground (2000). Must We Mean What We Play? In Creative Chords: Studies in Music. Gracewing 89--110.
    Must We Mean What We Play? INTRODUCTION It was Sir Thomas Beecham who said,'The English do not care for music-but they love the noise it makes.'Sir Thomas was, of course, given to making acerbic swipes but this one has always seemed to me to have.
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  7. Andrew Brenner (forthcoming). What Do We Mean When We Ask “Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?". Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Let’s call the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” the Question. There’s no consensus, of course, regarding which proposed answer to the Question, if any, is correct, but occasionally there’s also controversy regarding the meaning of the Question itself. In this paper I argue that such controversy persists because there just isn’t one unique interpretation of the Question. Rather, the puzzlement expressed by the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” varies depending on the ontology implicitly or (...)
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  8. Barry C. Smith (2006). What I Know When I Know a Language. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press
    EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view (...)
     
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  9. Adam M. Croom (2008). Racial Epithets: What We Say and Mean by Them. Dialogue 51:34-45.
    Racial epithets are terms used to characterize people on the basis of their race, and are often used to harm the people that they target. But what do racial epithets mean, and how do they work to harm in the way that they do? In this essay I set out to answer these questions by offering a pragmatic view of racial epithets, while contrasting my position with Christopher Hom's semantic view.
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  10. Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...)
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  11. Daniel Sarewitz (2010). Normal Science and Limits on Knowledge: What We Seek to Know, What We Choose Not to Know, What We Don't Bother Knowing. Social Research: An International Quarterly 77 (3):997-1010.
    We can't know everything; in fact, compared to the vast expanses of our ignorance, we can't really know very much. So the problem of "limiting knowledge" is not just one of the conflict between efforts to make knowledge available and efforts to keep knowledge locked up. There is also the often-invisible problem of how we decide what it is we are going to try to know, and what, as a consequence, we decide, even if by benign neglect, we (...)
     
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  12.  5
    Scott Soames (2008). The Gap Between Meaning and Assertion: Why What We Literally Say Often Differs From What Our Words Literally Mean. In Philosophical Essays, Volume 1: Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It. Princeton University Press 278-297.
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  13. Edouard Machery, What We All Think About Knowing:Cross-Cultural Uniformity and Diversity in Epistemic Assessments.
    Describing a person as knowing a proposition involves a rich array of abilities: psychological capacities to attribute mental states to others, linguistic competence with mental state verbs, conceptual grasp of the nature of knowledge and its relation to features such as reliability and evidence. One might wonder whether these abilities are all part of our natural endowment as human beings, or whether any of them is a product of a person's specific cultural context. This one-day workshop brings together researchers (...)
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  14. Maria Magoula Adamos & Julia B. Griffin, What Do We Mean by 'Forgiveness?': Some Answers From the Ancient Greeks. Forgiveness:Philosophy, Psychology, and the Arts.
    There seems to be confusion and disagreement among scholars about the meaning of interpersonal forgiveness. In this essay we shall venture to clarify the meaning of forgiveness by examining various literary works. In particular, we shall discuss instances of forgiveness from Homer’s The Iliad, Euripides’ Hippolytus, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and we shall focus on the changes that the concept of forgiveness has gone through throughout the centuries, in the hope of being able to understand, and therefore, of being able (...)
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  15.  14
    Georges Rey (2011). The Unavailability of What We Mean. Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  16.  14
    Georges Rey (1993). The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore. In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi 61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  17.  29
    Alastair Hannay (2000). Kierkegaard and What We Mean by 'Philosophy'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (1):1 – 22.
    Against influential views to the contrary, notably formulated in Henry Allison's 'Christianity and Nonsense', it is argued that Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript is not in itself, as a whole or in any part, an elaborate joke. The work contains a serious though negative argument designed to locate the place of faith in relation to reason. Given that the text itself makes claims on our reason in this way but that its pseudonymous author is a self-styled humorist, the question of where (...)
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor (1964). On Knowing What We Would Say. Philosophical Review 73 (2):198-212.
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  19.  22
    Terence Cuneo (2006). Saying What We Mean: An Argument Against Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:35-71.
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  20. Stewart Shapiro (2009). We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident: But What Do We Mean by That? Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):175-207.
    At the beginning of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (§2) [1884], Frege observes that “it is in the nature of mathematics to prefer proof, where proof is possible”. This, of course, is true, but thinkers differ on why it is that mathematicians prefer proof. And what of propositions for which no proof is possible? What of axioms? This talk explores various notions of self-evidence, and the role they play in various foundational systems, notably those of Frege and Zermelo. I (...)
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  21. Alexander Gabovich & Vladimir Kuznetsov (2013). What Do We Mean When Using the Acronym 'BCS'? European Journal of Physics 34 (2):371-382.
    The history and use of the acronym ‘BCS’ (named after Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer) in the science of superconductivity is traced and analysed. It is shown that a number of different theories are labelled ‘BCS’. The confusion in the application of the term ‘BCS’ is shown to be common because the term ‘theory’ itself is not precisely defined in physics. Recommendations are given to physics readers and students on how to distinguish between various theories referred to as ‘BCS’. Contributions from (...)
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  22.  17
    Jesús Navarro (2009). Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility . In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity and its relevance for the philosophy of language , mind , society and action . In the critical part, the notion of Background is (...)
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  23.  23
    Peter Makepeace (1958). Knowing What I Mean. Analysis 18 (4):88 - 93.
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  24.  38
    William Charlton (1986). Knowing What We Think. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):196-211.
  25.  2
    Diana Karbonowska (2015). What We Mean by Experience. The European Legacy 20 (6):674-676.
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  26. Arnold J. Chien (2002). On What We Mean.
  27.  11
    Rachel Vaughan (1992). Understanding and Knowing What You Mean. Philosophical Studies 33:171-176.
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  28. Rob Cross, Andrew Parker, Laurence Prusak & Stephen P. Borgatti (2006). Knowing What We Know: Supporting Knowledge Creation and Sharing in Social Networks. In Laurence Prusak & Eric Matson (eds.), Knowledge Management and Organizational Learning: A Reader. OUP Oxford
     
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  29.  5
    Anastasia Panagopoulos (2013). What We Mean by Experience Janack Marianne Stanford University Press, 2012; IX + 201 Pp.; $21.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Dialogue 52 (4):1-3.
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  30.  32
    Jeff Johnson (2000). Knowing and Saying We Know. Essays in Philosophy 1 (2):4.
    In these pages I resurrect a dispute that has, sadly I think, now gone by the wayside in current thinking about knowledge, among other things. I mean the dispute that we find Wittgenstein entertaining in certain sections of _On Certainty_ and the dispute that led John Searle to argue that there is such a thing as the assertion fallacy. The dispute turns on what lessons we can draw from the fact that in certain examples it would be fishy (...)
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  31.  4
    Elke U. Weber & Eric J. Johnson (2011). Query Theory: Knowing What We Want by Arguing with Ourselves. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):91-92.
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  32.  3
    Claire Katz (2011). Jew-Greek Redux: Knowing What We Do Not Know On Diane Perpich's The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Philosophia 1 (1):103-117.
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  33. Jesús Navarro Reyes (2009). Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background. Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
     
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  34. Oswald Hanfling (1997). A.J. Ayer Analysing What We Mean.
     
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  35. Marianne Janack (2012). What We Mean by Experience. Stanford University Press.
    Social scientists and scholars in the humanities all rely on first-person descriptions of experience to understand how subjects construct their worlds. The problem they always face is how to integrate first-person accounts with an impersonal stance. Over the course of the twentieth century, this problem was compounded as the concept of experience itself came under scrutiny. First hailed as a wellspring of knowledge and the weapon that would vanquish metaphysics and Cartesianism by pragmatists like Dewey and James, by the century's (...)
     
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  36. Marianne Janack (2012). What We Mean By Experience. Stanford University Press.
    Introduction : the authority of experience : realism, empiricism, and the problem of theory -- The linguistic turn and the ascendancy of anti-foundationalism -- Cognitive sciences of experience -- Children and other living computers -- Feminist discussions of experience : identity, naturalisms, and discourse -- Naturalism and agency -- Experience recaptured.
     
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  37. S. McMillan & D. J. Simpson (2006). Editors' Introduction: Does It Really Matter What We Mean by the Word or Concept Education? Journal of Thought 41 (3):3.
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  38. Jesús Navarro-Reyes (2009). Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
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  39. Richard H. Overman (1977). " He Doesn't Know What He's Talking About!" Isn't This What We All Feel Like Blurting Out Occasionally? Especially When We Find Someone Else's Language Failing to Express What We Know! Still, in Our Better Moments We Refrain From Such Outbursts, Because in Our Depths We Know That, in the Part of Our Lives Concerned with Language, Hardly Anything is More Difficult Than Being Sure What We Mean. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America 135.
     
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  40. Terry Penner (2005). « Platonic Justice And What We Mean By ’Justice’ ». Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society 5.
     
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  41. Julie Rothstein (1992). Ya Know What We Mean. Hastings Center Report 22 (1):3-3.
     
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  42. Anne Stevenson (2004). Saying What We Mean. In Emily R. Grosholz (ed.), The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir. Clarendon Press
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  43.  21
    D. Micah Hester (2004). What Must We Mean by “Community”? A Processive Account. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (5-6):423-437.
    The term community in ethics and bioethics traditionally has been used to designate either a specific kind of moral relationship available to rational agents or, in contrast, the context in which any sense of rational agency can even be understood. I argue that bioethics is better served when both selves and community are expressed through a more processive language that highlights the functional character of such concepts. In particular, I see the turn to processive community in bioethics as a turn (...)
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  44. Stephen Turner (2003). What Do We Mean by 'We'? ProtoSociology 18.
    Abtract: The analytic philosophy form of the problem of collective intentionality originated with the claim that individual statements of the form ''I intend x" cannot add up to a "we intend x" statement. Analytic philosophers from Wilfrid Sellars on have pursued a strategy that construes these sentences as individual tellings of statements whose form is collective. The point of the strategy is to avoid the problematic idea of a real collective subject. This approach creates unusual epistemic problems. Although ''telling" of (...)
     
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  45. Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford (2011). What We Tend to Mean. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1 (46):20-33.
    In this paper a dispositional account of meaning is offered. Words might dispose towards a particular or ‘literal’ meaning, but whether this meaning is actually conveyed when expressed will depend on a number of factors, such as speaker’s intentions, the context of the utterance and the background knowledge of the hearer. It is thus argued that no meaning is guaranteed or necessitated by the words used.
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  46.  33
    Stanley Cavell (2002). Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Reissued with a new preface, this famous collection of essays covers a remarkably wide range of philosophical issues, including essays on Wittgenstein, Austin, Kierkegaard, and the philosophy of language, and extending beyond philosophy into discussions of music and drama. Previous edition hb ISBN (1976): 0-521-21116-6 Previous edition pb ISBN (1976): 0-521-29048-1.
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  47. J. H. Woodger (1953). What Do We Mean by 'Inborn'? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (12):319-326.
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  48. Robert Stalnaker, Knowing Where We Are, and What It is Like.
  49.  43
    Stanley Cavell (1964). Must We Mean What We Say? In V. C. Chappell (ed.), Inquiry. Dover Publications 172 – 212.
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  50.  79
    Stanley Cavell (1958). Must We Mean What We Say? Inquiry 1 (1-4):172 – 212.
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