Search results for 'Knowing what we mean' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. The Things We Mean & Stephen Schiffer (2005). The Things We Mean, by Stephen Schiffer. Disputatio.score: 1590.0
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  2. Raymond E. Olson (1959). Knowing What We Mean. Journal of Philosophy 56 (11):473-485.score: 1020.0
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  3. Barry C. Smith (1998). On Knowing One's Own Language. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 391--428.score: 679.0
    We rely on language to know the minds of others, but does language have a role to play in knowing our own minds? To suppose it does is to look for a connection between mastery of a language and the epistemic relation we bear to our inner lives. What could such a connection consist in? To explore this, I shall examine strategies for explaining self-knowledge in terms of the use we make of language to express and report our (...)
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  4. Kuang-Ming Cheng (2005). Must We Know What We Mean? Kriterion 19:21-33.score: 632.5
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  5. Julie Rothstein (1992). Ya Know What We Mean. Hastings Center Report 22 (1):3-3.score: 632.5
     
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  6. Richard H. Overman (1977). " He Doesn't Know What He's Talking About!" Isn't This What We All Feel Like Blurting Out Occasionally? Especially When We Find Someone Else's Language Failing to Express What We Know! Still, in Our Better Moments We Refrain From Such Outbursts, Because in Our Depths We Know That, in the Part of Our Lives Concerned with Language, Hardly Anything is More Difficult Than Being Sure What We Mean. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America. 135.score: 627.5
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  7. Tim Ingold (2011). My Objective in This Chapter is to Investigate the Relation Between These Compo-Nents of Ambulatory Knowing, Pedestrian Movement, and Temperate Experience. I Shall Proceed in Four Steps. First, I Shall Explore the Meaning of What We Take to Be. [REVIEW] In Trevor H. J. Marchand (ed.), Making Knowledge: Explorations of the Indissoluble Relation Between Mind, Body and Environment. Wiley-Blackwell. 4--115.score: 615.0
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  8. Barry C. Smith (2006). What I Know When I Know a Language. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.score: 572.0
    EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view (...)
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  9. Barry C. Smith (2010). What We Mean, What We Think We Mean, and How Language Surprises Us. In E. Romero & B. Soria (eds.), Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston's Pragmatics. Palgrave.score: 524.3
    In uttering a sentence we are often taken to assert more than its literal meaning — though we sometimes assert less. Robyn Carston and others take this phenomenon to show that what is said or asserted by a speaker on an occasion of utterance is usually a contextuallyenriched version of the semantic content of the sentence. I shall argue that we can resist this conclusion if we recognize that what we think we are asserting, or take others to (...)
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  10. I. Ground (2000). Must We Mean What We Play? In Creative Chords: Studies in Music. Gracewing. 89--110.score: 513.0
    Must We Mean What We Play? INTRODUCTION It was Sir Thomas Beecham who said,'The English do not care for music-but they love the noise it makes.'Sir Thomas was, of course, given to making acerbic swipes but this one has always seemed to me to have.
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  11. Melissa Frankel (2009). Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds. Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.score: 482.0
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  12. Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.score: 474.8
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...)
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  13. Adam M. Croom (2008). Racial Epithets: What We Say and Mean by Them. Dialogue 51:34-45.score: 463.5
    Racial epithets are terms used to characterize people on the basis of their race, and are often used to harm the people that they target. But what do racial epithets mean, and how do they work to harm in the way that they do? In this essay I set out to answer these questions by offering a pragmatic view of racial epithets, while contrasting my position with Christopher Hom's semantic view.
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  14. Edouard Machery, What We All Think About Knowing:Cross-Cultural Uniformity and Diversity in Epistemic Assessments.score: 463.5
    Describing a person as knowing a proposition involves a rich array of abilities: psychological capacities to attribute mental states to others, linguistic competence with mental state verbs, conceptual grasp of the nature of knowledge and its relation to features such as reliability and evidence. One might wonder whether these abilities are all part of our natural endowment as human beings, or whether any of them is a product of a person's specific cultural context. This one-day workshop brings together researchers (...)
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  15. Alastair Hannay (2000). Kierkegaard and What We Mean by 'Philosophy'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (1):1 – 22.score: 456.8
    Against influential views to the contrary, notably formulated in Henry Allison's 'Christianity and Nonsense', it is argued that Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript is not in itself, as a whole or in any part, an elaborate joke. The work contains a serious though negative argument designed to locate the place of faith in relation to reason. Given that the text itself makes claims on our reason in this way but that its pseudonymous author is a self-styled humorist, the question of where (...)
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  16. Georges Rey (1993). The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 61-101.score: 456.8
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  17. Georges Rey (2011). The Unavailability of What We Mean. Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.score: 456.8
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor (1964). On Knowing What We Would Say. Philosophical Review 73 (2):198-212.score: 438.8
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  19. William Charlton (1986). Knowing What We Think. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):196-211.score: 438.8
  20. Peter Makepeace (1958). Knowing What I Mean. Analysis 18 (4):88 - 93.score: 438.8
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  21. Marianne Janack (2012). What We Mean By Experience. Stanford University Press.score: 438.8
    Introduction : the authority of experience : realism, empiricism, and the problem of theory -- The linguistic turn and the ascendancy of anti-foundationalism -- Cognitive sciences of experience -- Children and other living computers -- Feminist discussions of experience : identity, naturalisms, and discourse -- Naturalism and agency -- Experience recaptured.
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  22. Rachel Vaughan (1992). Understanding and Knowing What You Mean. Philosophical Studies 33:171-176.score: 438.8
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  23. Anastasia Panagopoulos (2013). What We Mean by Experience Janack Marianne Stanford University Press, 2012; IX + 201 Pp.; $21.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Dialogue:1-3.score: 438.8
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  24. Elke U. Weber & Eric J. Johnson (2011). Query Theory: Knowing What We Want by Arguing with Ourselves. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):91-92.score: 438.8
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  25. Terence Cuneo (2006). Saying What We Mean: An Argument Against Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:35-71.score: 438.8
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  26. Claire Katz (2011). Jew-Greek Redux: Knowing What We Do Not Know On Diane Perpich's The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Philosophia 1 (1):103-117.score: 438.8
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  27. Jesús Navarro-Reyes (2009). Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background. Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.score: 438.8
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  28. Jesús Navarro Reyes (2009). Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background. Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.score: 438.8
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  29. Bill Streever (2002). What We Mean by “Restoration”. Bioscience 52 (12):1146.score: 438.8
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  30. Rob Cross, Andrew Parker, Laurence Prusak & Stephen P. Borgatti (2006). Knowing What We Know: Supporting Knowledge Creation and Sharing in Social Networks. In Laurence Prusak & Eric Matson (eds.), Knowledge Management and Organizational Learning: A Reader. Oup Oxford.score: 438.8
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  31. S. McMillan & D. J. Simpson (2006). Editors' Introduction: Does It Really Matter What We Mean by the Word or Concept Education? Journal of Thought 41 (3):3.score: 438.8
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  32. Anne Stevenson (2004). Saying What We Mean. In Emily R. Grosholz (ed.), The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir. Clarendon Press.score: 438.8
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  33. Jeff Johnson (2000). Knowing and Saying We Know. Essays in Philosophy 1 (2):4.score: 438.0
    In these pages I resurrect a dispute that has, sadly I think, now gone by the wayside in current thinking about knowledge, among other things. I mean the dispute that we find Wittgenstein entertaining in certain sections of _On Certainty_ and the dispute that led John Searle to argue that there is such a thing as the assertion fallacy. The dispute turns on what lessons we can draw from the fact that in certain examples it would be fishy (...)
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  34. Jorge J. E. Gracia (2001). How Can We Know What God Means? The Interpretation of Religion. Palgrave.score: 437.0
    Explains the general conditions under which one can understand what God means through texts regarded as divinely revealed.
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  35. Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford (2011). What We Tend to Mean. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1 (46):20-33.score: 436.5
    In this paper a dispositional account of meaning is offered. Words might dispose towards a particular or ‘literal’ meaning, but whether this meaning is actually conveyed when expressed will depend on a number of factors, such as speaker’s intentions, the context of the utterance and the background knowledge of the hearer. It is thus argued that no meaning is guaranteed or necessitated by the words used.
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  36. Stewart Shapiro (2009). We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident: But What Do We Mean by That? Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):175-207.score: 436.5
    At the beginning of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (§2) [1884], Frege observes that “it is in the nature of mathematics to prefer proof, where proof is possible”. This, of course, is true, but thinkers differ on why it is that mathematicians prefer proof. And what of propositions for which no proof is possible? What of axioms? This talk explores various notions of self-evidence, and the role they play in various foundational systems, notably those of Frege and Zermelo. I (...)
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  37. D. Micah Hester (2004). What Must We Mean by “Community”? A Processive Account. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (5-6):423-437.score: 436.5
    The term community in ethics and bioethics traditionally has been used to designate either a specific kind of moral relationship available to rational agents or, in contrast, the context in which any sense of rational agency can even be understood. I argue that bioethics is better served when both selves and community are expressed through a more processive language that highlights the functional character of such concepts. In particular, I see the turn to processive community in bioethics as a turn (...)
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  38. Scott Soames (2007). What We Know Now That We Didn't Know Then: Reply to Critics of the Age of Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 135 (3):461 - 478.score: 432.0
    Author’s response to critical essays by Brian Weatherson, Alex Byrne, and Stephen Yablo on Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2 The Age of Meaning.
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  39. Walter G. Rosen (1994). Biology: How Do We Know What We Know? Science as a Way of Knowing: The Foundations of Modern Biology John A. Moore. Bioscience 44 (5):364-366.score: 431.3
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  40. Daniel Sarewitz (2010). Normal Science and Limits on Knowledge: What We Seek to Know, What We Choose Not to Know, What We Don't Bother Knowing. Social Research: An International Quarterly 77 (3):997-1010.score: 431.3
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  41. Margaret C. Jacob (2014). How Radical Was the Enlightenment? What Do We Mean by Radical? Diametros 40:99-114.score: 430.5
    The Radical Enlightenment has been much discussed and its original meaning somewhat distorted. In 1981 my concept of the storm that unleashed a new, transnational intellectual movement possessed a strong contextual and political element that I believed, and still believe, to be critically important. Idealist accounts of enlightened ideas that divorce them from politics leave out the lived quality of the new radicalism born in reaction to monarchical and clerical absolutism. Taking the religious impulse seriously and working to defang it (...)
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  42. Robert Stalnaker, Knowing Where We Are, and What It is Like.score: 427.5
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  43. James Conant (1989). Must We Show What We Cannot Mean? In R. Fleming & M. Payne (eds.), The Senses of Stanley Cavell. Bucknell. 242--83.score: 427.5
  44. Stanley Cavell (1958). Must We Mean What We Say? Inquiry 1 (1-4):172 – 212.score: 427.5
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  45. Alexander Gabovich & Vladimir Kuznetsov (2013). What Do We Mean When Using the Acronym 'BCS'? European Journal of Physics 34 (2):371-382.score: 427.5
    The history and use of the acronym ‘BCS’ (named after Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer) in the science of superconductivity is traced and analysed. It is shown that a number of different theories are labelled ‘BCS’. The confusion in the application of the term ‘BCS’ is shown to be common because the term ‘theory’ itself is not precisely defined in physics. Recommendations are given to physics readers and students on how to distinguish between various theories referred to as ‘BCS’. Contributions from (...)
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  46. Stanley Cavell (1964). Must We Mean What We Say? In V. C. Chappell (ed.), Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method. Dover Publications. 172 – 212.score: 427.5
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  47. Stanley Cavell (2002). Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays. Cambridge University Press.score: 427.5
    Reissued with a new preface, this famous collection of essays covers a remarkably wide range of philosophical issues, including essays on Wittgenstein, Austin, Kierkegaard, and the philosophy of language, and extending beyond philosophy into discussions of music and drama. Previous edition hb ISBN (1976): 0-521-21116-6 Previous edition pb ISBN (1976): 0-521-29048-1.
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  48. Adam Z. J. Zeman (2006). What Do We Mean by "Conscious" and "Aware?". Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):356-376.score: 427.5
  49. Claudia Card (1988). Women's Voices and Ethical Ideals: Must We Mean What We Say?:Women and Moral Theory. Eva Feder Kittay, Diana T. Meyers. Ethics 99 (1):125-.score: 427.5
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  50. Francis H. Bradley (1895). What Do We Mean by the Intensity of Psychical States. Mind 4 (13):1-27.score: 427.5
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