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Kris McDaniel [35]Kristopher McDaniel [2]
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Profile: Kris McDaniel (Syracuse University)
  1. Ben Caplan & Kris McDaniel, Mereological Myths.
     
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  2. Kris McDaniel (forthcoming). Compositional Pluralism and Composition as Identity. In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Let’s start with compositional pluralism. Elsewhere I’ve defended compositional pluralism, which we can provisionally understand as the doctrine that there is more than one basic parthood relation. (You might wonder what I mean by “basic”. We’ll discuss this in a bit.) On the metaphysics I currently favor, there are regions of spacetime and material objects, each of which enjoy bear a distinct parthood relation to members of their own kind. Perhaps there are other kinds of objects that enjoy a kind (...)
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  3. Kris McDaniel (forthcoming). Edith Stein: On the Problem of Empathy. In Eric Schliesser (ed.), Ten Neglected Philosophical Classics. Oxford.
    I will discuss Stein’s first major philosophical work, On the Problem of Empathy. I’ll first present some of the background context to the composition of this work and then discuss some of the themes of the work that I find intriguing.
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  4. Kris McDaniel (2014). A Moorean View of the Value of Lives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46.
    Can we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the value bearers are (...)
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  5. Kris McDaniel (2013). A Philosophical Model of the Relation Between Things in Themselves and Appearances. Noûs 48 (1).
    I introduce a methodology for doing the history of philosophy called philosophical modeling. I then employ this methodology to give a theory of Kant's distinction between things in themselves and appearances. This theory models Kant's distinction on the distinction between a constituting object and the object it constitutes.
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  6. Kris McDaniel (2013). Degrees of Being. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (19).
    Let us agree that everything that there is exists, and that to be, to be real, and to exist are one and the same. Does everything that there is exist to the same degree? Or do some things exist more than others? Are there gradations of being? I argue that some entities exist more than others. Moreover, many of the notions in play in contemporary metaphysical discourse, such as fundamentality, perfect naturalness, and grounding ought to be cashed out in terms (...)
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  7. Kris McDaniel (2013). Existence and Number. Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):209-228.
    The Frege-Russell view is that existence is a second-order property rather than a property of individuals. One of the most compelling arguments for this view is based on the premise that there is an especially close connection between existence and number. The most promising version of this argument is by C.J.F Williams (1981, 1992). In what follows, I argue that this argument fails. I then defend an account according to which both predications of number and existence attribute properties to individuals.
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  8. Kris McDaniel (2013). Heidegger's Metaphysics of Material Beings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):332-357.
    This paper discusses Heidegger's distinction between entities that are present-at-hand and entities that are ready-to-hand. Contrary to common consensus, I argue that this distinction is a metaphysical distinction. Specifically, no ready-to-hand object is numerically identical with a present-at-hand object.
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  9. Kris McDaniel (2013). Pasnau on Category Realism: Author Meets Critics, Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
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  10. Theodore Bach, Richmond Campbell, Victor Kumar, Justin Clarke-Doane, Glen Pettigrove, Christopher Heath Wellman, Jonathan Crowe, Lawrence J. Hatab, Kris McDaniel & Robert Kane (2012). 10. Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory (Pp. 440-444). Ethics 122 (2).
     
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  11. Kris McDaniel (2012). Hare , Caspar . On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Pp. 144. $30.95 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (2):403-410.
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  12. Kristopher McDaniel (2011). Trenton Merricks' Truth and Ontology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):203-211.
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  13. Kris McDaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
    Recently, I’ve championed the doctrine that fundamentally different sorts of things exist in fundamentally different ways.1 On this view, what it is for an entity to be can differ across ontological categories.2 Although historically this doctrine was very popular, and several important challenges to this doctrine have been dealt with, I suspect that contemporary metaphysicians will continue to treat this view with suspicion until it is made clearer when one is warranted in positing different modes of existence.3 I address this (...)
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  14. Kris McDaniel (2010). Being and Almost Nothingness. Noûs 44 (4):628-649.
    I am attracted to ontological pluralism, the doctrine that some things exist in a different way than other things.1 For the ontological pluralist, there is more to learn about an object’s existential status than merely whether it is or is not: there is still the question of how that entity exists. By contrast, according to the ontological monist, either something is or it isn’t, and that’s all there is say about a thing’s existential status. We appear to be to be (...)
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  15. Kris McDaniel (2010). Composition as Identity Does Not Entail Universalism. Erkenntnis 73 (1):97-100.
    Composition as Identity is the view that, in some sense, a whole is numerically identical with its parts. Compositional universalism is the view that, whenever there are some things, there is a whole composed of those things. Despite the claims of many philosophers, these views are logically independent. Here, I will show that composition as identity does not entail compositional universalism.
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  16. Kris McDaniel, John M. E. Mctaggart. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy comprehensive article on J.M.E. MacTaggart, with special focus on his methodology for philosophy, his metaphysical system, and his ethics.
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  17. Kris McDaniel (2010). Parts and Wholes. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):412-425.
    Philosophical questions concerning parts and wholes have received a tremendous amount of the attention of contemporary analytic metaphysicians. In what follows, I discuss some of the central questions. The questions to be discussed are: how general is parthood? Are there different kinds of parthood or ways to be a part? Can two things be composed of the same parts? When does composition occur? Can material objects gain or lose parts? What is the logical form of the parthood relation enjoyed by (...)
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  18. Kris McDaniel (2009). Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):325-331.
    The problem of qualitative heterogeneity is to explain how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation across its spatial or temporal axes, given that it lacks both spatial and temporal parts. I discuss how friends of extended simples should address the problem of qualitative heterogeneity. I present a series of arguments designed to show that rather than appealing to fundamental distributional properties one should appeal to tiny and short-lived tropes. Along the way, issues relevant to debates about material composition, persistence (...)
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  19. Kris McDaniel (2009). Structure-Making. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):251-274.
    Friends of states of affairs and structural universals appeal to a relation, structure-making, that is allegedly a kind of composition relation: structure-making ?builds? facts out of particulars and universals, and ?builds? structural universals out of unstructured universals. D. M. Armstrong, an eminent champion of structures, endorses two interesting theses concerning composition. First, that structure-making is a composition relation. Second, that it is not the only (fundamental) composition relation: Armstrong also believes in a mode of composition that he calls mereological, and (...)
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  20. Kris McDaniel (2009). Ways of Being. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    There are many kinds of beings – stones, persons, artifacts, numbers, propositions – but are there also many kinds of being? The world contains a variety of objects, each of which exists – but do some objects exist in different ways? The historically popular answer is yes. This answer is suggested by the Aristotelian slogan that “being is said in many ways”, and according to some interpretations is Aristotle’s view.1 Variants of this slogan were championed by medieval philosophers, such as (...)
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  21. Kris McDaniel (2008). Against Composition as Identity. Analysis 68 (298):128–133.
    The claim that composition is identity is an intuition in search of a formulation. The farmer’s field is made of six plots, and in some sense is nothing more than those six plots. According to the friend of composition as identity, the six plots are identical with the farmer’s field.1 Some philosophers, such as Peter van Inwagen (1994), have claimed that the view that composition is identity is incoherent. Van Inwagen cites the apparent ungrammaticality of sentences like ‘the six plots (...)
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  22. Kris McDaniel & Ben Bradley (2008). Desires. Mind 117 (466):267 - 302.
    It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires. In this paper we examine extant attempts to analyse conditional desire. From the failures of those attempts, we draw a moral that leads us to the correct account of conditional desires. We then extend the account of conditional desires to an account of all desires. It emerges that desires do not have the structure that they have been thought to have. We attempt to (...)
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  23. Kris McDaniel (2007). 8. Brutal Simples. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:233.
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  24. Kris McDaniel (2007). Distance and Discrete Space. Synthese 155 (1):157 - 162.
    Let us say that space is discrete if and only if every finite extended region of space is composed of finitely many atomic regions of space. I assume here that regions of space are individuals rather than sets of points, and have mereological structure; their parts are all and only their sub-regions. A region of space is an atomic region if and only if it has no proper parts, i.e., if and only if it is a mereological atom. In what (...)
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  25. Kris McDaniel (2007). Extended Simples. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
    I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.
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  26. Kris McDaniel (2006). Gunky Objects in a Simple World. Philo 9 (1):39-46.
    Suppose that a material object is gunky: all of its parts are located in space, and each of its parts has a proper part. Does it follow from this hypothesis that the space in which that object resides must itself be gunky? I argue that it does not. There is room for gunky objects in a space that decomposes without remainder into mereological simples.
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  27. Kris McDaniel (2006). Modal Realisms. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):303–331.
    Possibilism—the view that there are non-actual, merely possible entities—is a surprisingly resilient doctrine.1 One particularly hardy strand of possibilism—the modal realism championed by David Lewis—continues to attract both foes who seek to demonstrate its falsity (or at least stare its advocates into apostasy) and friends who hope to defend modal realism (or, when necessary, modify modal realism so as to avoid problematic objections).2 Although I am neither a foe nor friend of modal realism (but some of my best friends are!), (...)
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  28. Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, Richard Feldman & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.) (2005). The Good, the Right, Life And Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman. Ashgate.
  29. Kristopher McDaniel (2005). Review of D.M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8).
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  30. Kris McDaniel (2004). Modal Realism with Overlap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):137 – 152.
    In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap , the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism , which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal analogue (...)
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  31. Kris McDaniel (2003). Against Maxcon Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):265 – 275.
    In a recent paper titled 'Simples', Ned Markosian asks and answers the Simple Question, which is, 'under what circumstances is it true of some object that it has no proper parts?' Markosian's answer to the simple question is MaxCon , which states that an object is a simple if and only if it is a maximally continuous object. I present several arguments against MaxCon.
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  32. Kris McDaniel (2003). No Paradox of Multi-Location. Analysis 63 (4):309–311.
    In a recent paper, Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe (2003)1 argue that multilocation is impossible. An object enjoys multi-location just in case it is wholly present at more than one (distinct) space-time region (106). One popular view that is committed to multi-located objects is endurantism, the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each time they are located.2 So if Barker and Dowe are right, endurantism is in big trouble.
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  33. Kris McDaniel (2002). Phil Dowe, Physical Causation. Erkenntnis 56 (2):258-263.
  34. Kris McDaniel (2001). Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):269-290.
    I argue that a solution to puzzles concerning the relationship ofobjects and their properties – a version of the `bundle' theory ofparticulars according to which ordinary objects are mereologicalfusions of monadic and relational tropes – is also a solution topuzzles of material constitution involving the allegedco-location of material objects. Additionally, two argumentsthat have played a prominent role in shaping the current debate,Mark Heller's argument for Four Dimensionalism and Peter vanInwagen's argument against Mereological Universalism, are shownto be unsound given this version (...)
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