19 found
Sort by:
  1. Krista Lawlor (2013). Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims. Oup Oxford.
    What is an assurance? What do we do when we claim to know? Krista Lawlor offers an original account based on the work of J. L. Austin. She addresses challenges to contextualist semantic theories; resolves closure-based skeptical paradoxes; and helps us tread the line between acknowledging our fallibility and skepticism.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Krista Lawlor (2013). Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation. Inquiry 57 (1):1-27.
    (2014). Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation. Inquiry: Vol. 57, The Nature of Belief, pp. 1-27. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.858414.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Krista Lawlor (2013). New Essays on Singular Thought, by Robin Jeshion (Ed.). Mind 122 (486):fzt017.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Krista Lawlor (2010). Varieties of Coreference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):485-495.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Krista Lawlor (2009). Knowing What One Wants. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):47-75.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Krista Lawlor (2009). Memory. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Krista Lawlor (2009). Review of Simon J. Evnine, Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Krista Lawlor & John Perry (2008). Moore's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):421 – 427.
    G. E. Moore famously noted that saying 'I went to the movies, but I don't believe it' is absurd, while saying 'I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it' is not in the least absurd. The problem is to explain this fact without supposing that the semantic contribution of 'believes' changes across first-person and third-person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic. We offer a new solution to the paradox. Our solution is that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Krista Lawlor (2007). Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction - by Jos� Luis Berm�Dez. Philosophical Books 48 (2):180-182.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Krista Lawlor (2007). A Notional Worlds Approach to Confusion. Mind and Language 22 (2):150–172.
    People often become confused, mistaking one thing for another, or taking two things to be the same. How should we assign semantic values to confused statements? Recently, philosophers have taken a pessimistic view of confusion, arguing that understanding confused belief demands significant departure from our normal interpretive practice. I argue for optimism. Our semantic treatment of confusion can be a lot like our semantic treatment of empty names. Surprisingly, perhaps, the resulting semantics lets us keep in place more of our (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Krista Lawlor (2005). Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):21-36.
    Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to abandon modes of presentation. Making sense of confused thought (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Krista Lawlor (2005). Enough is Enough: Pretense and Invariance in the Semantics of "Knows That". Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):211–236.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
    Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Krista Lawlor (2004). Reason and the Past: The Role of Rationality in Diachronic Self-Knowledge. Synthese 145 (3):467-495.
    Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Krista Lawlor (2003). Deliberation and Agential Authority: A Rejoinder to Ferrero. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):579 – 584.
    My reply to Ferrero is divided into three parts: a recap of my argument and claim, a response to Ferrero's central criticism, and, finally, a question about his attempted defense of the authorship account.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Krista Lawlor (2003). Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
    Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Krista Lawlor (2002). Memory, Anaphora, and Content Preservation. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):97-119.
    Tyler Burge defends the idea that memory preserves beliefswith their justifications, so that memory's role in inferenceadds no new justificatory demands. Against Burge's view,Christensen and Kornblith argue that memory is reconstructiveand so introduces an element of a posteriori justificationinto every inference. I argue that Burge is right,memory does preserve content, but to defend this viewwe need to specify a preservative mechanism. Toward thatend, I develop the idea that there is something worthcalling anaphoric thinking, which preserves content inBurge's sense of ``content (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Krista Lawlor, Anaphora Memory & Oron Shagrir (2002). Thomas D. Bontly/The Supervenience Argument Generalizes 75–96. Philosophical Studies 109 (279).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Krista Lawlor (2001). New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts. Garland Pub..
    This book defends a novel theory of singular concepts, emphasizing the pragmatic requirements of singular concept possession and arguing that these requirements must be understood to institute traditions and policies of thought.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation