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  1. Gustaf Arrhenius & Krister Bykvist, And.
    Several people have helped us to write this essay. Our greatest debt is to Wlodek Rabinowicz, who has been an excellent supervisor of the project. He spent a lot of time and energy reading drafts of the essay. Without his painstaking criticism and helpful comments this essay would lack in precision, relevance, and logical correctness. Earlier drafts of the essay were discussed in Sven Danielsson and Wlodek Rabinowicz's seminar at the Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala. The participants of the (...)
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  2. Krister Bykvist, Objective Versus Subjective Moral Oughts.
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  3. Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2012). Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.
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  4. Krister Bykvist (2010). Can Unstable Preferences Provide a Stable Standard of Well-Being? Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
    How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not stable across worlds? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. The general problem is to find a stable standard of well-being when the standard is set by preferences that are not stable. In this paper, I shall show that the (...)
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  5. Krister Bykvist (2010). Interrogating Ethics. The Philosophers' Magazine 49 (49):110-111.
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  6. Krister Bykvist (2010). John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), Pp. 286. Utilitas 22 (4):497-500.
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  7. Krister Bykvist (2009). And Intergenerational Justice. In Gosseries Axel & Meyers L. (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oxford University Press. 301.
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  8. Krister Bykvist (2009). Preference Formation and Intergenerational Justice. In Axel Gosseries & Lukas H. Meyer (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oup Oxford.
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  9. Krister Bykvist (2009). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum.
    Introduction -- The nature and assessment of moral theories -- What is utilitarianism? -- Well-being -- Utilitarian aggregation -- A user-friendly guide to action? -- Is utilitarianism too demanding? -- Is utilitarianism too permissive? -- The way outcomes are brought about -- The place of rules in utilitarianism.
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  10. Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson (2009). Expressivism and Moral Certitude. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...)
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  11. Krister Bykvist (2007). Comments on Dennis McKerlie's 'Rational Choice, Changes in Values Over Time, and Well-Being'. Utilitas 19 (1):73-77.
  12. Krister Bykvist (2007). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, Edited by Michael Byron. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 245 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):240-245.
  13. Krister Bykvist (2007). The Benefits of Coming Into Existence. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):335 - 362.
    This paper argues that we can benefit or harm people by creating them, but only in the sense that we can create things that are good or bad for them. What we cannot do is to confer comparative benefits and harms to people by creating them or failing to create them. You are not better off (or worse off) created than you would have been had you not been created, for nothing has value for you if you do not exist, (...)
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  14. Krister Bykvist (2007). The Good, the Bad, and the Ethically Neutral. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):97-105.
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  15. Krister Bykvist (2007). Violations of Normative Invariance: Some Thoughts on Shifty Oughts. Theoria 73 (2):98-120.
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  16. Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi (2007). Does Thought Imply Ought? Analysis 67 (296):277–285.
  17. Krister Bykvist (2006). Prudence for Changing Selves. Utilitas 18 (3):264-283.
    What is the prudentially right thing to do in situations in which our actions will shape our preferences? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. This is the problem I will deal with in this article. I will begin by explaining why preferences matter to prudence. I will then go on to discuss a (...)
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  18. Krister Bykvist (2006). What Are Desires Good For? Towards a Coherent Endorsement Theory. Ratio 19 (3):286–304.
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  19. Krister Bykvist, Garrett Cullity, Åsa Carlson, Johan Brännmark, Klemens Kappel, Ulrik Kihlbom, Ian Law, Hans Mathlein, Derek Parfit & Ingmar Persson (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake1. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 115.
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  20. Krister Bykvist (2003). The Moral Relevance of Past Preferences. In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 115--136.
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  21. Krister Bykvist (2003). Normative Supervenience and Consequentialism. Utilitas 15 (01):27-.
    Act-consequentialism is usually taken to be the view that we ought to perform the act that will have the best consequences. But this definition ignores the possibility of various non-maximizing forms of act-consequentialism, e.g. satisficing theories that tell us to perform the act whose consequences will be good enough. What seems crucial to act-consequentialism is not that we ought to maximize value but that the normative status of alternative actions depends solely on the values of their outcomes. The purpose of (...)
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  22. Krister Bykvist (2002). Alternative Actions and the Spirit of Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 107 (1):45 - 68.
    The simple idea behind act-consequentialism isthat we ought to choose the action whoseoutcome is better than that of any alternativeaction. In a recent issue of this journal, ErikCarlson has argued that given a reasonableinterpretation of alternative actions thissimple idea cannot be upheld but that the newtheory he proposes nevertheless preserves theact-consequentialist spirit. My aim in thispaper is to show that Carlson is wrong on bothcounts. His theory, contrary to his ownintentions, is not an act-consequentialisttheory. By building on a theory formulated (...)
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  23. Krister Bykvist (2002). Sumner on Desires and Well-Being. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):475 - 490.
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  24. Krister Bykvist (2002). Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints:Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints. Ethics 112 (2):375-378.
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  25. Krister Bykvist (1999). All Time Preferences? Theoria 65 (1):36-54.
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  26. Krister Bykvist (1996). Utilitarian Deontologies? On Preference Utilitarianism and Agent-Relative Value. Theoria 62 (1-2):124-143.
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