59 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Kristie Miller [57]Kristie Lyn Miller [2]
See also:
Profile: Kristie Miller (University of Sydney)
Profile: Kristie Miller (University of Sydney)
  1.  149 DLs
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). The Physics of Extended Simples. Analysis 66 (3):222–226.
    The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians (Markosian 1998, 2004; Simons 2004; Parsons (2000) also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons (2004) goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples (henceforth just extended simples) are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty for these (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2.  129 DLs
    Sam Baron & Kristie Miller (forthcoming). Causation Sans Time. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is time necessary for causation? We argue that, given a counterfactual theory of causation, it is not. We defend this claim by considering cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. These cases involve laws of nature that govern entanglement. These laws make possible the evaluation of causal counterfactuals between space-like separated entangled particles. There is, for the proponent of a counterfactual theory of causation, a possible world in which causation but not time exists that can be reached by ‘stripping out’ (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3.  125 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2010). On the Concept of Sexual Perversion. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):808-830.
    Why has little progress been made in resolving the debate about the concept of sexual perversion? I suggest that the stalemate is due to misunderstandings and poor methodology. I develop a new methodology for resolving disputes about the correct analysis of the contents of concepts where the disputes have social and political ramifications. When deciding between competing analyses of a concept, we should not just consider facts about our inferential and judgemental dispositions with respect to that concept; we should also (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4.  95 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2009). Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics. Dialectica 63 (1):23-49.
    Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are universals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5.  91 DLs
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457 - 474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6.  84 DLs
    Sam Baron, Peter Evans & Kristie Miller (2010). From Timeless Physical Theory to Timelessness. Humana.Mente 13:35-59.
    This paper addresses the extent to which both Julian Barbour‘s Machian formulation of general relativity and his interpretation of canonical quantum gravity can be called timeless. We differentiate two types of timelessness in Barbour‘s (1994a, 1994b and 1999c). We argue that Barbour‘s metaphysical contention that ours is a timeless world is crucially lacking an account of the essential features of time—an account of what features our world would need to have if it were to count as being one in which (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7.  81 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2008). Thing and Object. Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89.
    There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8.  81 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2004). Enduring Special Relativity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):349-370.
    Endurantism is not inconsistent with the theory of special relativity, or so I shall argue. Endurantism is not committed to presentism, and thus not committed to a metaphysics that is at least prima facie inconsistent with special relativity. Nor is special relativity inconsistent with the idea that objects are wholly present at a time just if all of their parts co-exist at that time. For the endurantist notion of co-existence in terms of which “wholly present” is defined, is not, I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9.  75 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2009). Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10.  72 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2004). The Twins’ Paradox and Temporal Passage. Analysis 64 (283):203–206.
    In a recent paper in this journal, McCall and Lowe (2003) argue that an understanding of Special Relativity reveals that the A theorist’s notion of temporal passage is consistent with the B theory of time. They arrive at this conclusion by considering the twins’ paradox, where one of two twins (T) travels to Alpha Centauri and back and upon her return has aged 30 years, while her earth-bound twin (S) has aged 40 years. This paper argues that their account of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11.  71 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2008). Backwards Causation, Time, and the Open Future. Metaphysica 9 (2):173-191.
    Here are some intuitions we have about the nature of space and time. There is something fundamentally different about the past, present, and future. What is definitive of the past is that the past events are fixed. What is definitive of the future is that future events are not fixed. What is definitive of the present is that it marks the objective ontological border between the past and the future and, by doing so, instantiates a particularly salient phenomenological property of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12.  64 DLs
    Sam Baron, Kristie Miller & James Norton (2014). Groundless Truth. Inquiry 57 (2):175-195.
    We defend two claims: (1) if one is attracted to a strong non-maximalist view about truthmaking, then it is natural to construe this as the view that there exist fundamental truths; (2) despite considerable aversion to fundamental truths, there is as yet no viable independent argument against them. That is, there is no argument against the existence of fundamental truths that is independent of any more specific arguments against the ontology accepted by the strong non-maximalist. Thus there is no argument (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13.  63 DLs
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). The Loneliness of Stages. Analysis 64 (3):235–242.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14.  62 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2006). Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity. Erkenntnis 64 (2):223 - 230.
    I argue that for those who follow Evans in finding indeterminacy of de re identity statements problematic, ontic vagueness within a three-dimensionalist metaphysics will raise some problems that are not faced by the four-dimensionalist. For the types of strategies used to avoid de re indeterminacy within the context of ontic vagueness at-at-time, that is, spatial vagueness, are problematic within a three-dimensionalist framework when put to use within the context of ontic vagueness across-time, that is temporal vagueness.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15.  61 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2005). The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism. Erkenntnis 62 (1):91 - 117.
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16.  55 DLs
    Sam Baron & Kristie Miller (2014). Causation in a Timeless World. Synthese 191 (12):2867-2886.
    This paper offers a new way to evaluate counterfactual conditionals on the supposition that actually, there is no time. We then parlay this method of evaluation into a way of evaluating causal claims. Our primary aim is to preserve, at a minimum, the assertibility of certain counterfactual and causal claims once time has been excised from reality. This is an important first step in a more general reconstruction project that has two important components. First, recovering our ordinary language claims involving (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17.  52 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2006). Morality in a Branching Universe. Disputatio 1 (20):1 - 21.
    In most cases, we think that what settles what act it is right to perform is sensitive to what we take the facts about the world to be. But those facts include many controversial metaphysical claims about the world. I argue that depending on what metaphysical model we take to be correct, we will have very different views about what the right actions are. In particular, I argue that if a particular metaphysical model — the branching universe model — is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18.  39 DLs
    Kristie Miller & Michael Duncan (2015). Modal Persistence and Modal Travel. Ratio 28 (3):241-255.
    We argue that there is an interesting modal analogue of temporal persistence, namely modal persistence, and an interesting modal analogue of time travel, namely modal travel. We explicate each of these notions and then argue that there are plausible conditions under which some ordinary objects modally persist. We go on to consider whether it is plausible that any modally persistent objects also modally travel.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19.  39 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2006). Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):309-334.
    It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20.  38 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242-253.
    A plausible desideratum for an account of the nature of objects, at, and across time, is that it accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness without locating vagueness in the world. A series of arguments have attempted to show that while universalist perdurantism -- which combines a perdurantist account of persistence with an unrestricted mereological account of composition -- meets this desideratum, endurantist accounts do not. If endurantists reject unrestricted composition then they must hold that vagueness is ontological. But if they embrace (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21.  37 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2013). “Personal Identity” Minus the Persons. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):91-109.
    This paper defends a version of strong conventionalism minus the ontological commitments of that view. It defends the claim that strictly speaking there are no persons, whilst explicating how to make sense of talk that is about (or purportedly about) persons, by appealing to features in common to conventionalist accounts of personal identity. This view has the many benefits of conventionalist accounts in being flexible enough to deal with problem cases, whilst also avoiding the various worries associated with the existence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22.  37 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2010). Three Routes to Contingentism in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):965-977.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23.  36 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2010). Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):567-593.
    Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24.  35 DLs
    Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). There Is No Simpliciter Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249 - 278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25.  34 DLs
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499 - 534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26.  32 DLs
    Tom Dougherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (2015). Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story From Sydney. Hypatia 30 (2):467-474.
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27.  27 DLs
    Sam Baron, Richard Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller (2013). What is a Negative Property? Philosophy 88 (01):33-54.
    This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28.  27 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2008). Essential Stuff. Ratio 21 (1):55–63.
    Here is a common view. There exist things, and there exists stuff, where roughly, ‘thing’ is a count noun, and ‘stuff’ is a mass noun. Syntactically, ‘thing’ functions as a singular referring term that takes ‘a’ and ‘every’ and is subject to pluralisation, while ‘stuff’ functions as a plural referring term that takes ‘some’ and is not subject to pluralisation. Hence there exists a thing, and some stuff. Usual versions of the common view endorse two principles about portions of stuff. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29.  27 DLs
    Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (2015). What is Temporal Error Theory? Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2427-2444.
    Much current debate in the metaphysics of time is between A-theorists and B-theorists. Central to this debate is the assumption that time exists and that the task of metaphysics is to catalogue time’s features. Relatively little consideration has been given to an _error theory_ about time. Since there is very little extant work on temporal error theory the goal of this paper is simply to lay the groundwork to allow future discussion of the relative merits of such a view. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30.  26 DLs
    Kristie Lyn Miller (2006). Issues in Theoretical Diversity: Persistence, Composition, and Time. Springer.
    Our world is full of composite objects that persist through time: dogs, persons, chairs and rocks. But in virtue of what do a bunch of little objects get to compose some bigger object, and how does that bigger object persist through time? This book aims to answer these questions, but it does so by looking at accounts of composition and persistence through a new methodological lens. It asks the question: what does it take for two theories to be genuinely different, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31.  25 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2005). Time Travel and the Open Future. Disputatio 1 (19):223 - 232.
    In this paper, I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open futureobjective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32.  22 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2006). Non-Mereological Universalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):404–422.
    In this paper I develop a version of universalism that is non-mereological. Broadly speaking, non-mereological universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary set of objects and times, there is a persisting object which, at each of those times, will be constituted by those of the objects that exist at that time. I consider two general versions of non-mereological universalism, one which takes basic simples to be enduring objects, and the other which takes simples to be instantaneous objects. This yields (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33.  21 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2013). Properties in a Contingentist's Domain. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):225-245.
    This article attempts to make sense of property contingentism, the view that the metaphysical nature of properties is contingent. That is, it is contingent whether properties are universals or tropes or some other kind of entity. The article argues that even if one thinks that necessities are exhausted by conceptual truths and a posteriori necessities, the sort of methodology that can lead one to endorse contingentism in various domains in metaphysics does not give us good grounds to suppose that the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34.  20 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2012). Mathematical Contingentism. Erkenntnis 77 (3):335-359.
    Platonists and nominalists disagree about whether mathematical objects exist. But they almost uniformly agree about one thing: whatever the status of the existence of mathematical objects, that status is modally necessary. Two notable dissenters from this orthodoxy are Hartry Field, who defends contingent nominalism, and Mark Colyvan, who defends contingent Platonism. The source of their dissent is their view that the indispensability argument provides our justification for believing in the existence, or not, of mathematical objects. This paper considers whether commitment (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35.  18 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2005). What is Metaphysical Equivalence? Philosophical Papers 34 (1):45-74.
    Abstract Theories are metaphysically equivalent just if there is no fact of the matter that could render one theory true and the other false. In this paper I argue that if we are judiciously to resolve disputes about whether theories are equivalent or not, we need to develop testable criteria that will give us epistemic access to the obtaining of the relation of metaphysical equivalence holding between those theories. I develop such ?diagnostic? criteria. I argue that correctly inter-translatable theories are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36.  18 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2007). Immaterial Beings. The Monist 90 (3):349-371.
    This paper defends a view that falls somewhere between the two extremes of inflationary and deflationary accounts, and it does so by rejecting the initial conceptualisation of holes in terms of absences. Once we move away from this conception, I argue, we can see that there are no special metaphysical problems associated with holes. Rather, whatever one’s preferred metaphysics of paradigm material objects, that account can equally be applied to holes. This means that like the deflationist, I am entity monist: (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37.  17 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2005). Blocking the Path From Vagueness to Four Dimensionalism. Ratio 18 (3):317–331.
    There is a general form of an argument which I call the ‘argument from vagueness’ which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. I argue that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38.  16 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2005). A New Definition of Endurance. Theoria 71 (4):309-332.
    In this paper I present a new definition of endurance. I argue that the three-dimensionalist ought to adopt a different understanding from the four-dimensionalist, of what it is to have a part simpliciter. With this new understanding it becomes possible to define endurance in a manner that both preserves the central endurantist intuitions, whilst avoiding commitment to any controversial metaphysical theses. Furthermore, since this endurantist definition is a mereological one, there is an elegant symmetry between the definitions of endurance and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39.  15 DLs
    Kristie Lyn Miller (2014). Defending Substantivism About Disputes in the Metaphysics of Composition. Journal of Philosophy 111 (9/10):529-556.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40.  15 DLs
    Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. Topoi 34 (1):201-216.
    This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41.  14 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2009). Stuff. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):1 - 18.
    Linguistically, we distinguish between thing terms and stuff terms, where, roughly, "thing" is a count noun, and "stuff" is a mass noun. Syntactically, "thing" functions as a singular referring term, that is, a term that refers to a single "entity" and hence takes "a" and "every" and is subject to pluralization, while "stuff" functions as a plural referring term, that is, it refers to a plurality of "entities" and hence takes "some" and is not subject to pluralization. There exists a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42.  14 DLs
    Samuel Baron, John Cusbert, Matt Farr, Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences. Philosophy Compass 10 (8):560-571.
    Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43.  12 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2010). The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency. Erkenntnis 73 (2):211 - 235.
    There is a good deal of disagreement about composition. There is firstorder disagreement: there are radically different answers to the special composition question—the question of under what circumstances the xs compose a y. There is second-order disagreement: there are different answers to the question of whether first-order disagreement is real or merely semantic. Virtually all disputants with respect to both the first-and second-order issues agree that the answer or answers to the special composition question will take the form of a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44.  10 DLs
    Sam Baron, Richard Copley-Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller (2013). What is a Negative Property? Philosophy 88 (1):33-54.
    This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45.  9 DLs
    Sam Baron, Tom Dougherty & Kristie Miller (2015). Why Is There Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors? Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
  46.  9 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2013). Prudence and Person-Stages. Inquiry 48 (3):403-417.
    Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47.  8 DLs
    Tom Dougherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller, Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors: A Map of the Hypotheses and a Survey of the Evidence.
    Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48.  7 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2013). Times, Worlds and Locations. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):221-227.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49.  7 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2013). The Growing Block, Presentism, and Eternalism. In Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50.  7 DLs
    Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person-directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in part (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 59