73 found
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Kristie Miller [71]Kristie Lyn Miller [2]
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Profile: Kristie Miller (University of Sydney)
Profile: Kristie Miller (University of Sydney)
  1.  74
    Kristie Miller (2010). Contingentism in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):965-977.
    In a lot of domains in metaphysics the tacit assumption has been that whichever metaphysical principles turn out to be true, these will be necessarily true. Let us call necessitarianism about some domain the thesis that the right metaphysics of that domain is necessary. Necessitarianism has flourished. This paper considers why this is so and considers domains in which contingentism has been defended.
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  2.  59
    Tom Doherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (2015). Why is There Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors? Evidence of a Pre-University Effect. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    Why does female under- representation emerge during undergraduate education? At the University of Sydney, we surveyed students before and after their first philosophy course. We failed to find any evidence that this course disproportionately discouraged female students from continuing in philosophy relative to male students. Instead, we found evidence of an interaction effect between gender and existing attitudes about philosophy coming into tertiary education that appears at least partially responsible for this poor retention. At the first lecture, disproportionately few female (...)
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  3.  91
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2015). On Metaphysical Analysis. In Jonathan Schaffer & Barry Loewer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Wiley Blackwell
    Metaphysics is largely an a priori business, albeit a business that is sensitive to the findings of the physical sciences. But sometimes what the physical sciences tell us about our own world underdetermines what we should think about the metaphysics of how things actually are, and even how they could be. This chapter has two aims. The first is to defend a particular conception of the methodology of a priori metaphysics by, in part, exemplifying that methodology and revealing its results. (...)
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  4.  97
    Samuel Baron, John Cusbert, Matt Farr, Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences. Philosophy Compass 10 (8):560-571.
    Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research.
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  5.  83
    Tom Dougherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (2015). Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story From Sydney. Hypatia 30 (2):467-474.
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the (...)
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  6.  36
    Kristie Miller (forthcoming). The Moving Spotlight Lights, and Having Lit, Moves On. Metascience:1-5.
    Ross Cameron’s the moving spotlight reminds me a bit of Pirates of the Caribbean. Although there are no pirates, it’s a rip roaring swashbuckling adventure. It’s a wild ride. Truth be told, many of us will probably conclude that it’s no more plausible an account of our world than is Pirates of the Caribbean a faithful depiction of piracy. I’m not a moving spotlight theorist. There aren’t many of them out there. I’m not even an A-theorist, though there are plenty (...)
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  7. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). The Physics of Extended Simples. Analysis 66 (3):222–226.
    The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty for these views lies in explaining why it is that the various subvolumes of (...)
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  8.  23
    Tom Dougherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (2015). Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors: A Map of the Hypotheses and a Survey of the Evidence. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-30.
    Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.
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  9.  53
    Sam Baron & Kristie Miller (forthcoming). Our Concept of Time. Philosophy and Psychology of Time.
    In this chapter we argue that our concept of time is a functional concept. We argue that our concept of time is such that time is whatever it is that plays the time role, and we spell out what we take the time role to consist in. We evaluate this proposal against a number of other analyses of our concept of time, and argue that it better explains various features of our dispositions as speakers and our practices as agents.
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  10.  77
    Kristie Miller (2005). The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism. Erkenntnis 62 (1):91 - 117.
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
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  11. Kristie Miller (2009). Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics. Dialectica 63 (1):23-49.
    Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are universals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This (...)
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  12.  6
    Kristie Miller (forthcoming). A Taxonomy of Views About Time in Buddhist and Western Philosophy. Philosophy East and West.
    We find the claim that time is not real in both western and eastern philosophical traditions. In what follows I will call the view that time does not exist temporal error theory. Temporal error theory was made famous in western analytic philosophy in the early 1900s by John McTaggart (1908) and, in much the same tradition, temporal error theory was subsequently defended by Gödel (1949). The idea that time is not real, however, stretches back much further than that. It is (...)
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  13. Sam Baron, Kristie Miller & James Norton (2014). Groundless Truth. Inquiry 57 (2):175-195.
    We defend two claims: (1) if one is attracted to a strong non-maximalist view about truthmaking, then it is natural to construe this as the view that there exist fundamental truths; (2) despite considerable aversion to fundamental truths, there is as yet no viable independent argument against them. That is, there is no argument against the existence of fundamental truths that is independent of any more specific arguments against the ontology accepted by the strong non-maximalist. Thus there is no argument (...)
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  14. Kristie Miller (2006). Morality in a Branching Universe. Disputatio 1 (20):1 - 21.
    In most cases, we think that what settles what act it is right to perform is sensitive to what we take the facts about the world to be. But those facts include many controversial metaphysical claims about the world. I argue that depending on what metaphysical model we take to be correct, we will have very different views about what the right actions are. In particular, I argue that if a particular metaphysical model — the branching universe model — is (...)
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  15. Kristie Miller (2013). The Growing Block, Presentism, and Eternalism. In Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell
    This paper has three main sections. The first section provides a general characterisation of presentism, eternalism and growing blockism. It presents a pair of core, defining claims that jointly capture each of these three views. This makes clear the respects in which the different views agree, and the respects in which they disagree, about the nature of time. The second section takes these characterisations and considers whether we really do have three distinct views, or whether defenders of these views are (...)
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  16. Sam Baron & Kristie Miller (forthcoming). Causation Sans Time. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is time necessary for causation? We argue that, given a counterfactual theory of causation, it is not. We defend this claim by considering cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. These cases involve laws of nature that govern entanglement. These laws make possible the evaluation of causal counterfactuals between space-like separated entangled particles. There is, for the proponent of a counterfactual theory of causation, a possible world in which causation but not time exists that can be reached by ‘stripping out’ (...)
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  17.  5
    Kristie Miller (forthcoming). Is Some Backwards Time Travel Inexplicable? American Philosophical Quarterly.
    It has been suggested that there is something worrisome, puzzling, or incomprehensible about the sorts of causal loops sometimes involved in backwards time travel. This paper disentangles two distinct puzzles and evaluates whether they provide us reason to find backwards time travel incomprehensible, inexplicable, or otherwise worrisome. The paper argues that they provide no such reason.
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  18.  47
    Sam Baron, Tom Dougherty & Kristie Miller (2015). Why Is There Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors? Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the (...)
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  19. Kristie Miller (2004). Enduring Special Relativity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):349-370.
    Endurantism is not inconsistent with the theory of special relativity, or so I shall argue. Endurantism is not committed to presentism, and thus not committed to a metaphysics that is at least prima facie inconsistent with special relativity. Nor is special relativity inconsistent with the idea that objects are wholly present at a time just if all of their parts co-exist at that time. For the endurantist notion of co-existence in terms of which “wholly present” is defined, is not, I (...)
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  20.  76
    Sam Baron & Kristie Miller (2014). Causation in a Timeless World. Synthese 191 (12):2867-2886.
    This paper offers a new way to evaluate counterfactual conditionals on the supposition that actually, there is no time. We then parlay this method of evaluation into a way of evaluating causal claims. Our primary aim is to preserve, at a minimum, the assertibility of certain counterfactual and causal claims once time has been excised from reality. This is an important first step in a more general reconstruction project that has two important components. First, recovering our ordinary language claims involving (...)
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  21.  24
    Kristie Miller (2005). Blocking the Path From Vagueness to Four Dimensionalism. Ratio 18 (3):317–331.
    There is a general form of an argument which I call the ‘argument from vagueness’ which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. I argue that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks (...)
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  22. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457 - 474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in (...)
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  23.  8
    Kristie Miller (2005). The Metaphysical Equivalence Of Three And Four Dimensionalism. Erkenntnis 62 (1):91-117.
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
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  24.  79
    Kristie Miller (2006). Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):309-334.
    It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents (...)
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  25.  53
    Sam Baron, Richard Copley-Coltheart, Raamy Majeed & Kristie Miller (2013). What is a Negative Property? Philosophy 88 (1):33-54.
    This paper seeks to differentiate negative properties from positive properties, with the aim of providing the groundwork for further discussion about whether there is anything that corresponds to either of these notions. We differentiate negative and positive properties in terms of their functional role, before drawing out the metaphysical implications of proceeding in this fashion. We show that if the difference between negative and positive properties tabled here is correct, then negative properties are metaphysically contentious entities, entities that many philosophers (...)
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  26. Kristie Miller (2005). Time Travel and the Open Future. Disputatio 1 (19):223 - 232.
    In this paper, I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open futureobjective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we (...)
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  27. Kristie Miller (2009). Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
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  28.  44
    Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242-253.
    A plausible desideratum for an account of the nature of objects, at, and across time, is that it accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness without locating vagueness in the world. A series of arguments have attempted to show that while universalist perdurantism -- which combines a perdurantist account of persistence with an unrestricted mereological account of composition -- meets this desideratum, endurantist accounts do not. If endurantists reject unrestricted composition then they must hold that vagueness is ontological. But if they embrace (...)
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  29.  19
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (forthcoming). On Time and the Varieties of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science.
    This paper proffers an account of why interdisciplinary research on, inter alia, the nature of time can be fruitful even if the disciplines in question have different explanatory pro-jects. We suggest that the special sciences perform a subject setting role for lower-level disciplines such as physics. In essence, they tell us where, amongst a theory of the physical world, we should expect to locate phenomena such as temporality; they tell us what it would take for there to be time. Physical (...)
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  30.  51
    Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller (2015). What is Temporal Error Theory? Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2427-2444.
    Much current debate in the metaphysics of time is between A-theorists and B-theorists. Central to this debate is the assumption that time exists and that the task of metaphysics is to catalogue time’s features. Relatively little consideration has been given to an error theory about time. Since there is very little extant work on temporal error theory the goal of this paper is simply to lay the groundwork to allow future discussion of the relative merits of such a view. The (...)
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  31.  30
    Kristie Lyn Miller (2014). Defending Substantivism About Disputes in the Metaphysics of Composition. Journal of Philosophy 111 (9/10):529-556.
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  32.  33
    Kristie Miller (2013). Times, Worlds and Locations. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):221-227.
    In ‘from times to worlds and back again: a transcendentist theory of persistence’ (henceforth TTP) Alessandro Giordani outlines five competitor views regarding the manner in which objects occupy regions along a dimension. These are: (1) classical uni-location (2) bare uni-location (3) multi-location (4) counterpart presence and (5) transcendent presence. Each view comes in both a temporal and modal version and Giordani argues that one ought to prefer transcendentism (i.e. 5) along both dimensions. According to temporal transcendentism, necessarily, no object is (...)
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  33.  10
    Kristie Miller (2016). Persisting Particulars and Their Properties. In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter 139-160.
    My present inclination is to say that both identity and relational analyses are intelligible hypotheses. I reject the identity analysis, looking rather to relations between different phases to secure the unity of a particular over time. But I do not think that the identity view can be rejected as illogical. If it is to be rejected, then I think it must be rejected for Occamist reasons. The different phases exist, and so do their relations. These phases so related, it seems, (...)
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  34. Roberto Ciuni, Giuliano Torrengo & Kristie Miller (eds.) (2013). New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism. Philosophia Verlag.
    The book is divided into three parts. The first, containing three papers, focuses on the characterization of the central tenets of previii sentism (by Neil McKinnon) and eternalism (by Samuel Baron and Kristie Miller), and on the ‘sceptical stance’ (by Ulrich Meyer), a view to the effect that there is no substantial difference between presentism and eternalism. The second and main section of the book contains three pairs of papers that bring the main problems with presentism to the fore and (...)
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  35. Kristie Miller (2010). On the Concept of Sexual Perversion. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):808-830.
    Why has little progress been made in resolving the debate about the concept of sexual perversion? I suggest that the stalemate is due to misunderstandings and poor methodology. I develop a new methodology for resolving disputes about the correct analysis of the contents of concepts where the disputes have social and political ramifications. When deciding between competing analyses of a concept, we should not just consider facts about our inferential and judgemental dispositions with respect to that concept; we should also (...)
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  36. Sam Baron, Peter Evans & Kristie Miller (2010). From Timeless Physical Theory to Timelessness. Humana.Mente 13:35-59.
    This paper addresses the extent to which both Julian Barbour‘s Machian formulation of general relativity and his interpretation of canonical quantum gravity can be called timeless. We differentiate two types of timelessness in Barbour‘s (1994a, 1994b and 1999c). We argue that Barbour‘s metaphysical contention that ours is a timeless world is crucially lacking an account of the essential features of time—an account of what features our world would need to have if it were to count as being one in which (...)
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  37.  92
    Kristie Miller (2008). Essential Stuff. Ratio 21 (1):55–63.
    Here is a common view. There exist things, and there exists stuff, where roughly, ‘thing’ is a count noun, and ‘stuff’ is a mass noun. Syntactically, ‘thing’ functions as a singular referring term that takes ‘a’ and ‘every’ and is subject to pluralisation, while ‘stuff’ functions as a plural referring term that takes ‘some’ and is not subject to pluralisation. Hence there exists a thing, and some stuff. Usual versions of the common view endorse two principles about portions of stuff. (...)
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  38.  32
    Kristie Miller (2006). Non-Mereological Universalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):404–422.
    In this paper I develop a version of universalism that is non-mereological. Broadly speaking, non-mereological universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary set of objects and times, there is a persisting object which, at each of those times, will be constituted by those of the objects that exist at that time. I consider two general versions of non-mereological universalism, one which takes basic simples to be enduring objects, and the other which takes simples to be instantaneous objects. This yields (...)
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  39. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). The Loneliness of Stages. Analysis 64 (3):235–242.
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  40. Kristie Miller (2004). The Twins’ Paradox and Temporal Passage. Analysis 64 (283):203–206.
    In a recent paper in this journal, McCall and Lowe (2003) argue that an understanding of Special Relativity reveals that the A theorist’s notion of temporal passage is consistent with the B theory of time. They arrive at this conclusion by considering the twins’ paradox, where one of two twins (T) travels to Alpha Centauri and back and upon her return has aged 30 years, while her earth-bound twin (S) has aged 40 years. This paper argues that their account of (...)
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  41.  51
    Kristie Miller & Michael Duncan (2015). Modal Persistence and Modal Travel. Ratio 28 (3):241-255.
    We argue that there is an interesting modal analogue of temporal persistence, namely modal persistence, and an interesting modal analogue of time travel, namely modal travel. We explicate each of these notions and then argue that there are plausible conditions under which some ordinary objects modally persist. We go on to consider whether it is plausible that any modally persistent objects also modally travel.
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  42.  25
    Kristie Miller (2009). Stuff. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):1 - 18.
    Linguistically, we distinguish between thing terms and stuff terms, where, roughly, "thing" is a count noun, and "stuff" is a mass noun. Syntactically, "thing" functions as a singular referring term, that is, a term that refers to a single "entity" and hence takes "a" and "every" and is subject to pluralization, while "stuff" functions as a plural referring term, that is, it refers to a plurality of "entities" and hence takes "some" and is not subject to pluralization. There exists a (...)
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  43.  44
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499-534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will (...)
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  44.  37
    Kristie Miller (2010). Travelling in Time. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):309-334.
    It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents (...)
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  45.  69
    Kristie Miller (2007). Immaterial Beings. The Monist 90 (3):349-371.
    This paper defends a view that falls somewhere between the two extremes of inflationary and deflationary accounts, and it does so by rejecting the initial conceptualisation of holes in terms of absences. Once we move away from this conception, I argue, we can see that there are no special metaphysical problems associated with holes. Rather, whatever one’s preferred metaphysics of paradigm material objects, that account can equally be applied to holes. This means that like the deflationist, I am entity monist: (...)
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  46.  43
    Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence. Topoi 34 (1):201-216.
    This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (...)
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  47. Kristie Miller (2008). Thing and Object. Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89.
    There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.
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  48.  16
    Kristie Miller (2009). Decifrare il convenzionalismo dell'identità personale. Rivista di Estetica 49 (41):59-83.
    Conventionalism’ about personal-identity is an umbrella term for a cluster of views. All these views accept the core idea that conventions, or what are often known as person-directed practices, are crucially involved in the identity of persons over time, and that had those conventions or practices been different, the individuation and persistence conditions of persons would have been different.The purpose of this paper is not to argue for conventionalism broadly understood, nor for any particular version of conventionalism. That is a (...)
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  49.  22
    Kristie Miller (2010). The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency. Erkenntnis 73 (2):211 - 235.
    There is a good deal of disagreement about composition. There is firstorder disagreement: there are radically different answers to the special composition question—the question of under what circumstances the xs compose a y. There is second-order disagreement: there are different answers to the question of whether first-order disagreement is real or merely semantic. Virtually all disputants with respect to both the first-and second-order issues agree that the answer or answers to the special composition question will take the form of a (...)
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    Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person-directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in part (...)
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