In the paper the author explores the question ‘Did Wittgenstein (re)invent emoticons?’ in three sub-questions. What did he draw and for which purposes? What are emoticons? Are there similarities and differences between his drawings and emoticons? The answers are following. Wittgenstein has drawn faces from the 1930s to the 1940s which are graphically and by use like emoticons. He presented a philosophical problem of interpretation of faces. Emoticons as made of written and typed punctuation marks or as drawings were invented (...) and used centuries before the 1930s, but common and popular use started in the 1960s. Previous inventions were probably unknown to Wittgenstein, and his faces probably didn’t influence later inventions. His faces and emoticons are graphically similar and made with the similar purposes. Differences are that he only used drawings and never written or typed punctuation marks, and he used them to deal with problems of emotions and perception (similar to his problems of the duck-rabbit head). These answers are connected to available textual and interpretative evidence, interpretations are given in propositions from (a) to (p), and summarized in the conclusion (r). Some consequences of visual thinking on philosophical thinking are also drawn in terms of a future research. (shrink)

In the text the author tries to investigate Wittgenstein’s notions of action, practice and pragmatism in his book On Certainty. An attempt is made to sketch the criterion of Wittgenstein’s analysis of certainty and to define the crucial concepts such as world-picture, practice, certainty and justification. The analysis shows that Wittgenstein applies a specific form of pragmatic solution to the problem of justification, which after all, can and should be called a kind of pragmatismus. This is the subject of the (...) first and the second part of the text. The third part shows the application of this pragmatic theory of justification to Wittgenstein’s refutation of scepticism. The author suggests that his pragmatic analysis of certainty presents an adequate means for the refutation of scepticism. However, his anti-scepticism is situated in the tradition of common sense and ordinary language philosophy and epistemology (Moore, Chisholm, Lehrer, Austin, Grice, Strawson, etc.). In the conclusion the author applies this anti-sceptical solution to the so called rule-following problem (as stated in Kripke’s work) and shows that there are some far reaching consequences of this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later work to his position on language, learning, ontology and knowledge. (shrink)

In the paper, the author analyzes and compares cube examples in Wittgenstein’s works, especially the cube from TLP and the cube from PPF. There is no direct evidence that the PPF–cube is a reaction to the “grave mistake” of the TLP–cube. Also, there is no evidence that the TLP–cube is a representation of the Necker’s cube, although it resembles the Jastrow’s cube. These are negative results. Both cubes present important ideas of TLP and PPF. Also, Wittgenstein writes that he “purposely (...) chose” the example of the cube in PI and PPF, perhaps to show one of the “grave mistakes” of the TLP–cube. By analysis of the Necker’s cube and comparison of drawings and accompanied text of the TLP–cube and the PPF–cube the author tries to explicate some possible implicit pictorial aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought and of the general nature philosophical thinking as pictorial. (shrink)

U tekstu autor nastoji istražiti Wittgensteinove pojmove djelovanja, prakse i pragmatizma iz njegove knjige O izvjesnosti. Nastoji se ocrtati kriterij Wittgensteinove analize izvjesnosti i definirati ključne pojmove poput slike svijeta, prakse, izvjesnosti i opravdanja. Analiza pokazuje da Wittgenstein primjenjuje specifičan oblik pragmatičnoga rješenja problema opravdanja, koji se na kraju krajeva može i treba nazvati nekom vrstom pragmatizma. To je predmet prvog i drugog dijela teksta. U trećemu se dijelu pokazuje primjena ove pragmatične teorije opravdanja na Wittgensteinovo opovrgavanje skepticizma. Autor sugerira (...) da je njegova pragmatična analiza izvjesnosti prikladno sredstvo za opovrgavanje skepticizma. Međutim, njegov je antiskepticizam smješten u tradiciju filozofije i epistemologije zdravoga razuma i običnoga jezika . U zaključku autor primjenjuje ovo antiskeptičko rješenje na tzv. problem slijeđenja pravila i pokazuje da postoje dalekosežne posljedice ove interpretacije Wittgensteinova kasnog djela na njegova shvaćanja jezika, učenja, ontologije i znanja.In the text the author tries to investigate Wittgenstein’s notions of action, practice and pragmatism in his book On Certainty. An attempt is made to sketch the criterion of Wittgenstein’s analysis of certainty and to define the crucial concepts such as world-picture, practice, certainty and justification. The analysis shows that Wittgenstein applies a specific form of pragmatic solution to the problem of justification, which after all, can and should be called a kind of pragmatismus. This is the subject of the first and the second part of the text. The third part shows the application of this pragmatic theory of justification to Wittgenstein’s refutation of scepticism. The author suggests that his pragmatic analysis of certainty presents an adequate means for the refutation of scepticism. However, his anti-scepticism is situated in the tradition of common sense and ordinary language philosophy and epistemology . In the conclusion the author applies this anti-sceptical solution to the so called rule-following problem and shows that there are some far reaching consequences of this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later work to his position on language, learning, ontology and knowledge. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil der Abhandlung wird Wittgenstein als Morphologe untersucht. Die Verfasser erläutern einige wichtige Begriffe Wittgensteins als Illustrierung seiner Methode und liefern Eckdaten zu Autoren, von denen Wittgenstein in dieser Hinsicht beeinflusst wurde . Des Weiteren werden bestimmte Passagen aus Wittgensteins Schriften sowie aus Kommentaren zusammengefasst, die sich auf seine morphologische Methode und ihre Umsetzung beziehen. Es ist das Hauptziel dieses Artikels, die Textstellen in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen und in seinen Bemerkungen zu Frazers The Golden Bough zu kommentieren. Ihre (...) Darstellung ist eine begriffliche Untersuchung zur Ermittlung von Ähnlichkeiten und Analogien zwischen zahlreichen, auf den ersten Blick völlig unterschiedlichen und unzusammenhängenden Fällen , wodurch im Grunde die Morphologie als Methode erst deutlich gemacht wird. Im zweiten Teil der Abhandlung wird Wittgenstein als Morphologe untersucht. Die Verfasser erörtern den Charakter der Morphologie im Hinblick auf Grammatik, Brauchtum und Institutionen und versuchen, die Vor- und Nachteile der Morphologie bezüglich der zum Einsatz kommenden philosophischen Untersuchungsmethode zu erhellen. Die Würdigung der Rolle der Morphologie trägt zum besseren Verständnis des späten Wittgenstein bei. Der Leser erhält so eine klare Vorstellung der Philosophischen Untersuchungen . Die Verfasser der Abhandlung versuchen außerdem einigen wichtigen Beanstandungen der morphologischen Methode zu begegnen und verweisen auf Textstellen in den Schriften Wittgensteins. Morphologisch wichtig ist die Art und Weise, wie sprachliche Phänomene organisiert sind, wichtig ist ihr Organisationsmuster, das man sehen muss, um es verstehen zu können. Des Weiteren gilt es, den Begriff Morphologie selbst zu differenzieren: Es ist zu unterscheiden zwischen einer Morphologie als Methode und einer Morphologie als Struktur oder Organisation, wenn ein sprachliches Phänomen erläutert wird. (shrink)

Dans la première partie, les auteurs étudient Wittgenstein en tant que morphologue. Ils expliquent son concept de vue synoptique et de connexions et offrent quelques notes sur les auteurs l’ayant influencé . En outre, les auteurs résument certains points chez Wittgenstein ainsi que certains commentaires à propos de sa méthode morphologique et de son application. L’objectif est de commenter les Investigations philosophiques : 122 et les Remarques sur Le Rameau d’or de Frazer : 133 ; la présentation, claire et compréhensible, (...) semble être une étude conceptuelle qui consiste à trouver des similitudes et des analogies parmi de nombreux cas différents et d’apparence disparate, ce qui désigne la morphologie comme une méthode. Dans la deuxième partie, les auteurs étudient Wittgenstein en tant que morphologue. Ils débattent de la nature de la morphologie à l’égard de la grammaire ou des institutions, et tentent de formuler ses avantages et ses inconvénients par rapport à la méthode de recherche philosophique. La reconnaissance du rôle de la morphologie nous aide à mieux comprendre la phase tardive de Wittgenstein. Ceci offre un aperçu clair, du moins de certaines parties, des Investigations philosophiques. Les auteurs tentent également, en citant Wittgenstein, d’en finir avec certaines objections importantes à la méthode morphologique. Ce qui est important du point de vue morphologique est l’organisation des phénomènes et leur modèle qui doit être vu afin d’être compris. On peut distinguer la morphologie comme méthode de la morphologie comme structure et organisation, lorsqu’elle s’explique à partir des phénomènes. (shrink)

U tekstu izlažemo rješenje razlike između Wittgensteinove uporabe modela u TLP i modeliranja u PI, RFM i OC temeljem analize razlike u izboru samih riječi i opisa pojmova fenomena u njegovim napomenama. Metoda je pojmovna analiza Wittgensteinova tretiranja znanstvenih modela i modeliranja. Dodatno, tekstualna raščlamba i poredba korištena je pri istraživanju njegovih glavnih napomena na tu temu. Ako je otkrivena razlika između modela i modeliranja i kontinuitet ovisnosti oba pojma o pojmu slike, pri čemu je razlika slike i oslikavanja uzeta (...) kao zadana, zaključujemo kako je Wittgenstein svoj stari pojam modela nastojao inkorporirati u novi pojam modeliranja. Eksplicirana razlika i inkorporiranje pridonosi pojašnjenju teme Wittgensteinovog posrednog i neposrednog utjecaja na filozofiju znanosti. (shrink)

In the 1st part authors investigate Wittgenstein as the morphologist. They explicate his notion of overview and seeing connections as his description of the method and they also make a few notes on authors which influenced him on this matter . Besides that they summarise some places from Wittgenstein and commentaries regarding his morphological method and some of the obvious applications of it. The main goal is to comment on PI: 122 and GB: 133. Perspicuous presentation seems to be a (...) conceptual investigation which consists in finding similarities and analogies between many and at first glance completely different and disconnected cases which is in fact morphology as a method. In the 2nd part authors investigate Wittgenstein as the morphologist. They discuss the nature of morphology regarding grammar, customs and institutions and try to make sense of advantages and disadvantages of morphology regarding the method of philosophical inquiry. Acknowledging the role of morphology helps us to better understand the later Wittgenstein. It gives us perspicuous presentation of of PI. In the paper they also try to come up with an answer to few important objections to the morphological method by quoting Wittgenstein. That which is morphologically important is organisation of phenomena, their pattern which should be seen in order to be understood. There is also the distinction within the notion of morphology, namely morphology as a method, when it is applied and the morphology as a structure or organisation, when it is explicated from the phenomena. (shrink)

In the paper authors present, examine, and test elements of the vital idea of the philosophical morphology as a method and a technique of philosophical investigation. The paper consists of some applications mostly concerning the method applied by L. Wittgenstein in PI and related later works, and of a series of examples concerning daily phenomena. In the first part the philosophical morphology is explicated as a method, and in the second and in the third part basic “commandments” of morphological technique (...) are described and examined, namely the first one – which says that one should “look-at exhaustively”, and the second one – which says that one should “see-as and describe synoptically”. In these parts some objections and replies to crucial morphological ideas are provided and accompanied with examples. (shrink)